Hu Bo (2015): “Until Taiwan is unified with the mainland, the Chinese navy’s ability to conduct distant-sea operations is severely constrained. The strengthening of China’s maritime power will inevitably challenge Japan’s maritime position in the East China Sea, prompting Japan’s

https://twitter.com/stephenwertheim/status/2005657388431376454

defensive measures and suppression. As long as China aspires to become a maritime power, it must confront these structural issues head-on and engage in struggle, demonstrating the resolve and courage to use various means, including military action ... For China, the Diaoyu

Xi Jinping: "Gu Junshan was never interested in studying political theory; instead, he loved reading books about secrets of officialdom and the 'Thick Black Theory,' treating becoming a high-ranking official and amassing wealth as his life’s creed."

What is Thick Black Theory?
Gu Junshan, then Deputy Director of the General Logistics Department, was one senior most PLA officials brought down in Xi's initial corruption campaign. In a speech made to the CMC in 2014, Xi noted General Gu's admiration for reading books on the "Thick Black Theory" (厚黑学).

While the West tends to think of democracy as a universal value that transcends class interests—the opposite of authoritarian class rule, Wang Huning, Xi Jinping's chief ideologue, offers a differing opinion--democracy is not the opposite of class rule; it is a form of it ...
Wang's argument is that because democracy is a form of the state, and a state is always an instrument of class rule, then any democracy is by necessity a form of class rule. A bourgeois democracy, therefore, is not necessarily meant as a pejorative but as a technical description:

"Cultural warfare is the highest level of warfare, distinguished from cultural exchange primarily by whether the actors engage with an attitude of equality. We acknowledge that well-intentioned cultural exchanges do exist, but a global cultural war has also undeniably begun." This is in line with Xi Jinping's repeated descriptions of what he calls the "smokeless battlefield"--ongoing ideological and cultural wars, as referenced in this speech he gave to PLA soldiers stationed in Xinjiang, April 29, 2014:

Xi Jinping on Operation Neptune Spear: “Modern warfare involves system-versus-system confrontation, with integrated joint operations becoming the basic form of combat. The U.S. military’s operation to kill Osama bin Laden was a typical example of 'large-scale system support ... for elite forces.' On the surface, it involved only four helicopters and twenty-four special forces personnel, but in the background, satellites provided intelligence support, aircraft carrier fleets at sea provided backup, and U.S. military bases in Central Asia offered ground

Michael Howard argued that when it comes to studying war, one must comprehensively approach it in terms of WIDTH, DEPTH, and CONTEXT. When it comes to Sun Tzu studies in the West, we tend to focus on the “width” of Sun Tzu’s text, but generally neglect both “depth” and “context.”
Ever since Sun Tzu first entered the West’s consciousness, we have mainly focused on situating it within Howard’s concept of WIDTH: “an observation of the way in which warfare has developed over a long historical period.” Most famously B.H. Liddell Hart, despite not having …

Ge Zhaoguang: “Early Chinese writing clearly shows that the ancient Chinese were used to the concrete rather than the abstract.”

This is similar to the case I make that the distinction between Sun Tzu’s advice to “win without FIGHTING” and “win without BATTLE” is important … Ge notes that early Chinese writing lacked a general category term for agricultural products like the modern term “crops” (莊稼), so when referenced in early texts the authors would need to use the character for the specific type of crop being discussed: rice, millet, wheat, etc.

Does the PLA subscribe to the Ends-Ways-Means concept of strategy? According to the latest version of the "Science of Military Strategy (2020)" they still use a similar framework with nearly identical terminology: Objectives (目标), Guidelines (方针) and Means (手段) … Much like Lykke’s 3-legged stool remains the basis for defining strategy in western PME the 2020 SMS argues: “in terms of the essential characteristics and functions of strategy, the three elements are indispensable and should be considered the fundamental components of strategy”

PLA Assessment: "Although the U.S. military is equipped with sophisticated weaponry, it is extremely afraid of getting injured or killed ... Although the U.S. military won the Gulf War with relatively low casualties, due to the inherent nature of its bourgeois army, the fear of casualties among its officers and soldiers is a weakness that will persist for a long time, especially when the U.S. military conducts large-scale aggressive wars overseas. This fear of casualties will intensify."

This article was written by a PLA officer, Zhang Youming, in 1991

“During the civil war between Communists and the Kuomintang regime [Mao Zedong] sent aides into enemy territory to find a copy of [Sun Tzu’s Art of War].”

In an earlier article, I criticized the author of this book for perpetuating this fictitious anecdote. I was wrong … Although Andrew did not footnote this claim, an interview published in 1968 documents this fascinating exchange between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao (the man soon after labeled traitor of the revolution) where they do discuss the Chairman’s level of exposure to Sun Tzu’s Art of War.

In 536 BC, the chief minister of the state of Zheng commissioned the creation of a large bronze vessel inscribed with the state's penal code to be prominently displayed within the capital city. It was an act born of desperation. Zheng at this time was a small feudal state of ... the larger Zhou kingdom, strategically located but perilously wedged between two more powerful and predatory feudal states, Jin and Chu. Zichan was a skilled diplomat, an early prototype of later celebrated statesmen like Metternich and Kissinger, who worked tirelessly to protect

“Qin will be destroyed by Hu”

Was China’s first Great Wall (大城) erroneously constructed as a result of a misinterpreted prediction as to what would eventually cause the downfall of the Qin empire?

The Han dynasty historian Sima Qian hints that this was the reason … Sima Qian noted that in 215 BC the first emperor, Qin Shihuang, dispatched Scholar Lu to seek out the immortals in hopes of finding a key to longevity. When Lu returned, he claimed he met the immortals beyond the sea, who relayed to him the message: “Qin will be destroyed by Hu”

My argument for why we need to have a better understanding of Chinese history is not just because it is interesting, but because it is also a necessary component to better understand our allies & adversaries. Here is a quick example of how our lack knowledge hindered us ... Well before Pearl Harbor, the US had been supporting Chiang Kai-shek's war with Japan, but US interlocutors were getting frustrated that the KMT was more focused on preparing against the CCP than fighting the Japanese. Theodore White, a famous journalist, interviewed him in 1941

One way to highlight which Sun Tzu translation you read has a significant impact on what lessons you draw from the text is to demonstrate it thru one of PME's favorite techniques: Apply one classical theorist's strategic tenets to another war outside its own cultural milieu ... For our historical example, we will examine Sparta's initial strategy during the Peloponnesian War. As described by Thucydides, the Spartans would annually march its army directly into Attica, purposefully avoiding besieging Athens, but destroying the Attic countryside.

One piece of advice I give to anyone tasked with teaching Sun Tzu in our Professional Military Education (PME) system is to begin instruction by discussing the aftermath of the 638 BC Battle of Hong River. Fortunately, it’s a short narrative, but here is why it is critical …

https://twitter.com/JohnF_Sullivan/status/1670429344458592256

Following the Song army’s catastrophic defeat, there is a fascinating debate between Duke Xiang of Song and his military advisor, Ziyu. Even in defeat, the duke defends his decision to not urge an attack on Chu while they were severely disadvantaged due to factors of terrain.

I occasionally point out the egregious lack of decent secondary source books in English on early Chinese history—which still needs to be rectified—but also want to note that the body of translated classic texts from the era is getting much better and will continue to improve … We will soon have a new ‘Exalted Documents’ (Nylan) and ‘Pheasant Cap Master’ (Goldin). A new ‘Discourse on Salt and Iron’ is in the works as well as two more Spring & Autumn commentaries: Gongyang & Guliang. We are also close to having the full version of Sima Qian’s Shiji.

Johnston (1999): "There is little direct debate over the Sun Zi text because there has been so little written on the topic in the Sinological community. There is, however, the potential for a major debate over Sun Zi as a pragmatic source of more or less universal ideas ... for military strategists versus its status as a uniquely Chinese philosophical text on violence. However, this potential faultline in Sun Zi studies has not really developed into a full-blown academic debate. There are simply too few people in the academic world working on ...

We often misread Mao Zedong's military theory. Fighting a prolonged guerrilla campaign is only a liminal stage. You won't DEFEAT the enemy thru guerrilla war alone. At some point according to Mao, you MUST transition from irregular to regular war, something the IW primacists miss

He makes this clear in his 1938 work, Problems of War and Strategy: "In the anti-Japanese war as a whole, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare is supplementary, for only regular warfare can decide the final outcome of the war." Mao identifies three strategic phases...

Influential Chinese theorist Yan Xuetong, in a book arguing that China should proactively seek to replace the current international system, uses examples such as the 651 BC Kuiqui covenant and 546 BC “bi-polar configuration of Jin and Chu” to make his case for this shift. Yet how many in the West will recognize these references let alone grasp what lessons contemporary Chinese leaders are drawing from them?

Does it matter?

I argue it does, not through discovering their “secret plan,” but rather by understanding the subtle influence of analogy …

HBO's The Wire is rightly lauded for its vivid & realistic depiction of urban decay. But you might not notice that under the surface it is also a subtle exposition on Mohist & Legalist challenges to Confucian orthodoxy as witnessed during China's turbulent Warring States era: As sinologist A.C. Graham noted, for the Chinese philosophers of the era the crucial question for all of them was not What is the truth? but instead Where is the Way?—the way to provide order and conduct one's personal life. In the Wire, the Way (道) is referred to as “THE GAME”

In the “Six Secret Teachings of Jiang Ziya” (one of the 7 Military Classics of ancient China) King Wu asks Jiang Ziya how others can assist the ruler in developing & implementing strategy. His answer is an interesting early conceptualization of the modern general staff system: First is Fuxin (literally stomach and heart) An individual in charge of advising about secret plans for responding to sudden events; investigating Heaven so as to eliminate sudden change; exercising general supervision over all planning; and protecting the lives of the people.