Thread by @LarryLewis_

To show how the IDF are not doing everything possible to protect civilians in Gaza, we can also compare operations in Gaza to recent U.S. and coalition/multinational operations, particularly in Mosul and Raqqa. Another thread.

2. For Mosul and Raqqa, both of those operations had relatively high rates of civilian harm. So, as I compare Gaza to them, Mosul and Raqqa were not great examples of civilian protection. Instead, I’m contrasting three operations that didn't effectively mitigate civilian harm.

3. When these are compared to Gaza, we see Gaza is even worse. In 2.5 months, we've had about the level of strikes in this tiny little area in Gaza as what we saw combined in Mosul in 9 months and Raqqa in 6 months. A staggering # of strikes in much shorter time and smaller area.

4. In the Raqqa Report () we discuss how, from a civilian harm perspective, the campaign design itself was flawed for Mosul and Raqqa. It channelized all of the fighters and civilians together, so there is no way to separate them.rand.org/pubs/research_…

5. This creates a siege, which means you're going to have more civilian deaths, you're going to have more destruction of civilian property. The campaign design in itself creates risk to civilians. We see the same thing in Gaza. The campaign design in Gaza is fundamentally flawed.

6. Also, in Gaza, we see the IDF seeming to have a different threshold for acceptable civilian losses. This leads to the IDF making decisions to strike facilities, for example, the October 31st strike on the refugee complex [Jabalya].

7. The level of civilian harm that resulted from that strike is something we would never see the US doing deliberately. There were a few high-casualty incidents in Mosul and Raqqa but they were unintentional--the U.S. and allies did not foresee this level of harm.

8. For example, a case where the U.S. was baited by ISIS to attack a building with civilians in the basement, or an attack on an IED factory where the secondary explosions were so intense that many civilians in the vicinity were harmed.

9. The IDF seems willing to conduct attacks knowing that scores or even hundreds of civilians will be harmed. It certainly appears that their risk tolerance for civilian harm compared to expected operational benefits is significantly different than what we would accept as the US.

10. The IDF’s frequent use of high yield weapons in Gaza () also stands in contrast with U.S. practice. In U.S. operations, aircraft would often have a loadout with a range of different weapons to enable operational alternatives.nytimes.com/interactive/20…

11. Also, U.S. operational decisions to attack would consider the minimum destruction that was required to achieve the mission objective and select munitions and the method of attack accordingly. This reporting strongly suggests an absence of such deliberations.

12. Consideration of operational alternatives can also include the use of ground forces versus airstrikes. Data from Afghanistan showed the rate of civilian harm to be orders of magnitude lower for ground operations versus airstrikes.

13. The IDF’s reliance on airstrikes creates elevated risks to civilians. In light of the greater usage of airstrikes in the IDF campaign, another consideration is the transfer of risk from friendly forces to the civilian population.

14. In Raqqa, the ratio of friendly losses to civilian losses was 1:6; in Mosul it was 1:8. In Gaza, that ratio is currently about 1:130. When considered with the other factors above, this paints an overall picture of a campaign where protecting civilians is not the priority.

15. Some believe that protecting civilians and being operationally effective are mutually exclusive. In my work I have found that the win-win scenario is possible: the data shows that you can find creative ways to be operationally effective while also limiting harm to civilians.

16. The IDF should be looking for these creative approaches to “do everything” to protect civilians. But the campaign design and the IDF’s use of so many 2,000lb bombs in Gaza...

17. ...the extensive use of these large explosive weapons with vast potential for widespread harm to civilians, in Gaza with its densely populated areas, strongly suggests that they are not looking for these win-win opportunities. The IDF could do far more to protect civilians.