Why Russia mobilizes contract soldiers with money, even if the costs for the budget are enormous. (1/3)

New data on Russian recruitment: Around 200,000 men signed a contract in the first half of 2025. Dmitry Medvedev claims the number is 210,000 - my latest estimated based on regional budget data indicates 191,000. By now, I'm pretty confident that my recruitment estimates based on regional budget data are useful. Over the last 1.5 years, they closely tracked the quarterly results based on federal data (which is always published with a big delay).

The discussion about European peacekeepers is deeply dishonest. Is the idea to sneak them in while Russia is not looking? Hoping that Russia will be afraid to attack them afterwards? Should we get Putin drunk so he agrees to the deployment and when he sobers up it is too late?

https://twitter.com/HoansSolo/status/1901914418436526095

If anything, these peacekeepers will be an invitation for Russia to test Europeans by attacking them in Ukraine. Are European societies ready to see thousands of their soldiers dying there? Because Putin certainly would be willing to sacrifice his people to expose Europe.

The current situation: Russia is exploring what it can get from Trump. The minimum it would want for a ceasefire is control over Ukraine, i.e. some form of surrender by Kyiv. This could take a number of forms: a new Russian-controlled president, restrictions on Ukraine's army... Although the US position has diverged from Europe's, it is still far from Russia's. At least some in the US administration believe that Ukraine could remain independent after a deal, or that the Europeans could send in troops. Both are non-starters for Moscow.

Don't expect a ceasefire in Ukraine: Russia will not agree to it - yet. Putin knows that the war is his biggest asset. As soon as he agrees to a ceasefire, he will lose all his leverage. Trump will celebrate and then lose interest. Violating "Trump's" ceasefire later on is risky. A ceasefire will be the last thing Putin agrees to, after he has secured (not in writing, but in reality) everything he wants: Regime change in Kyiv, recognition of new borders, crippling Ukrainian military, roll-back of NATO troops from the Eastern Flank and a few more things.

Many Russian regions are offering huge sign-on bonuses to find more recruits for the war in Ukraine.

It seems to be working: I analyzed regional budget spending on bonuses for over 20 Russian regions and - while noisy - the data says that recruitment in Russia is accelerating. The regions I analyzed are just a small part of Russia, but they are very diverse and from different parts of the country, and they tell a similar story (which may not be that surprising): Offering millions of rubles attracts more recruits.

The newest sanctions on Russian energy are nothing less than a paradigm change: For the first time, the goal is to cut Russian export volumes. Before, the goal was to make oil exports less profitable for Russia, but to keep the volumes intact. The US did not just target any export volume, but made sure to hit Russia's most profitable export routes the hardest: Oil from Russia's Pacific ports had a small discount and low shipping costs, making it much more profitable then exports from the Baltic/Black Sea to India.

Great text: Bitcoin is a fascinating Ponzi-like / pyramid scheme. More and more people jump on the bandwagon, hoping to profit. Early adopters get rich. Late adopters now hope that governments will create "reserves", i.e. join the Ponzi scheme, to keep the party going...

https://twitter.com/jp_koning/status/1870107164913873231

Bitcoin doesn't appear to be a Ponzi scheme - because there is no Ponzi! The system is decentralized. In the early years of Bitcoin, there was a lot of talk of possible use cases of Bitcoin. That has almost disappeared, now it is just the hope of the value going up up up.

A few notes on Sam Charap's latest article: Charap and I have a fundamentally different views of Russia, Putin's interests and goals, and the history of the war in Ukraine. I still like to check where exactly the disagreements materialize in the arguments and the conclusions. It is not difficult to find interpretations in the text that I violently disagree with: For example: that the Istanbul negotiations were anywhere close to ending the war. The re-framing of the process as "almost successful" initally began in conspirational corners of the debate.

I really recommend this new report on #Russia's economy from CASE Center. The authors argue that the economy is much more resilient than commonly assumed. The conclusions are a bit too fatalistic in my view, but it is definitely worth reading. case-center.org/wp-content/upl… The authors explain why - in their view - a lot of the earlier predictions for Russia's economy have not come true. It is not just an analysis "in hindsight": Already in March 2022, Dmitry Nekrasov wrote a forecast for Russia's economy that turned out to be very accurate.

More Russian voices push back against the idea of a ceasefire in Ukraine. Not surprisingly, Russia has zero interest in ending the war before it has defeated Ukraine. Apparently, ceasefires only existed in some Western dreams.

https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/status/1854552763549499472

Similarly, Trenin says Russia is first and foremost interested in "the character of Ukraine's future regime and military potential".
kommersant.ru/doc/7283219

Es gibt keinerlei Anzeichen dafür, dass es in der Ukraine in absehbarer Zeit Frieden geben könnte. Dass hierzulande so viel darüber gesprochen wird, zeigt nur den Realitätsverlust und Anmaßung der deutschen Debatte. Wir können den Krieg nicht von oben "befrieden". Wir können den Ausgang das Krieges nur durch unsere Ukraine-Unterstützung beeinflussen (und ein stückweit über Sanktionen). Wir können aber nichts dirigieren oder erzwingen, und auch der globale Süden wird uns nicht aushelfen (wollen oder können).

For the past two years, it often seemed like sanctions could not hurt Russia. The Russian economy was on a massive sugar high, fueled by booming energy markets. But now things are changing. Russia's struggling coal industry is the best example. After two crazy years, world market prices for coal have returned to something closer to normal. Suddenly it turns out that Russian coal can no longer break even at these more normal market prices. What happened? tradingeconomics.com/commodity/coal

The average regional signing bonus for Russian soldiers is 596k rubles, it more than tripled from the beginning of the year. The average total bonus increased from 363k to 996k. But can the increase change people's minds about fighting in Ukraine?

storage.googleapis.com/istories/stori…
When you enlist in the Russian military, your family can expect three different types of payments over the course of your (often literally short-lived) career:
- Signing bonus
- Monthly pay
- Compensation for death/injury.

How do sanctions affect the war in Ukraine? The simplistic explanation that "Russia is running out of money" is not wrong, but it is also not quite right. To understand the impact of sanctions, it helps to think of Russia's trade with the outside world as a big machine. 1/5 On one side of this machine, Russia puts in oil, metals, grain etc, and on the other side, this machine puts out computer chips, cars, and machinery. Sanctions sabotage this "trade machine" in many ways. As a result, Russia has to put in more barrels of oil to make it work. 2/5

Russia apparently cannot find enough men for its military. Today Putin doubled the federal signing bonus from 195,000 to 400,000 rubles. The regions are supposed to add at least 400,000. Many regions pay much more. 1/4
kommersant.ru/doc/6864822?fr…
In some places, the total signing bonus will buy you an apartment. Signing bonuses make up a significant part of the budget: Russia claims it mobilizes 100k soldiers in 3-4 months. If we assume total bonus is 1 mio, this is 400 billion rubles (4.5 billion dollars) per year. 2/4

When Russia started its full-scale invasion, it had three major resources:
1.) Huge stocks of old weapons
2.) Poor & unemployed men
3.) Super solid finances
This has allowed Putin to fight a big war while keeping most Russians in their comfort zone: Lots of guns AND butter. 1/5

https://twitter.com/verekerrichard1/status/1814284243465368063

All three are not limitless, and the economic consequence of that is inflation. Inflation is the result of urgently ramping up military production, pulling men from the labor market and sending them to the front, and from weakening trade and fiscal balances. 2/5

The West needs to rethink sanctions and move from ad hoc measures to long-term economic containment. Russia will remain a threat to Europe for many years to come. The future of European security depends on the future of Russian economic might. 1/
brookings.edu/wp-content/upl…
After two years of unprecedented sanctions, the Russian economy has exceeded expectations. Yes, sanctions have had a clear impact, but they leave Putin with enough resources to militarize Russia in the coming years and turn it into a conventional military threat to Europe. 2/

Ein sehr gutes und wichtiges Gespräch zum Thema "Verhandlungen und Einfrieren" von @AliceBota und @MichaelOThumann. Es geht um die alten Mythen der Russlandpolitik, die gerade durch Wagenknecht und Mützenich eine Renaissance erleben, aber auch um die Verhandlungen von 2022. 1/6 Der Text von Charap&Radchenko ist dabei ebenfalls Thema. Michael Thumann berichtet von seinen Gesprächen mit Unterhändlern in Istanbul. Alice Bota beobachtet gut, dass alle russischen Äußerungen von den Autoren des Textes (geradezu ahistorisch) für bare Münze genommen werden. 2/6

The key problem I have with this piece is the assumption that Putin agreed to, or even cared much for, the Istanbul Communique at the time. The authors seem to have their own doubts (Putin agreed to debate the status of Crimea with Ukraine?).
1/4

foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/talks-… The authors fail to point out that Putin didn't appear to be deeply involved in the process at the time and only began bringing up the supposed "almost deal" much later, with the rather obvious intention to discredit the West and improve his image with the Global South. 2/4

Although it will take many more attacks on refineries to create a real gasoline shortage in Russia (and even then, Belarus has available capacities), it is an effective strategy for many reasons:
1.) A gasoline shortage would be a political nightmare for Putin, because it would..

https://twitter.com/jakluge/status/1767814255573684253

.. be felt and discussed by everyone. Gasoline prices are political, even in Russia. Average Russians are not willing to pay a price for the war.
2.) Refineries are important for the military. Of course the military will not feel shortages, but refineries are legitimate targets.