Fragmentation warheads are 50% to 75% metal fragmentations, so I'll use 10.5 kg explosive for 3.35 metric tons for the blast high explosive energy mass.
My first run on the app doesn't match the observed blast effect at the Feodosia railway station given the blown out window frames and the disabled electricals preventing the use of electric railway engines there, AKA at least 2 PSI.
9/
This is where the Shaheds come in.
Assuming 400 Shahed-136's with 40 kg warheads with enhanced blast. We are looking at another 16,000 kg of mass with more blast energy than TNT.
I'll FUJI* it at ~1.5 times TNT for 24m tons of TNT
*frequently used judgemental estimate.
10/
That works out to 0.0988 kilotons. I ran this TNT mass number through the blast calculator app with no change in results.
When I used 0.1 kilotons of TNT, 100 metric tons of TNT blast equivalent, I finally got this result that ~matched the Feodosia railway station.
11/
BLUF:
There weren't enough shell/rocket munitions to account blast damage seen in Feodosia
There must have been many hundreds of Shahed-136 drones in the Nonocherkassk when she was "Storm Shadowed."
She was used to move Shaheds in the same way USS Indianapolis was used...
12/
...to move the A-bomb in WW2, for security reasons.
RuAF security that AFU signals, cyber & human intelligence penetrated.
The lack of these Shaheds in Crimean launch sites will affect Russia's military plans to attack Osea & the Ukrainian power grid this winter.
13/13 End
14/13
P.S.
Osea = Odesa
@threadreaderapp unroll please.
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The Little Crappy Ship (LCS) is tragically incapable in the Houthi littoral combat environment of drones, anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles.
And the USN brass knows it
No USN flag rank will risk losing his career by exposing an LCS in the Red Sea⬇️ 1/
The failure of the LCS procurement is why Peter Zeihan's prediction that the USN will abandon protecting the world sea lanes in his book
"The End of the World is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalization"
is getting far too close to reality for my comfort.
2/
This Politico headline featuring three anonymous Pentagon officials talking about the US Navy losing the cost-attrition war shooting multi-million dollar missiles at $2000 Houthi drones underlines the anti-access area denial effect cheap drones cause.
The 1st & most important piece of Western kit Ukraine used was one of the two Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS) Engagement Operations Center (EOC) provided by the USA.
The Reporting on Ukraine Youtube channel has some good graphics describing the VKS glide bomb standoff and the mechanics of the Ukrainian roving SAM battery ambush using a forward radar to cue a long range SAM like an MIM-104 Patriot.
The LCS design was called a "Little Crappy Ship" for a reason.
The USN refusal to deploy it is a realistic acknowledgement that the LCS is incapable in the Houthi's air & boat drone, anti-ship cruise missile, anti-ship ballistic missile rich threat environment of the Red Sea. 1/
The text photo clip below details Houthi anti-access area denial coast defense capabilities available in the Red Sea.
I'll carefully note the shore based coastwatchers and drone and cellphone pinging spy-Dhow working with those coastwatchers.
2/
The 2019 Oryx article on the Houthi's A2AD capabilities are bad enough for the LCS near non-existent anti-aircraft capabilities for anti-ship ballistic missiles & swarms of low/slow/cheap threats.
The base seeker of the SeaRAM is an adaptation of Sidewinder and Stinger IR missile seekers with an added passive radar seeking the radar signals from most anti-ship missiles.
Small drones like this Qasef-1 in the video
do not have radar seekers.
This Ukrainian 29 km FPV drone range for a Russian BM-27 Uragan 220mm MLRS kill sounds like a modified 10-inch FOV racing drone carried by a Baba Yaga that was acting as a radio relay.
It helps that Ukraine has the higher side of the Dnipro for radio line of sight reasons.😈
This is another battlefield demonstration that artillery is far more vulnerable to drones than drones are vulnerable to artillery.
This is downstream from the physical reality that drones fly too low for artillery counter battery radars to detect them.
2/
FPV drones' ability to avoid Russian counter battery radar detection is why you see headlines like this in Newsweek from Mykhailo Fedorov, Kyiv's Minister of Digital Transformation.