The key problem I have with this piece is the assumption that Putin agreed to, or even cared much for, the Istanbul Communique at the time. The authors seem to have their own doubts (Putin agreed to debate the status of Crimea with Ukraine?).
1/4

foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/talks-… The authors fail to point out that Putin didn't appear to be deeply involved in the process at the time and only began bringing up the supposed "almost deal" much later, with the rather obvious intention to discredit the West and improve his image with the Global South. 2/4

Although it will take many more attacks on refineries to create a real gasoline shortage in Russia (and even then, Belarus has available capacities), it is an effective strategy for many reasons:
1.) A gasoline shortage would be a political nightmare for Putin, because it would..

https://twitter.com/jakluge/status/1767814255573684253

.. be felt and discussed by everyone. Gasoline prices are political, even in Russia. Average Russians are not willing to pay a price for the war.
2.) Refineries are important for the military. Of course the military will not feel shortages, but refineries are legitimate targets.

Why won't the Kremlin agree to a compromise in Ukraine? The answer lies in Putin's motives. Initially, it may have been imperialism and a desire to control Ukraine. That was bad enough, and difficult enough to stop. But after the full-scale invasion began, the motives changed. The reason is that the Ukrainian military exposed the weakness of Putin's regime. Russia was humiliated on the world stage. Since then, it is not about domination: Putin needs to destroy Ukraine and humiliate the West because they openly challenged him and exposed his weakness.

There are two dominant arguments in the Western discourse on Russia's war against Ukraine:
1.) Russia is weaker than it seems, the war and Putinism will go away once Ukraine kicks Russia out.
2.) Russia is stronger than it seems, so some kind of deal with Russia is necessary. It is difficult to go beyond these lines of thought: If you point out Russian strength, there's an automatic suspicion that you want to porpose a deal with Russia, or that you're not loyal to the Ukrainian cause.

What are the effects of #sanctions on the opinions of Russians about the West and the war? There is a naïve pro-sanctions view: Sanctions lead to economic hardship which is then attributed to the war and leads to anti-war sentiment. This is certainly not happening. 1/ There is also a naïve anti-sanctions view: Sanctions lead to economic hardship, which is attributed to the West's hostility and leads to a "rally-round-the-flag" effect and stronger support for Putin. This is also not happening. 2/

Can Vladimir Putin drag the world into the abyss of West-China escalation? Maybe. The secret to Putin's long-term survival in power is his skill in taking everybody hostage. He excels in creating settings in which you go down if he goes down, if you like him or hate him. 1/ He did it in Russia, in Russia's neighbourhood, with many in the West, and he is of course also trying to do it with Xi Jinping. Putin's tactic should not be confused with actual "madman" behaviour. Putin will not choose nuclear armageddon. It is calculated and rational. 2/

Great thread by @AlexGabuev, the best source on everything related to Russia-China! The way the use of the yuan has increased in #Russia over the last year really is remarkable. I still wonder how far it can grow from here, and if it is a local or a global phenomenon. 1/

https://twitter.com/AlexGabuev/status/1636074487807463424

Let's look at what the yuan can and cannot offer to Russia.

1.) Yuan is a store of value with low sanctions risk. Yuan has become the most important element in Russian foreign exchange reserves. Russia does not have any alternative if it wants to implement its budget rule. 2/

How are Russians sending money abroad? Raiffeisen has become the most important channel. On OhMySwift.ru, Russians are reporting about their experiences with wire transfers abroad (~4700 datasets), the picture is pretty clear. Here are recent transfers to Germany: 1/ You can also order entries by bank, which is conclusive in the case of recently sanctioned Tinkoff: It stopped working, except for one yuan transfer to Hongkong. 2/

China's Huawei and Russia post 2022: It's complicated. Overall, Huawei tries to respect Western sanctions and is retreating from Russia in crucial areas. It is not delivering network equipment to Russia, which is painful for Moscow. It has closed down offices and sales points.1/6 Huawei has banned Russian MIR cards from its "Huawei Pay" in Russia, an Apple/Google Pay alternative. It has also kicked out the apps of sanctioned Russian banks from AppGallery, its App Store alternative, and is compelling app developers to follow Western sanctions. 2/6

#Russia has become much more dependent on #China as a result of war and #sanctions. This is about shifting trade volumes, but also the changing character of economic cooperation: It increasingly resembles the classic relationship of a petrostate with a modern economy. 1/ Most of the signature projects of the Russia-China economic partnership since 2014 have failed. Highspeed railway between Moscow and Kazan? Cancelled. The Russian-Chinese long-range airliner CR929? Practically dead. Russian 5G networks with Huawei technology? Nowhere in sight. 2/

Ein kurzer 📺🧵 zur Frage von Friedensverhandlungen und Auswegen aus dem Krieg (Sendung StudioM, Link ganz unten).

1.) Zum "Manifest für Frieden": 2.) Zum Vorschlag "Land für Frieden":

1) New data on Russia's federal #budget in February is out. Some normalization after a high January deficit was expected, but the opposite happened. The deficit grew to 2.6 tn RUB, 1.7% of GDP after two months. Revenues in February 2023 were 1.8 tn RUB, expenditure 2.6 tn RUB. 2) Last year around this time, the Russian budget was firmly in positive territory. The January 2023 deficit was clearly not representative, but an additional deficit of 800 billion RUB in February shows it's not a one-off phenomenon.

Great and sober interview with Russian economist Oleg Vyugin (ex Minfin/CBR). Main points below.
business-gazeta.ru/article/584961 1.) Sanctions did not work immediately 100%, because Russia was able to export so much. The West needed Russian oil to stay on the world market to keep prices from rising.
2.) Russian businesses were able to reestablish supply chains quicker than expected.

This is unfortunately a very simplistic, incomplete and distorted description of what happened between Russia, Ukraine and NATO/EU in the last years.

theguardian.com/commentisfree/… One missing aspect is domestic change in Russia. There was a continuous process if increasing radicalisation of Putin, both in domestic and foreign policy. The only exception were arguably the Medvedev years. Putin has contributed more to his own growing resentment than the West.

#Russia announced it will cut #oil production (read: #sanctions affect oil exports) by around 0.5m barrels per day. The result is higher oil prices and lower export volumes. Will Russia earn more or less as a result? It depends on elasticities and Russia's market share. 1/4 Russia's share in world oil markets is roughly 10%. To compensate for lower exports, i.e. total revenue of all oil producers needs to rise 10x the value of the 0.5m barrels lost volume. This would mean a low price elasticity of demand of -0.1 if supply/reserves are stable. 2/4

Das Problem ist noch ein anderes als ich heute morgen dachte (danke an die Hinweise in den Kommentaren). Der Chart bleibt Quatsch, aber aus anderen Gründen. Hier erstmal die Entwicklung des iranischen BIP nach Kaufkraftparität in Dollars. Man sieht den Einbruch wg. Sanktionen.1/5

https://twitter.com/jakluge/status/1623580908098842625

Wie kommt das bombastische Wachstum auf dem Steingart/Statista/IWF-Chart zustande? Die Ursache ist der zugrunde liegende "offizielle" Wechselkurs. Der hat nichts mit dem (Markt-) Wert der iranischen Währung zu tun sondern ist an den Dollar gekoppelt. 2/5

In the first half of 2022, more people were leaving Russia than arriving, which is very unusual and clearly related to the war. Since July, Russia is registering net migration inflow again. 1/3 In total, Russia registered a net migration outflow for 1-10/2022. Russia's population was shrinking, but mostly due to a massive increase of deaths from Covid-19 and a negative impact of demography. Fallen soldiers would be a visible, but minor component in the deaths bar.2/3

How are Russians transferring payments and goods to and from #Russia under #sanctions? Countries like Kazakhstan, Armenia & Georgia play a key role, but also remaining Western banks, especially (most likely) Raiffeisen Bank. A few examples from a recent BFM article. 1/ Russians can get Armenian Visa and Mastercards to e.g. pay for Western internet services. They transfer rubles from Russian MIR cards to an Armenian MIR-connected card, and from there send it to their Armenian Visa/Mastercard (converted to dollars) and use it from Russia. 2/

The big #sanctions strategy shift: In the first months of the Russian invasion, sanctions were mainly targeted at making it hard for Russia to import. This was achieved by
- Western export controls
- side-effects of financial sanctions
- international companies leaving Russia. 1/ In early 2022, it was very difficult to cut off Russian export revenues immediately due to Western dependency on oil and global post-covid energy scarcity. Russia received obscene amounts of dollars and euros. It could afford anything that was available for importing. 2/

#Russia's budget in November 2022: Revenues rose, largely thanks to #Gazprom, which contributed ~1 trillion rubles in dividends and one-time tax on excess earnings in November. This led to a surplus, meaning that the budget is still not officially in a deficit. 1/7 #Gazprom "earned" the windfall revenue by exploiting its market power in the EU, a massive abuse that should lead to dozens of billions of euros in fines (prohibiting any market return). Without Gazprom's contribution, the negative trend in the budget becomes clear. 2/7

Russian oil&gas #budget revenues fell to a new 2-year low in November, actually below 450 billion RUB, but the result is obsucred by an one-time tax on Gazprom (paid in three tranches Oct/Nov/Dec). October was already pretty bad, but a quarterly tax payment made it look better. To clarify - here are the key production tax revenues: