In the “Six Secret Teachings of Jiang Ziya” (one of the 7 Military Classics of ancient China) King Wu asks Jiang Ziya how others can assist the ruler in developing & implementing strategy. His answer is an interesting early conceptualization of the modern general staff system:
First is Fuxin (literally stomach and heart) An individual in charge of advising about secret plans for responding to sudden events; investigating Heaven so as to eliminate sudden change; exercising general supervision over all planning; and protecting the lives of the people.
Next five Planning Officers: A responsible for planning security and danger; anticipating the unforeseen; discussing performance and ability; making clear rewards and punishments; appointing officers; deciding the doubtful; and determining what is advisable and what is not.
Three Astrologers: responsible for the stars and calendar; observing the wind and qi, predicting auspicious days and times; investigating signs and phenomena; verifying disasters and abnormalities; and knowing Heaven's mind with regard to the moment for completion or abandonment.
Three Topographers: in charge of the army's disposition and strategic configuration of power when moving and stopped [and of] information on strategic advantages and disadvantages of land features so as not to lose the military benefit of the terrain.
Nine Strategists: : responsible for discussing divergent views; analyzing the probable success or failure of various operations; selecting the weapons and training men in their use; and identifying those who violate the ordinances.
Four Supply Officers: responsible for calculating the requirements for food and water; preparing the food stocks and supplies and transporting the provisions along the route; and supplying the five grains so as to ensure that the army will not suffer any hardship or shortage.
Four Officers for Flourishing Awesomeness: responsible for picking men of talent and strength; for discussing weapons and armor; for setting up attacks that race like the wind and strike like thunder so that [the enemy] does not know where they come from.
Three Secret Signals officers: responsible for the pennants and drums, for clearly signaling to the eyes and ears; for creating deceptive signs and seals and issuing false designations and orders; and for stealthily and hastily moving back and forth, going in and out like spirits
Four “Legs and Arms”: responsible for undertaking heavy duties and handling difficult tasks; for the repair and maintenance of ditches and moats; and for keeping the walls and ramparts in repair in order to defend against and repel [the enemy].
Two Liaison officers: responsible for gathering what has been lost and supplementing what is in error; receiving honored guests; holding discussions and talks; mitigating disasters; and resolving difficulties.
Three Officers of Authority: responsible for implementing the unorthodox and deceptive; for establishing the different and the unusual, things that people do not recognize; and for putting into effect inexhaustible transformations.
Seven “Ears and Eyes”: responsible for going about everywhere, listening to what people are saying; seeing the changes; and observing the officers in all four directions and the army's true situation.
Five “Claws and Teeth”: responsible for raising awesomeness and martial [spirit]; for stimulating and encouraging the Three Armies, causing them to risk hardship and attack the enemy's elite troops without ever having any doubts or second thoughts.
Four “Feathers and Wings”: responsible for flourishing the name and fame [of the army]; for shaking distant lands [with its image]; and for moving all within the four borders in order to weaken the enemy's spirit.
Eight Roving Officers: responsible for spying on [the enemy's] licentiousness and observing their changes; manipulating their emotions; and observing the enemy's thoughts in order to act as spies.
Two Officers of Techniques: responsible for spreading slander and falsehoods and for calling on ghosts and spirits in order to confuse the minds of the populace.
Three Officers of Prescriptions: in charge of the hundred medicines; managing blade wounds; and curing the various maladies.
Two Accountants: responsible for accounting for the provisions and foodstuffs within the Three Armies’ encampments and ramparts; for the fiscal materials employed; and for receipts and disbursements.
So next time you are in a joint HQ, attempt to determine who are the modern equivalents of “Claws and Teeth, “Eyes and Ears” or “Officers for Flourishing Awesomeness,” and ponder whether or not the ancient equivalent to DTS (“Accountants”) was any less capricious and infuriating.
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Michael Howard argued that when it comes to studying war, one must comprehensively approach it in terms of WIDTH, DEPTH, and CONTEXT. When it comes to Sun Tzu studies in the West, we tend to focus on the “width” of Sun Tzu’s text, but generally neglect both “depth” and “context.”
Ever since Sun Tzu first entered the West’s consciousness, we have mainly focused on situating it within Howard’s concept of WIDTH: “an observation of the way in which warfare has developed over a long historical period.” Most famously B.H. Liddell Hart, despite not having …
a deep understanding of ancient Chinese history or the difficulty inherent in its early writing system, confidently proclaimed that “Sun Tzu’s Art of War has never been surpassed in comprehensiveness … Sun Tzu has clearer vision, more profound insight, and eternal freshness.”
Ge Zhaoguang: “Early Chinese writing clearly shows that the ancient Chinese were used to the concrete rather than the abstract.”
This is similar to the case I make that the distinction between Sun Tzu’s advice to “win without FIGHTING” and “win without BATTLE” is important …
Ge notes that early Chinese writing lacked a general category term for agricultural products like the modern term “crops” (莊稼), so when referenced in early texts the authors would need to use the character for the specific type of crop being discussed: rice, millet, wheat, etc.
I argue a similar feature is found in early Chinese military texts. There was no commonly accepted term for the abstract concept of “fighting.” Instead, authors distinguished multiple terms used to describe concrete methods of fighting, of which there were many subtle variations.
Does the PLA subscribe to the Ends-Ways-Means concept of strategy? According to the latest version of the "Science of Military Strategy (2020)" they still use a similar framework with nearly identical terminology: Objectives (目标), Guidelines (方针) and Means (手段) …
Much like Lykke’s 3-legged stool remains the basis for defining strategy in western PME the 2020 SMS argues: “in terms of the essential characteristics and functions of strategy, the three elements are indispensable and should be considered the fundamental components of strategy”
As explained in the Science of Military Strategy, Strategic OBJECTIVES (战略目标) “primarily address the question of ‘what to do.’ Strategic objectives serve both as the starting point for formulating strategy and the endpoint for its implementation.”
PLA Assessment: "Although the U.S. military is equipped with sophisticated weaponry, it is extremely afraid of getting injured or killed ... Although the U.S. military won the Gulf War with relatively low casualties, due to the inherent nature of its bourgeois army, the fear of
casualties among its officers and soldiers is a weakness that will persist for a long time, especially when the U.S. military conducts large-scale aggressive wars overseas. This fear of casualties will intensify."
This article was written by a PLA officer, Zhang Youming, in 1991
What is interesting is that it was published in a 2023 book without any further analysis or updating the data based on the subsequent 30 years of U.S. military combat operation experience. The assumption that the U.S. fears casualties is a deeply rooted assumption within the PLA.
“During the civil war between Communists and the Kuomintang regime [Mao Zedong] sent aides into enemy territory to find a copy of [Sun Tzu’s Art of War].”
In an earlier article, I criticized the author of this book for perpetuating this fictitious anecdote. I was wrong …
Although Andrew did not footnote this claim, an interview published in 1968 documents this fascinating exchange between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao (the man soon after labeled traitor of the revolution) where they do discuss the Chairman’s level of exposure to Sun Tzu’s Art of War.
But unlike Andrew’s implication that this is evidence of the powerful influence Sun Tzu exerted on Mao, it instead reveals Mao’s ignorance of the text. Mao notes that at the famous Zunyi Conference in 1935, a fellow Communist colleague asked if he ever read it—he hadn’t.
In 536 BC, the chief minister of the state of Zheng commissioned the creation of a large bronze vessel inscribed with the state's penal code to be prominently displayed within the capital city. It was an act born of desperation. Zheng at this time was a small feudal state of ...
the larger Zhou kingdom, strategically located but perilously wedged between two more powerful and predatory feudal states, Jin and Chu. Zichan was a skilled diplomat, an early prototype of later celebrated statesmen like Metternich and Kissinger, who worked tirelessly to protect
Zheng's freedom of action in a world where the Zhou king had long abandoned his role as fair adjudicator of subordinate states' disputes. Increasingly, though, he was stymied by other Zheng officials who were focused more on protecting their own parochial interests than serving