Why won't the Kremlin agree to a compromise in Ukraine? The answer lies in Putin's motives. Initially, it may have been imperialism and a desire to control Ukraine. That was bad enough, and difficult enough to stop. But after the full-scale invasion began, the motives changed.
The reason is that the Ukrainian military exposed the weakness of Putin's regime. Russia was humiliated on the world stage. Since then, it is not about domination: Putin needs to destroy Ukraine and humiliate the West because they openly challenged him and exposed his weakness.
Putin can't let Ukraine get away with this. Throughout his time in power, he has carefully cultivated a reputation for destroying and humiliating those who openly challenge him. Crucially, this destruction must be a spectacle, shocking and demoralizing. Saving face is not enough.
Long-time observers of Russian domestic politics know how important this reputation is to Putin's grip on power. Navalny was supposed to die a spectacular and painful death on a plane, but survived through luck and FSB incompetence. Prigozhin's execution was similarly theatrical.
This explains why almost all experts on Russian domestic politics don't believe in the possibility of a negotiated settlement and are pushing for more support for Ukraine. They have become familiar with Putin's trademark cruelty over the years.
Discussions of "negotiated settlements" are mostly conducted by international relations (or "geopolitics") experts who don't have a strong background in Russian domestic affairs. They focus on the first motive: Russia's imperialism and desire to dominate Europe.
But since the Kremlin's motives have evolved from domination to the complete destruction of Ukraine within days after 2/24/2022, there is no room for compromise. On the contrary: For Putin, it is crucial that there never be the slightest hint of compromise with Ukraine.
(PS: I haven't mentioned the experts who still talk about Russian security interests in the context of the Ukraine war because I find it hard to take them seriously at this point.)
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Don't expect a ceasefire in Ukraine: Russia will not agree to it - yet. Putin knows that the war is his biggest asset. As soon as he agrees to a ceasefire, he will lose all his leverage. Trump will celebrate and then lose interest. Violating "Trump's" ceasefire later on is risky.
A ceasefire will be the last thing Putin agrees to, after he has secured (not in writing, but in reality) everything he wants: Regime change in Kyiv, recognition of new borders, crippling Ukrainian military, roll-back of NATO troops from the Eastern Flank and a few more things.
The "problem" is that Trump cannot give Putin what he wants, because he does not control it alone. He needs EU and Kyiv to play along, and they won't. Seeing this problem, Putin is already demanding that Trump has to put more pressure on Europe. But this is unlikely to work.
Many Russian regions are offering huge sign-on bonuses to find more recruits for the war in Ukraine.
It seems to be working: I analyzed regional budget spending on bonuses for over 20 Russian regions and - while noisy - the data says that recruitment in Russia is accelerating.
The regions I analyzed are just a small part of Russia, but they are very diverse and from different parts of the country, and they tell a similar story (which may not be that surprising): Offering millions of rubles attracts more recruits.
One particularly interesting (very preliminary) finding of the analysis is that the rate of recruitment in most regions is proportional to the region's population size, be it rich or poor, large or small, ethnic or non-ethnic, industrial, rural or urban regions.
The newest sanctions on Russian energy are nothing less than a paradigm change: For the first time, the goal is to cut Russian export volumes. Before, the goal was to make oil exports less profitable for Russia, but to keep the volumes intact.
The US did not just target any export volume, but made sure to hit Russia's most profitable export routes the hardest: Oil from Russia's Pacific ports had a small discount and low shipping costs, making it much more profitable then exports from the Baltic/Black Sea to India.
It also makes a lot of sense to go after those tankers that are the most specialized and the hardest to replace.
Overall, the measures look well thought through and will reduce Russian revenues, both in the budget and in the trade balance.
Great text: Bitcoin is a fascinating Ponzi-like / pyramid scheme. More and more people jump on the bandwagon, hoping to profit. Early adopters get rich. Late adopters now hope that governments will create "reserves", i.e. join the Ponzi scheme, to keep the party going...
Bitcoin doesn't appear to be a Ponzi scheme - because there is no Ponzi! The system is decentralized. In the early years of Bitcoin, there was a lot of talk of possible use cases of Bitcoin. That has almost disappeared, now it is just the hope of the value going up up up.
Companies like Microstrategy have even managed to create small pyramids within the larger Bitcoin pyramid. It goes without saying that no government should ever participate in a pyramid scheme. It should never bail out gamblers with taxpayers' money.
A few notes on Sam Charap's latest article: Charap and I have a fundamentally different views of Russia, Putin's interests and goals, and the history of the war in Ukraine. I still like to check where exactly the disagreements materialize in the arguments and the conclusions.
It is not difficult to find interpretations in the text that I violently disagree with: For example: that the Istanbul negotiations were anywhere close to ending the war. The re-framing of the process as "almost successful" initally began in conspirational corners of the debate.
The point of the story was to blame the West for the war - esp. Biden and Johnson - and to portray Russia as willing to compromise. Since 2023, Putin has been promoting it. One member of the Ukrainian delegation also keeps confirming it (Chalyi), but his case is complicated.
I really recommend this new report on #Russia's economy from CASE Center. The authors argue that the economy is much more resilient than commonly assumed. The conclusions are a bit too fatalistic in my view, but it is definitely worth reading. case-center.org/wp-content/upl…
The authors explain why - in their view - a lot of the earlier predictions for Russia's economy have not come true. It is not just an analysis "in hindsight": Already in March 2022, Dmitry Nekrasov wrote a forecast for Russia's economy that turned out to be very accurate.
Keep in mind that, at the time, even the Russian Central Bank and the Russian government were expecting a huge crisis in the Russian economy. It was the mainstream perspective, and Nekrasov contradicted it: telegra.ph/Ob-apokaliptic…