2. The bill creates utterly open-ended authority for fed. agencies to demand a "community benefit agreement" as price of any permit for which an EIS was prepared.
This converts NEPA from procedural statute into grant of substantive reg / exaction authority.
/3
In exercising the "community benefit agreement" authority, what is a federal agency supposed to consider?
Consideration #1 is the deepness of the permit-applicant's pocket. Seriously.
/4
And in case the new, expansive definition of "enviro impact" wasn't clear enough, the bill adds that CBAs may be imposed to offset any *social or economic* (as well as enviro) impacts of the project.
/5
In fact, the bill says an agency can impose a CBA not just to mitigate adverse effects of the project, but "to address legacy or historical harm" with, e.g., local-hire requirements.
/6
3. The bill would also destroy the caselaw that limits scope of enviro review to scope of agency's regulatory discretion, not only via the CBA provision but also by expressly requiring analysis of effects "not within control of any federal agency."
4. And the bill would send a torrent of federal dollars into the coffers of groups who'd exploit NEPA for labor or other side hustles.
- there's $3 billion of "community engagement" grants to arm nonprofits & others
/8
- and there's a new statutory mandate that FERC reimburse NGO intervenors in regulatory proceedings (if intervenor affects the outcome)
/9
5. And in case NEPA turned up to 11 isn't enough, there's also a new, judicially enforceable mandate for "community impact reports" if a project may affect an "environmental justice community."
/10
6. There's also a wild provision that seems to prevent federal agencies from considering any project alternatives in an EIS unless (a) the alternative would have no adverse impact on any "overburdened community," or (b) it serves a compelling interest *in that community.*
/11
"Overburdened communities" are defined, in turn, not as communities burdened by the project, or by legacy pollution, but by race, poverty, or language-minority status.
(CJ Roberts & Co. may find the race piece unconstitutional, but the rest would stand.)
/12
The biggest shocker for me is that this bill has the backing of the old "New Democrats," not just the left wing of the Dem coalition.
I should add that I know NEPA less well than CEQA. Maybe I'm misreading or misunderstanding something in the bill.
Let's hope better minds will find my errors.
@nicholas_bagley @dfarber @jadler1969 @AA_Mance @CarolineCecot @EnergyLawProf @AlecStapp @TDuncheon
/end
One more observation: the bill subtly nudges NEPA toward super-statute status by directing conflicts b/t NEPA "and any other provision of law" to be resolved in favor of NEPA.
@drvolts, @robinsonmeyer: I'd love to hear your thoughts on the CETAA draft that dropped last month. (Apologies if I missed your coverage.)
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@SeanMcCulloch11 @salimfurth Paper also relies on strong functional-form assumptions about utility function.
But even w/o those caveats, it's stunning (1) that "renter density" is disvalued at ~5x "homeowner density"; (2) how strongly anti-density prefs vary w/ income and density of neighborhood. 3/5
New UCLA Lewis Center report on LA's housing element rezoning program (CHIPs) illustrates urgent need for legislative oversight + clarification of housing-element law.
L.A.'s housing element was great. Using research from @TernerHousing, L.A. discounted sites' nominal capacity by estimated probability of development during planning period. Status quo shown to be woefully inadequate --> big rezoning commitments.
@TernerHousing But L.A. did not promise to make p(dev) adjustment for its rezoning program, alas.
The UCLA study evaluates the rezoning program, w/o p(dev) adjustment, and says it "appears to fulfill the city's commitment to increase zoned housing capacity by at least 255,000 units."
3/10
Context:
- After 3+ years of studies & debate, Arlington in March, 2023 passed an ordinance that allows up to 58 "plexes" (of up to 6 units) to be permitted annually in single-family-home zones,
/2washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2023/…
- Interested members of the public had abundant opportunities for input. So controversial was the matter that The Washington Post covered the city council's initial decision just to *commission a study* of whether to allow denser housing in SFH zones.
/3 washingtonpost.com/local/virginia…
Prop 33 supporters are saying voters needn't worry about cities abusing rent control to kill off housing development b/c state law guarantees landlords a "just and reasonable" return on investment.
Pointing to this precedent, the fact checkers at @CalMatters dispute that Prop. 33 would enable cities to evade state housing laws by setting rents so low as to deter developers from building apartments.
/3
L.A. housing element rezone is a big test for @California_HCD.
Public discussion has focused on city's decision to "preserve" its SFH zones, but the bigger prob is a mess of new, cost-elevating rules, obscured by hand-waiving about sites probability of development.
🧵/19.
When L.A. prepared its housing element, it worked with @TernerHousing on a good study that related sites' land-value residuals under various zoning scenarios to their probability of development.
/2 ternercenter.berkeley.edu/research-and-p…
The city used this information to "discount" sites' nominal zoned capacity by estimated p(dev) during planning period. Typical site has p(dev) of <0.02.
The city concluded that w/ status quo zoning, it was about 220k projected units short of its RHNA target.
/3
On Jan. 1, 2025, most lots in San Francisco's residential neighborhoods will be opened up for 4-9 unit, 100% market-rate projects.
Applicants may design their project *however they want,* provided it conforms to *some* zoning district anywhere in city.
An explainer 🧵. 1/19.
This result comes courtesy of AB 1893, signed into law yesterday, which for present purposes made three significant changes to California's Housing Accountability Act (HAA).
/2
First, it clarifies that HAA subd. (d)(5)(A) protects projects on sites that a housing element proposes for rezoning to accommodate low- or mod-income housing, not just projects on sites that housing element deems suitable for such housing under status-quo zoning.
/3