Ekaterina Duntsova and Russian electoral dictatorship. A 🧵
1/
Ekaterina Duntsova is a local activist and journalist from Rzhev, a small town in central Russia known mostly for the gruesome WW2 battles that happened there.
2/
A few weeks ago she announced her candidacy for the March 2024 presidential election. Today, she was blocked from participating under some formal pretext.
3/
This is notable for two reasons. First: the operation of electoral authoritarianism.
4/
Elections in Russia have long been a joke, completely hollowed out by all kinds of fraud. And yet, the mighty Kremlin is afraid of a 40-year old local activist with zero national visibility. Afraid enough to block her from participating.
5/
This is very typical of electoral authoritarianism: extreme vulnerability to any kind of challenge, despite the weight of propaganda and repression.
If Putin is so popular, why is he so afraid of ANY competition not directly sanctioned by his presidential administration?
6/
The second thing: despite the decades of intensifying dictatorship and the departure of close to 1 million people since Feb 24, there are still people capable of participating in democratic politics - and willing to do so.
7/
Russian society has long been ready for democracy. It is very easy for me to imagine a vibrant democratic process in Russia, in the absence of the artificial handicap pulling everyone back.
8/
This is precisely why any kind of challenge, no matter how small, is met with crushing force by the Kremlin. Force is increasingly the only thing they can rely on.
9/
This is also why Putin is not interested in ending the war. His regime currently survives through de facto martial law introduced because of it.
10/
The failure and bankruptcy of Putinism have been glaringly obvious for a long time. It's a concrete block dragging the country down, forcing it to drown.
11/
Of course, as Charles Tilly once remarked, "violence works". The completely artificial nature of Putinism at this point does not mean that it is any easier to get rid of it.
12/
Moreover, Putin's chief objective now is to re-mold the Russian society, closing the gap between the public and the regime. The aggressive injection of propaganda in the school education is a case in point.
13/
Despite the broad (but shallow and superficial) support for the war, Putin is disappointed in the Russian society and wants to re-educate it in an essentially fascist gesture.
14/
I recognize that each of us can only make small steps to resist this tendency, but if tens of millions of people will take these steps, the process can be reversed and Putinism can be finally defeated.
15/
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
I feel like most of the debates about the resolution of the war in Ukraine miss the point. It's not about the occupied territories, NATO or security guarantees. It's about the future of the Ukrainian army.
A 🧵.
1/
Most people agree at this point that the liberation of all the occupied territories is unrealistic.
2/
However, the NATO issue refuses to go away. Ukraine will not be admitted to NATO for the simple reason that Russia's renewed aggression against Ukraine would mean a war between Russia and NATO.
3/
Fascinating how Putinist the so-called "Project 2025" is both in terms of ends and means.
Goals such as completely banning gender-affirming care and sexuality education: done and done in Russia.
Means: creating a parallel government to control the entire bureaucracy (President's Office of Management and Budget in the US case) - done! See Putin's Presidential Administration.
Recent staff changes at the top in Russia reveal Putin's thinking about his entourage. Essentially, he divides his people into three categories: experts on the Anglo-Saxon conspiracy, old heavyweights and guys actually capable of working ("technocrats").
1/
Putin's clear preference lies with the conspiracy experts, as he's become such an expert himself. He likes to talk to them and hang with them, discussing Russia's historic mission and Western perfidy.
2/
However, he realizes that such cadres should not be appointed to the positions that require real work. As much as he enjoys listening to them (or to himself through their speeches), he reserves positions of responsibility for the "technocrats"...
3/
I am devastated by the news from Moscow. The death toll is terrible. I will not speculate about the perpetrators. Nor will I tolerate gloating comments here.
One thing I will note though. After such an attack, one wants to know the truth - and this is precisely the thing the Russian authorities cannot deliver.
In 2017, a bomb blast killed 16 and wounded 87 in Saint-Petersburg metro. The remains of a suicide bomber, Akbarzhon Jalilov, were found on site.
Despite everything, there is a tendency in the West to see Russian "elections" as actual elections.
That is, Putin's "victory" is seen as reflecting genuine popular approval of the economic performance, military successes etc.
It just doesn't work this way in dictatorships.
1/
Syria's Assad "won" with 92% of the vote while the civil war was raging across most of the country. It wasn't even clear which territories "voted" in his "elections".
Tunisia's Ben Ali "won" with 90%. A year went by and he was ousted by a popular movement.
2/
It's not a problem for consolidated authoritarian regimes to stage an electoral spectacle with any result they like.
For instance, this time Putin decided to go the Central Asian way with an almost 90% result. Easy.
3/
You know what's especially ironic? As part of the "smart voting" strategy, Navalny called to vote for the second most popular candidate in single-seat elections across the country. That candidate was usually from... the Communist Party.
For Navalny and his team, this was a tactic in the conditions of electoral authoritarianism.
They understood full well it's impossible to replace the authorities with voting in Russia, but they believed one could make a dent in the regime's stability...
2/
...with a strategic voting campaign, combined with street protests and a media assault.
In effect, Navalny called to vote for hundreds of KPRF candidates across the country. For this, he got a lot of heat from Russia's die-hard anticommunist liberals.
3/