The use of FPV drones from both Ukraine and Russia has long been a constant feature of daily updates from the front lines. The following research has been conducted on Ukrainian and Russian drone usage, using data collected between August and December 2023 by @AndrewPerpetua, and aims to evaluate the usage of FPV and Lancet drones.
To begin with, it is known that Ukraine has sourced a significant number of FPV drones from various companies and private initiatives, with some of these coming from foreign sources. Accurate figures attributed to foreign producers are difficult to obtain and therefore any estimate would be speculative. Russia, however, has heavily publicized its own increase of FPV drone production and several research articles have already covered this topic [1]. To date, the topic of loitering munitions, particularly the production of Lancet drones, has been covered in both Russia and western media but extrapolation from recent data is yet to be conducted [2]. 1/5
To begin with, it is known that Ukraine has sourced a significant number of FPV drones from various companies and private initiatives, with some of these coming from foreign sources. Accurate figures attributed to foreign producers are difficult to obtain and therefore any estimate would be speculative. Russia, however, has heavily publicized its own increase of FPV drone production and several research articles have already covered this topic [1]. To date, the topic of loitering munitions, particularly the production of Lancet drones, has been covered in both Russia and western media but extrapolation from recent data is yet to be conducted [2]. 1/5
2/5 We can begin by examining the total number of attacks on infantry, over a recent 4 four month period, carried out by both sides using FPV (First Person View) technology. This will exclude any attacks carried out using reusable drones. I have decided to use data from August 2023 to December 2023 as this time marks a period during which @AndrewPerpetua identified and cataloged each individual type of FPV and Lancet strike.
This data shows a progressive increase in drone strikes against infantry. Until November 2023, the Ukrainians were consistently able to score more strikes on infantry than the Russians. However, this situation changed in December, but not with the expected dominance one might have expected following Russia’s 2023 production of FPV drones on a large, state-driven scale. Lancet figures are irrelevant in this context since the cost of a Lancet drone only justifies its use on high-value targets, with open source evidence consistently demonstrating this.
This data shows a progressive increase in drone strikes against infantry. Until November 2023, the Ukrainians were consistently able to score more strikes on infantry than the Russians. However, this situation changed in December, but not with the expected dominance one might have expected following Russia’s 2023 production of FPV drones on a large, state-driven scale. Lancet figures are irrelevant in this context since the cost of a Lancet drone only justifies its use on high-value targets, with open source evidence consistently demonstrating this.
3/5 A greater difference occurs in the comparison between Russian and Ukrainian strikes against vehicles. Ukrainians hold a position of complete dominance over their Russian adversary in this area. Russia registered a similar trend, but at a much lower number of strikes. Thus, any previously anticipated Russian FPV dominance is not a reality supported by evidence. This could be due to a lack of training or an increase in Russian assaults along the front lines. The Ukrainian 2023 counter-offensive, however, was ongoing in August and September so more successful Russian strikes against Ukrainian forces should have been observed. In addition, the use of Lancet follows a similar trend, however, its impact has not been decisive.
4/5 Analysis of data on a day-by-day basis is necessary to examine the historical trend on the usage of FPVs during this war. The data on infantry strikes reveals that both sides have exhibited similar results, with the exception of a significant spike on October 6th when UA FPV drone operators were likely active around Avdiivka. During this time, the impact of the Lancet was comparitavely insignificant. When we examine the data on vehicles, however, we can observe a clear difference between Ukrainian and Russian strikes, with distinct averages and minimal influence from the Lancet observable. The average number of daily strikes for Russia was 4, compared with 13 for Ukraine, indicating more extensive use overall by Ukraine. Even by combining the Russian FPV strikes with the Lancet the difference is still significant.
5/5 From August to the end of the year, Russia used 1485 FPV drones, while Ukraine used 2874.The figure below shows the total usage, allowing us to extrapolate the following. 1. It was widely speculated in the spring that Russia had achieved dominance in the production of FPV and Lancet drones. Despite this, some may argue that Russia is yet to use these stocks and has in fact retained this weaponry in storage. Nevertheless, in an attritional war such as this one, any low-cost, widely available weapon that can destroy high-value targets is likely to be utilized en masse and when needed by either side. This was evidenced in Ukraine's heavy use of FPV drones, which has become due to its notable lack of large caliber mortar and artillery shells. 2. Lancet is not as threatening as previously thought. It is capable against lightly armored vehicles and equipment like radar. However, its cost and the presence of decoys make it less practical and favours cheaper FPVs. 3. Ukraine has demonstrated its capability to sustain and consistently deliver FPV drones to the front line. However, more is needed to save precious artillery shells for future offensive maneuvers. It is also important to highlight that the Ukrainian army has been successful in introducing the figure of FPV operators, as they did for traditional drone operators. This will likely lead to the retention of such dominance thanks to the advantage built and the lower likelihood of losing experienced drone operators who are now also being hunted down by Ukraine drone operators.
Conclusions
To conclude, the Kremlin's most effective weapons are propaganda and panic. However, reliable data and accurate numbers can counteract them, and help us see through the fog of war. The data collected suggests that Russia is still not able to outmatch Ukraine in terms of FPV and Loitering munition use.
Although the situation could change, we have received alarming news of Russian FPV drones fabricated in China. This news further confirms that Russia cannot outproduce Ukraine in this area. It will be crucial to keep track of these attacks and identify any changes in trends, which currently favor Ukraine in an attritional winter war.
I would like to express my gratitude to @AndrewPerpetua for sharing all the data and assisting me in interpreting the table, @wendy_dyers for his incredible proofreading, and the entire @tochnyi
team for their assistance and comments.
(Gif by @JThomason88 )
To conclude, the Kremlin's most effective weapons are propaganda and panic. However, reliable data and accurate numbers can counteract them, and help us see through the fog of war. The data collected suggests that Russia is still not able to outmatch Ukraine in terms of FPV and Loitering munition use.
Although the situation could change, we have received alarming news of Russian FPV drones fabricated in China. This news further confirms that Russia cannot outproduce Ukraine in this area. It will be crucial to keep track of these attacks and identify any changes in trends, which currently favor Ukraine in an attritional winter war.
I would like to express my gratitude to @AndrewPerpetua for sharing all the data and assisting me in interpreting the table, @wendy_dyers for his incredible proofreading, and the entire @tochnyi
team for their assistance and comments.
(Gif by @JThomason88 )
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