Mouin Rabbani Profile picture
Dec 31, 2023 65 tweets 9 min read Read on X
THREAD: The Israeli correspondent Barak Ravid had an interesting article in Axios on 29 December. The article in question, about a recent phone call between Biden and Netanyahu,
deals in part with US efforts to persuade Israel to transfer the Palestinian tax receipts it owes to the Palestinian Authority (PA). First, a little background:
From the outset of the occupation in 1967 Israel enforced a common market and customs union between Israel and the occupied territories. This meant trade and monetary policy, and matters such as customs duties, taxation, and currency, were unilaterally determined by Israel
and imposed on the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip - foreign territory whose Palestinians are not Israeli citizens.
Palestinians paid the same tariffs and same sales tax as Israelis. Foreign trade was fully controlled by Israel. If, for example, Palestinians wanted to export oranges from the Gaza Strip or olive oil from the West Bank to Europe, they could not do so directly.
Rather, they had to sell their produce to Israel’s Agricultural Export Company AGREXCO, which would then export them to Europe as Israeli products. AGREXCO was also the main exporter of illegal Israeli settlement products to Europe.
The Europeans, who like to sanctimoniously pontificate to the rest of the world about human rights and the rule of law, didn’t give a damn about such practices and formed AGREXCO’s largest market. Thankfully, the company went bankrupt in 2011.
The crucial point about the enforced common market is that Israel formulated economic policy based on what was best for the Israeli economy, and then imposed these policies wholesale upon the Palestinian economy.
Given the growing disparity between the two economies over time, it created a situation where Palestinians earned like Jordanians but were taxed like Israelis, but unlike either Jordanians or Israelis couldn’t trade freely with the rest of the world.
One of Israel’s main priorities in the 1993 Oslo Accords was to ensure that the Palestinians would not become economically independent. Which meant Israel was determined to prevent the PA from having the authority to develop trade and monetary policies of its own.
The 1994 Israeli-Palestinian Protocol on Economic Relations, also known as the Paris Protocol and incorporated into the Oslo Accords, achieved this.
Pursuant to its terms the common market and customs union continued unabated. The New Israeli Shekel (NIS) – introduced in the 1980s after the Israeli Lira (IL) became worthless on account of rampant inflation in the wake of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon – remained legal tender
within territory where the PA had jurisdiction. The PA was prohibited from issuing a currency of its own. VAT was determined by Israel, and the PA was obliged to adjust its own VAT (sales tax) rate commensurate with whatever Israel decided.
The same applied to customs (import) duties and related tariffs. What the Palestinians could (and could not) import and export was also determined by Israel.
Egypt and Jordan, which both had peace treaties with Israel, could not freely export their products to PA territories or import from them, since such matters were regulated by the Paris Protocol.
If I remember correctly there was a schedule indicating which items Jordanian companies were permitted to export to the PA, and in which quantities.
The key instrument in Israel’s hands to enforce such arrangements was its continued control over borders, between the West Bank and Jordan, and until the 2005 disengagement between the Gaza Strip and Egypt.
The PA presence at these borders during the 1990s never entailed control. A Palestinian returning to Nablus from Beijing or London via the Allenby Bridge that connects Jordan to the West Bank, for example,
would give his passport to a PA border official, who would then give it to the Israeli soldier sitting in a booth behind him concealed by a two-way mirror. If the Palestinian was wanted for questioning, harassment, or arrest by the Israelis, he would be delivered to them.
This cosmetic arrangement was abolished during the Second Intifada when Israel once again took full and direct control.
Pursuant to the Paris Protocol Israel also has full control over the clearance of imports and the collection of customs. This means that Israel has the right to inspect and approve/reject any imports destined for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
It also means that Israel collects, on the PA’s behalf, all import duties and related tariffs on goods and services destined for these territories.
As specified in the Paris Protocol, Israel shall at the end of each month transfer to the PA the various taxes and duties it has collected on its behalf, less a three percent processing fee. The same arrangement applies taxes paid by Palestinians who work in Israel,
from which Israel deducts twenty-five per cent. (Somewhat more, since the three percent processing fee is applied to the sum total of the entire monthly payment).
Although Israel since 2005 no longer has control over the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, these arrangements still apply to goods and services imported to Gaza from Israel,
which account for the majority of imports in view of Egypt’s collaboration and enforcement of the Israeli blockade.
The Palestinians should of course never have accepted such an iniquitous arrangement, and should have immediately recognised the potential – in my view the absolute certainty – that Israel would use and abuse these arrangements for political gain.
But the Palestinian leadership was excessively eager to get the ball rolling once the Oslo Accords were signed, and acted on the assumption that the Paris Protocol, like Oslo, consisted of interim arrangements that would expire within five years
– i.e. by 1999, and be superseded by a different treaty. The monthly payments, it needs to be emphasised, consisted exclusively of Palestinian funds that Israel insisted on collecting on the PA’s behalf.
In exchange Israel accepted a legal/treaty obligation to transfer these funds to the PA on a monthly basis. These transfer also accounted for over two-thirds of the PA budget.
In other words, it didn’t take Israel long to realise that its ability to withhold the transfers constituted a powerful instrument that could be exploited for political leverage.
Starting already in the late 1990s Israel – during Netanyahu’s first term of office – would periodically withhold monthly payments under various pretexts in order to weaken the PA or pressure it to accept various Israeli demands.
Over time, Israel also began unilaterally deducting sums from these transfer payments to settle the debts of Palestinian companies and individuals – not debts of the PA itself – owed to Israel companies.
At other times Israel has refused to transfer the full amount of the monthly payment, claiming objection to the intended destination of that portion of the transfers it is withholding
(e.g. social security payments to families of Palestinians languishing in Israeli prisons or killed by Israel’s soldiers and settlers). In other words, Israel has claimed the right to determine how the PA spends its budget.
On previous occasions, the PA has refused to accept partial payments. This has produced a budgetary crisis, meaning that the PA cannot pay the salaries of its security forces, whose main role is to enforce the occupation on Israel’s behalf.
Pressure on the Israeli government from the Israeli security establishment, Washington, and Brussels, equally committed to keeping the occupation running smoothly until the end of time, has tended to resolve the issue.
Although Hamas seized power in the Gaza Strip in 2007, part of the PA’s budget is still destined for the enclave. Initially these were limited to for example pension payments to retired PA employees,
or salary payments to those who obeyed orders from Ramallah to go on strike against Hamas rule. More recently, agreements were reached between the PA and Hamas whereby the PA would use that portion of the monthly transfer Israel had collected from Gaza,
to pay the salaries of civil servants in the Gaza Strip, and to cover the costs of its medicine imports, of electricity imported from Israel, and the like. This amounts to some thirty per cent of the monthly transfer.
After the 7 October Hamas attacks Israel’s finance minister, the far-right messianic Zionist Bezalel Smotrich, who advocates – for starters – dismantling the PA and the immediate and total annexation of the West Bank,
proclaimed that he would halt the monthly transfers on the spurious pretext that the PA supported the attacks and bore responsibility for them. After public condemnation from the Israeli security establishment,
which feared the impact the measure would have on Palestinian security forces in the West Bank at a time the Israeli military was pre-occupied with its genocide in the Gaza Strip, Smotrich partially relented. He agreed to transfer the monthly payment to the PA,
but insisted on withholding the thirty per cent the PA would normally disburse in or on behalf of the Gaza Strip.
Once again demonstrating unyielding principle when it comes to money, Abbas refused to accept a partial payment. Netanyahu, recognising an opportunity to further weaken the PA, probably agrees with Smotrich.
More importantly, he needs the flamethrowing extremist onside to keep his governing coalition intact.
Which brings us back to Ravid, Biden, and Netanyahu. According to Ravid’s narration, Biden has been seeking to persuade Netanyahu to transfer the fund to the PA so that its security forces receive their salaries and won’t produce another crisis for Israel in the West Bank.
Biden also believes the PA can be sufficiently strengthened to rule what’s left of the Gaza Strip after the genocide runs its course. Netanyahu by contrast has repeatedly and publicly opposed any role for the PA in the Gaza Strip.
His preference is that there will be no one left in the territory to govern, and failing that he would like to see local notables subservient to Israel administer different sectors of the enclave.
But Netanyahu also understands that Israel’s genocide is entirely dependent upon Biden’s unconditional military and diplomatic support, and therefore has to pretend he’s taking US concerns seriously.
To this end, Netanyahu had during a previous call with Biden proposed sending the withheld portion of the payment to Norway, which would retain it until arrangements are found to satisfy Israel that none of the funds would go to Hamas (which they weren’t in the first place).
Presented with this option by the Americans, Abbas agreed. It seems Israel was banking on a PA rejection, and faced with its acceptance began to backtrack.
During their most recent phone call, Netanyahu indicated to Biden that he was having second thoughts because he doesn’t trust the Norwegians, and that Biden should instead be pressuring Abbas to accept a partial payment.
According to Ravid, Biden was sufficiently upset with Netanyahu that he abruptly ended the call.
Ravid then quotes US officials variously describing Biden as frustrated because he “is going out on a limb for Bibi every day and when Bibi needs to give something back and take some political risk he is unwilling to do it”;
as satisfied because Netanyahu indicated Israel hasn’t rejected the Norwegian option and is “still working through things on their end"; and as having had a “good and productive” conversation with Netanyahu.
In other words Biden, who wants to see the PA empowered and installed in the Gaza Strip, never thought to insist that Israel simply fulfil its treaty obligations towards the PA. He instead spent the phone call trying to convince Netanyahu to accept Netanyahu’s own proposal.
When this failed, he also didn’t simply insist that Israel implement its own initiative and be done with it. As I’ve previously noted in response to reports that Biden and his advisors destest Netanyahu, the latter must be thinking: With enemies like these, who needs friends?
Netanyahu’s problem is that unless Smotrich concedes, Netanyahu can’t accept his own proposal without entering into conflict with Smotrich. That is a conflict that could see Israel’s governing coalition implode.
Seen in broader perspective this is essentially an argument between Biden, Netanyahu, and Smotrich about which of them has the right to choose who rules the Gaza Strip. Biden wants the PA, Netanyahu wants hand-picked cronies answerable to Israel,
and Smotrich wants to re-establish Israel’s settlements in the territory. The idea that this issue should be determined by Palestinians is equally rejected by all of them.
As Khalid Turani deftly summarised this Israeli government infighting amidst Israeli-US policy differences:
a gang of bankrobbers start fighting about how to divide the loot before leaving the premises, then get in a fight with the driver of their getaway car about which escape route to take.
Given the state of Israel’s efforts in the Gaza Strip, soon to enters its fourth month, he might also have added that the brawl is taking place the night before the robbery, and that the gangsters have yet to figure out how to crack the safe.
END. Here's a link to the Barak Ravid article: axios.com/2023/12/28/bid…

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More from @MouinRabbani

Feb 13
THREAD: It seems the Israeli-Palestinian exchange of captives that had been scheduled for this weekend but was suspended by Hamas this past Monday is now back on track. What happened? The short answer: Israel’s prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, caved.
As I noted in my previous thread, Hamas on Monday stated that it was indefinitely suspending the further exchange of captives in response to repeated and escalating Israeli violations of the January agreement between the two parties. Israeli officials, cited in the Israeli press and at the tail end of a NYT article, confirmed the validity of Hamas’s accusations.
I had earlier also noted that Hamas was responding to Israel’s refusal to engage in negotiations on the second stage of the three-part January agreement, to new proposals put forward by the Israeli prime minister that sought to comprehensively revise what had already been negotiated and concluded between the two parties, as well as to US President Donald Trump’s harebrained scheme to permanently expel the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip to the Arab world. The latter scheme, needless to say, renders the entire agreement meaningless and irrelevant.
Read 23 tweets
Feb 11
THREAD: On Monday 10 February Abu Ubaida, spokesperson of the Martyr Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, announced that the movement was indefinitely suspending further Israeli-Palestinian exchanges of captives on account of repeated and continued Israeli violations of the agreement reached between the two in January of this year.
While Israel has indeed been violating the agreement in various ways, there is also more to the story. Most importantly this concerns Israel’s refusal to commence negotiations on the the agreement’s second phase, and US President Donald Trump’s recent proposal for the forcible mass expulsion of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to the Arab world.
The January agreement between Israel and Hamas is about more than an exchange of captives. At Israel’s insistence, it comprises three phases rather than one. During the first phase, scheduled to last 42 days (until the beginning of March) a limited exchange of captives and suspension of hostilities will be accompanied by a partial Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, freedom of movement within the territory for displaced Palestinians, and surge of urgently-needed humanitarian supplies.
Read 19 tweets
Feb 8
THREAD: The three Israeli captives released on 8 February appeared emaciated, pallid, and in need of medical attention. The Palestinian organizations that held them were under an absolute obligation to treat them in accordance with international law. That includes a prohibition – also absolute – on taking captive civilian non-combatants, because such individuals are considered hostages rather than prisoners-of-war.
The primary responsibility for any harm to civilian hostages rests with those who took them hostage and did not comply with their obligation to release them, immediately and unconditionally. They should never have been placed in a situation that exposed them to prolonged confinement, or to the deliberate attempts by Israel to murder them to prevent their captivity, or to the hunger, thirst, and lack of medical care resulting from Israel’s comprehensive, genocidal siege of the Gaza Strip, or to Israel’s efforts to kill them during their captivity to reduce Hamas’s bargaining power.
Whatever culpability Israel and its Western sponsors have for the suffering and killings of civilian hostages in the Gaza Strip – and that culpability is very considerable – it does not absolve those who took them hostage from their own responsibilities, or exempt them from accountability.
Read 12 tweets
Jan 22
THREAD: Much has been made of President Bread & Circus, on his first day in office, rescinding the sanctions placed by the Biden administration on several Israeli settlers and a few of the organizations that support them. Let’s put this in perspective:
1. It’s unclear why Trump took this decision. Most likely it has little to do with US Middle East policy, and was motivated by Trump’s determination to undo what passes for Genocide Joe’s legacy, and in the process throw some red meat to the MAGA cult.
2. The decision to rescind sanctions doesn’t demonstrate a meaningful distinction between the Trump and Biden administrations. The Biden administration during its term of office did not reverse a single policy decision implemented by the first Trump presidency with respect to Palestine(*). It additionally provided total and unconditional support for Israel’s genocidal campaign in the Gaza Strip, and did absolutely nothing to hold the main agent of violence and colonial expansion in the West Bank – the Israeli state and its government – accountable for any of its actions.
Read 8 tweets
Dec 31, 2024
THREAD (Jimmy Carter, Part 1): Former US president Jimmy Carter has died at the age of 100. In his later years he was widely admired by Palestinians, and broadly detested by Israelis, some of whom are exuberantly celebrating his death on this platform. It’s a very different picture than that which existed during his presidency.
Carter was elected to office in 1976, ousting Gerald Ford, who had assumed the presidency in 1974 when Richard Nixon was forced to resign on account of the Watergate scandal. Perhaps on account of Carter’s previous obscurity, it was a surprisingly close election. Ford’s decision to pardon Nixon, thus ensuring the latter wouldn’t be held accountable for Watergate (Nixon never faced the prospect of accountability for his infinitely more serious crimes in southeast Asia) sealed Ford’s fate with many voters. Ford was additionally weakened by a strong challenge for the Republican nomination by Ronald Reagan, representing the radical right of the party, and by presiding over Washington’s final defeat and ignominious withdrawal from Vietnam on 30 April 1975.
In the Middle East, Carter was an unknown quantity. That was certainly not the case with the outgoing administration. Henry Kissinger, appointed National Security Advisor during Nixon’s first term and additionally Secretary of State during his second, retained both positions until late 1975 and the latter for the remainder of Ford’s presidency. By the time of his 1977 exit he had dominated the US foreign policy agenda for almost a decade. A Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany, Kissinger was, largely on account of his identity, viewed as irredeemably pro-Israeli. He often was, but this was primarily because he believed Israel served US interests – in the Middle East, in the Cold War, and during an era of revolutionary challenges to US power in the Third World. And secondarily because embracing Israel was a useful arrow in his quiver for his relentless bureaucratic warfare against Beltway rivals.
Read 37 tweets
Dec 25, 2024
THREAD (Syria Part I): I started writing a thread about recent developments in Syria, and ended up delving into the country’s very long history. This first instalment attempts to summarise aspects of Syria’s history until the First World War. For those interested, I’ve here and there included references to a number of accessible texts for further reading. These are included in brackets at the end of the relevant paragraphs.
With the unanticipated, rapid collapse of the Syrian government between 27 November and 8 December 2024, sixty-one years of uninterrupted Ba’thist rule over the country has come to a sudden end. The repercussions are expected to be seismic, first and foremost for Syria, but also for the wider region, with potentially geopolitical ramifications. How did we get here?
Roughly the size of New England in the United States or China’s Hubei province, Syria is the product of some of the world’s oldest civilisations. Its capital, Damascus, sitting astride the Barada river, is a leading candidate for the oldest continuously inhabited city on earth. Syria’s second city but at various points its most prominent urban center, Aleppo, situated along the Quwayq river, is among the few competitors for this title, and is believed to be permanently settled since the sixth millennium BCE.
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