2. The bill creates utterly open-ended authority for fed. agencies to demand a "community benefit agreement" as price of any permit for which an EIS was prepared.
This converts NEPA from procedural statute into grant of substantive reg / exaction authority.
/3
In exercising the "community benefit agreement" authority, what is a federal agency supposed to consider?
Consideration #1 is the deepness of the permit-applicant's pocket. Seriously.
/4
And in case the new, expansive definition of "enviro impact" wasn't clear enough, the bill adds that CBAs may be imposed to offset any *social or economic* (as well as enviro) impacts of the project.
/5
In fact, the bill says an agency can impose a CBA not just to mitigate adverse effects of the project, but "to address legacy or historical harm" with, e.g., local-hire requirements.
/6
3. The bill would also destroy the caselaw that limits scope of enviro review to scope of agency's regulatory discretion, not only via the CBA provision but also by expressly requiring analysis of effects "not within control of any federal agency."
4. And the bill would send a torrent of federal dollars into the coffers of groups who'd exploit NEPA for labor or other side hustles.
- there's $3 billion of "community engagement" grants to arm nonprofits & others
/8
- and there's a new statutory mandate that FERC reimburse NGO intervenors in regulatory proceedings (if intervenor affects the outcome)
/9
5. And in case NEPA turned up to 11 isn't enough, there's also a new, judicially enforceable mandate for "community impact reports" if a project may affect an "environmental justice community."
/10
6. There's also a wild provision that seems to prevent federal agencies from considering any project alternatives in an EIS unless (a) the alternative would have no adverse impact on any "overburdened community," or (b) it serves a compelling interest *in that community.*
/11
"Overburdened communities" are defined, in turn, not as communities burdened by the project, or by legacy pollution, but by race, poverty, or language-minority status.
(CJ Roberts & Co. may find the race piece unconstitutional, but the rest would stand.)
/12
The biggest shocker for me is that this bill has the backing of the old "New Democrats," not just the left wing of the Dem coalition.
I should add that I know NEPA less well than CEQA. Maybe I'm misreading or misunderstanding something in the bill.
Let's hope better minds will find my errors.
@nicholas_bagley @dfarber @jadler1969 @AA_Mance @CarolineCecot @EnergyLawProf @AlecStapp @TDuncheon
/end
One more observation: the bill subtly nudges NEPA toward super-statute status by directing conflicts b/t NEPA "and any other provision of law" to be resolved in favor of NEPA.
@drvolts, @robinsonmeyer: I'd love to hear your thoughts on the CETAA draft that dropped last month. (Apologies if I missed your coverage.)
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By describing the credible commitment problem (the need to reassure developers of new housing or energy that their project won't face price controls for a very long time) I didn't mean to imply, as some critics on the right insist, that the problem is insurmountable.
/2
I think the problem can be greatly mitigated:
1. By offering DC-style "certificates of assurance" to developers, i.e., recordable contracts for compensation if the project is subjected to price controls within a defined period of time.
/3
I have great respect for @nealemahoney & @BharatRamamurti, but I just about pulled my hair out reading their op-ed this morning.
Price controls aren't going to be "a way out" unless their advocates can credibly commit not to apply them to today's projects tomorrow.
🧵/12
The authors briefly acknowledge this concern at the end of their piece but offer nothing beyond a brief nod to sunset clauses and income targeting.
/2
They fail to acknowledge that the NYC controls that Mamdani campaigned on strengthening (w/o income targeting...) have been in place for 50+ years; that popularity of rent controls surely depends on them *not* being income targeted;
/3
In "The Symbolic Politics of Housing," @dbroockman @j_kalla & I showed that public opinion about housing policies correlates w/ affect towards the groups that the policies make salient (via framing or criteria in the policy itself).
🧵/19
Readers asked, "But is the relationship causal?"
We set out to answer their question, focusing on a much-maligned group that ordinary people blame for high housing prices & rents: Real-estate developers.
/2
Working with a filmmaker and a real-life developer, we created short-form videos that sought to humanize the developer -- without conveying information about what her projects look like or how housing development affects prices or local amenities.
/3
I stumbled across the work of Arthur E. Stamps III this morning and, wow, my eyes have been opened!
He's was (is?) an architect in San Francisco who wrote scores of academic papers on the mass public's aesthetic preferences & the failure of "design review" to serve them.
🧵/18
His studies show that San Francisco's Great Downzoning (1970s & early 1980s) was an answer to the public's genuine aesthetic dislike of residential dingbats and downtown "refrigerator towers."
/2
The city planning department had tried to address the public's dislike of midcentury "plain box" style by mandating bay windows. That yielded "Richmond Specials" -- a slight improvement, but still substantially disfavored by public relative to random sample of existing bldgs.
If builder's remedy comes to San Francisco, the city's anti-demolition / displacement rules go out the window.
For progressive supes & tenant orgs who believe what they say about those rules, enacting a compliant rezoning & constraint removal plan should be Priority #1.
🧵/9
Explanation:
- s/t narrow exceptions, a city may not impose any local requirements on a builder's remedy project that EITHER (1) render project infeasible, OR (2) prevent a project that meets certain requirements from being constructed "as proposed by the applicant"
/2
- any local rule or procedure that prevents the demolition of the existing structure on a lot almost surely will "render the project infeasible"
- the exceptions, enumerated in GC 65589.5(d)(1)-(4), do not include tenant or old-building protections
The SF City Economist report on city's housing-element rezone is a nice bookend to the Court of Appeal's decision last month in New Commune v. Redondo Beach.
Put them together, and it's clear that pretty drastic reforms to CA's Housing Element Law are in order.
Crux of New Commune: If city does fact-intensive, site-specific analysis of "realistic" capacity for new housing, any frustrated YIMBY can dredge up an existing lease, go to court, and get the judge to put the city in Builder's Remedy penalty box.
/2
Import of S.F. City Economist report (together w/ HCD's correspondence w/ city thus far): If city instead uses p(dev) method to gauge its plan's capacity, city will be at mercy of the inexpert model gods at HCD.