2. The bill creates utterly open-ended authority for fed. agencies to demand a "community benefit agreement" as price of any permit for which an EIS was prepared.
This converts NEPA from procedural statute into grant of substantive reg / exaction authority.
/3
In exercising the "community benefit agreement" authority, what is a federal agency supposed to consider?
Consideration #1 is the deepness of the permit-applicant's pocket. Seriously.
/4
And in case the new, expansive definition of "enviro impact" wasn't clear enough, the bill adds that CBAs may be imposed to offset any *social or economic* (as well as enviro) impacts of the project.
/5
In fact, the bill says an agency can impose a CBA not just to mitigate adverse effects of the project, but "to address legacy or historical harm" with, e.g., local-hire requirements.
/6
3. The bill would also destroy the caselaw that limits scope of enviro review to scope of agency's regulatory discretion, not only via the CBA provision but also by expressly requiring analysis of effects "not within control of any federal agency."
4. And the bill would send a torrent of federal dollars into the coffers of groups who'd exploit NEPA for labor or other side hustles.
- there's $3 billion of "community engagement" grants to arm nonprofits & others
/8
- and there's a new statutory mandate that FERC reimburse NGO intervenors in regulatory proceedings (if intervenor affects the outcome)
/9
5. And in case NEPA turned up to 11 isn't enough, there's also a new, judicially enforceable mandate for "community impact reports" if a project may affect an "environmental justice community."
/10
6. There's also a wild provision that seems to prevent federal agencies from considering any project alternatives in an EIS unless (a) the alternative would have no adverse impact on any "overburdened community," or (b) it serves a compelling interest *in that community.*
/11
"Overburdened communities" are defined, in turn, not as communities burdened by the project, or by legacy pollution, but by race, poverty, or language-minority status.
(CJ Roberts & Co. may find the race piece unconstitutional, but the rest would stand.)
/12
The biggest shocker for me is that this bill has the backing of the old "New Democrats," not just the left wing of the Dem coalition.
I should add that I know NEPA less well than CEQA. Maybe I'm misreading or misunderstanding something in the bill.
Let's hope better minds will find my errors.
@nicholas_bagley @dfarber @jadler1969 @AA_Mance @CarolineCecot @EnergyLawProf @AlecStapp @TDuncheon
/end
One more observation: the bill subtly nudges NEPA toward super-statute status by directing conflicts b/t NEPA "and any other provision of law" to be resolved in favor of NEPA.
@drvolts, @robinsonmeyer: I'd love to hear your thoughts on the CETAA draft that dropped last month. (Apologies if I missed your coverage.)
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New decision from CA Court of Appeal on the fee-shifting provisions of AB 1633 has big implications for NIMBYs' incentive to challenge housing approvals under CEQA & beyond.
Context: As part of the 1970s revolution in admin law, states & the federal gov't actively encouraged self-appointed "private attorneys general" to sue, via attorneys' fee bounties.
/2
Asymmetric fee-shifting provisions were written into scores of public laws: If a plaintiff challenging a gov't decision wins, the gov't has to pay for the plaintiff's attorney; if the plaintiff loses, they don't have to pay for the gov's attorney.
"For a typical mid-rise apartment in San José, construction costs can exceed $700k–$900k per unit."
I 💯% agree w/ @MattMahanSJ that reducing construction costs should be a top priority for 2026 -- and that this is mainly a job for the state legislature.
Reason #1. CA's fiscal constitution + local political incentives push local govs to extract "value" from development w/ impact fees, IZ & transfer taxes.
This drives up the cost of building enormously.
/2
The state leg should preempt most such fees, IZ, & taxes, ***and create a substitute source of local revenue.***
My preferred alternative: a state parcel tax assessed on the "net potential square feet" or "net potential units" created by upzoning pursuant to state law.
/3
Could L.A. really land in the Builder's Remedy penalty box, just for f'ing around with a single low-income housing project which a nonprofit developer wants to build on city-owned land?
In October, @California_HCD sent L.A. a sharply worded letter, warning that the city's housing element had relied on the Venice Dell project both as a "pipeline project" and as part of the city's strategy to "affirmatively further fair housing."
/2 hcd.ca.gov/sites/default/…
The HCD letter also flagged five "policies" and two "programs" in L.A.'s housing element that per HCD should "facilitate the project."
The city's course of action has been "inconsistent with these policies."
Cooking in San Diego: A turquoise, 23-story test of the Permit Streamlining Act's new-and-improved "deemed approved" proviso.
This could turn into a big constitutional battle.
🧵/22
Enacted in 1977, the PSA put time limits on CEQA and other agency reviews of development proposals.
If an agency violated the time limits, the project was to be "deemed approved" by operation of law. Wow!
It proved wholly ineffectual.
/2
As @TDuncheon & I explained, courts first decided that the Leg couldn't possibly have meant for a project to be approved before enviro review was complete.
- San Francisco almost certainly must approve this 25-story project on a site zoned for 4 stories
- The city's new ordinance deregulating density in "well-resourced areas" will operate as de-facto downzoning of such sites
🧵
This project's site is zoned for retail use and is currently occupied by the Marina Safeway.
The zoning classification also allows residential use at density of 1 unit per 600 sqft of lot area or density of nearest residential district, whichever is greater.
/2
The nearest residential district, RM-4, allows density of 1 unit per 200 sqft of lot area.
That translates into 567 units on site.
Developer proposes to build 790 units, which requires a 39% density bonus (790/567 = 1.39).
By describing the credible commitment problem (the need to reassure developers of new housing or energy that their project won't face price controls for a very long time) I didn't mean to imply, as some critics on the right insist, that the problem is insurmountable.
/2
I think the problem can be greatly mitigated:
1. By offering DC-style "certificates of assurance" to developers, i.e., recordable contracts for compensation if the project is subjected to price controls within a defined period of time.
/3