Would you like to understand a bit more about Yahya alSanwar's strategy to survive the Israeli invasion and declare his personal victory?
Then please consider the following analysis thread:
1. To understand this strategy, you must first consider the battlefield conditions and how alSanwar has personally position himself at this stage of Al Aqsa Floods war, and which resources he has provided himself to survive.
2. When the Israelis announced their invasion plans for the North of Gaza after October 7th, alSanwar and several of the leadership left Gaza City to Khan Younis. He moved very secretly and stowed himself in one of the aid vehicles to avoid being targeted by the Israelis.
3. Since, alSanwar and the trusted war leadership live in the Khan Younis Brigade's command tunnels (in each governorate of Gaza there is one particularly deep, multilayered structure just for the leadership). Other Hamas political seniors were not invited, he does not trust them
4. In the underground positions, alSanwar is rumoured to have enabled himself with many defenses. It includes huddling some of the Israeli captives around him at all times, while also ensuring the presence of the alQassam martyrdom units to detonate against penetrating soldiers
5. During the ceasefire, it occurred to alSanwar that he had made a mistake when he released the Israelis would resume fighting. He became more careful and stopped his movements and all communications with the outside via his different communications available to him
6. With this positioning in mind, how will alSanwar claim his victory over the Israelis, who invade Khan Younis after the ceasefire ?
7. The key is that alSanwar believes now the Israeli cabinet made moves which put time on his side.
Firstly, they enabled enough fuel to enter Gaza to power the tunnel network infrastructure, even air venting.
Second, the Israelis begin infighting over their longer strategy.
8. As such, alSanwar strategizes to prolong the fighting above ground to force the main Israeli forces to leave Gaza, without installing anyone to replace his regime.
9. AlSanwar is not new to such conditions. In Israeli jails he obsessed over understanding the mentality of the Israelis to understand their nerve points.
Now underground, he continues to obsess, and is rumoured to make his decisions based on the remarks of Israeli media.
10. AlSanwar sees how the Israelis are particularly sensitive to each loss of one of their soldiers in battle, and he believes, via reports from his operative, that he can bleed the Israeli army and force them out before they identify his actual position.
11. This is the reason why AlSanwar rejected and continues to reject any new ceasefire arrangement, as he believes he does not need to.
12. As his backup, alSanwar believes that if the Israelis find his location, he will have time to restrategize. The Israelis Will need to carefully negotiate his steel doors, booby trapped entrances, and hidden tunnel floors before they can reach his location.
13. And as a final resort, alSanwar knows he has the Israeli captives, which if necessary, can grant him escape to another country if necessary, according to his thinking.
Thank you for your consideration of the analysis.
Supporting evidence and arguments for this analysis will gradually be added to the thread in forms of quote posts.
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Maybe you notice, but an attempt at a regional power shift is occurring before us.
The Saudis and the Emiratis are making a play for Gaza and the Palestinian arena.
A thread for your consideration:
1. The play is occurring via Egypt, which (as was reported here increasingly) is pushing out Qatar as the main mediator between the parties.
Egypt offered a new plan to end the war recently. It starts with a minor prisoner swap and ends with a technocratic Palestinian Authority
2. Quite bluntly edging out the Qataris, Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamel went to Rafah to be connected to the landline that reaches to Sinwar (the phone line is accessed from a tunnel near the crossing and stretches underground to his position) and directly negotiate.
According to conversations, videos, and other reports, the following:
Many fighters were killed in Israeli strikes before and in the days of the invasion. Many were killed along with their families when the Israelis targeted their homes or bombarded underground positions.
Then, when the Israelis invaded Wadi Gaza along Juhur ad Dik axis, communication with the leadership in Khan Younis with alQassam units in the North was hindered as Gaza was cut in half.
Military commentators note that since the start of the Israeli invasion, alQassam Gaza City and Northern Gaza Brigades combined succeeded in carrying out only two company-level attacks on the Israelis. A thread for your consideration:
The 1st attack occurred at the outset of the invasion at the end of October when a combined weapons attack targeted an armoured vehicle north of Beit Lahiya & killed an entire squad of infantry. The 2nd occurred in alShujaiya days ago and involved multiple boobytraps and attacks
Besides these events, all of the attacks against the Israelis were carried out at the squad level, and not according to the years of defense preparations by these brigades which called for larger forces and more dramatic attacks. The main evidence comes from AlQassam media unit:
Much of the reporting here has covered the Gazan criticisms of the aid distribution mechanisms.
As the crisis grows, it has been requested by many to provide an analysis of the process and explanation why the aid is not reaching enough people.
For your consideration: 🧵
1. All sides, with picture evidence to prove it, suggests a backlog on the Egyptian ports of entry, even before Rafah.
Egypt does not have enough warehouses to store the aid enroute to Gaza, and the international organizations report difficulty organizing shipments from Arish
2. After the Americans pressured the Israelis to increase aid after the ceasefire, the Israelis agreed and approved many more trucks. By the Rafah crossing is not scaled to facilitate this amount of traffic, and it leads to a backlog that can be seen every day in north Sinai.
The Israelis miscalculate from the very beginning the missile capabilities and stocks of the Palestinian factions: An analysis thread for your consideration 🧵
Mainly, with each salvo to the central Israeli cities, the analysts begin mathematical calculations on and other explanations as to why after so many weeks of fighting, alQassam is still able to target their main cities.
They explain that alQassam seeks to use what remains of its stocks before the ground forces capture Gaza. They also calculate the remainder of the missile stocks according to an assumption that the factions possessed "40,000" rockets (or similar numbers) before Tufan Al Aqsa war.
Both the Israeli and Palestinian channels begin to publish footage from their perspectives of the battles in Khan Younis which show the intensity of the fighting, which has escalated in recent days:
AlQassam media publishes the aftermath of a failed Israeli rescue raid in Khan Younis region which sought one of the male captives, and claims casualties on the Israeli side, including the captive himself.
The Israeli channels meanwhile spread images from the aftermath of an assault on alQassam positions at what appears to be the al-Uthaymeen school in alQarara.