📝 Reaching further and without limits

1. Long-range strike (LRS) weapons have emerged as a critical element in Ukraine’s war strategy, enabling precision strikes on Russian military infrastructure, logistics, and command structures. 2. Long-range strike weapons provide strategic impacts beyond the battlefield by targeting critical locations behind enemy lines. Their main functions include counter-population, strategic interdiction, counter-leadership, and counterforce. tochnyi.info/2024/11/reachi…

🧵Russian IRBM attack on Dnipro

1. It is always important to let the dust settle before making any analysis in these cases. Regarding the attack on Dnipro, we can say it is highly likely that it is not very significant for the kinetic aspect of the war in Ukraine. 2. In the first hours following the attack, many people, myself included, believed it was an ICBM. However, thanks to @John_A_Ridge and the initial information provided, we can confirm that it was actually an IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile). While this distinction is important, it is also a minor one.

1/n The 67th Arsenal of GRAU (53° 8’34.42″N 34°57’5.27″E ) successfully strike tonight has been covered in our latest research article on @tochnyi . Let’s have a look together on what it is, and why it is important.

tochnyi.info/2024/10/attack… 2/n the 67th Arsenal of GRAU is what we classify as a class 2 depot. It has mostly Soviet-era buildings and a series of old ECMs. The site is within the 500 km range from the Ukrainian border. Has a vast tree coverage and a substantial surface area.

📝 Attack on the Arsenals: Russia's Achilles' Heel

Our investigation at @tochnyi on Russian Ammunition Depots is out, I will give you a short introduction in this thread but you can find it in full on our website at:

tochnyi.info/2024/10/attack… 2/n First of all, it's important to note that not all ammunition depots are the same. I've decided to categorize those within 500 km of the Ukrainian border. We start with those which are old and not particularly rugged, which I define as Class 1. These are Soviet-era ammo depots. They have little to no soil protection and mostly use above-ground magazines. Sometimes, you can also find tons of ordnance left in the open or under conventional roofs, with no sidewalls at all.

🧵Oktyabrsky precision strike

1/6 Last night, there were two strikes, and my first thread on the Toropets bunker was just released. The image I'm sharing combines a CNES/Airbus 2024 optical image and a false colour image from Sentinel 1C. The depot can be divided into two macro areas: North with mostly unprotected AGM (Above Ground Magazine) and South with open-air stockpiles. The strike affected Some places more than others; I'll be delving into this to understand why. 2/6 This schematic illustrates why the southern region, despite its clear vulnerability, is less impacted by fires—at least those visible. Notably, the largest open-air storage area has been quite active. Stockpiles from 2021 until summer 2023, appear significantly depleted and are likely not being replenished with new materials. In addition, the central open-air section of the northern part of the depot seems largely empty.

🧵Reading under Toropets’ hashes

1/7 The Ukrainian strike on Toropets may have been one of the most successful attacks on an ammunition depot since the start of the war. The reasons behind this success are still under scrutiny. Many are discussing the potential use of the Storm Shadow missile or the large number of drones, possibly up to 100. It's clear there also has been incompetence within the Russian army. 2/7 First of all, while everyone is rushing to see the ashes, I spent some time examining how this site was built. The initial information we have gathered from 2013 to 2018 indicates that the forest ground has not been excavated. Soil has been moved, and construction started in a big rush. This is a problem because to offer more protection, you would dig a few meters into the ground and then build your concrete shell.

Short 🧵EW in the Kursk Operation

1/n There have been reports of ZSU push at Korenevo, following a successful targeting of bridges and pontoon bridges along the Seym River. Two newly constructed bridges have become targets for the Ukrainian Air Force. (@AndrewPerpetua Map) 2/n The offensive itself, taking many international observers by surprise, saw successful advances made by the Ukrainian Armed Forces within the first few hours and days of the operation. Operations in the Kursk area have been intensifying and were likely already taking shape by early June. During the lead-up to the offensive, there was an escalation in activity overall, but particularly in terms of drone strikes - which Andrew and his team documented at the time.

A new🧵 factories fueling Russia's war machine.
This is part of a long investigation we started at @tochnyi months ago to uncover the network of industries supporting military production beyond the commonly known defence manufacturers. Today we will explore the Krasny Oktyabr metallurgical plant in Volgograd. 1/n Since 2009, Russia has invested a large amount of resources into improving its metallurgical production facilities, an industry which stagnated after the fall of the Soviet Union. For the detailed research, here is the article’s link: tochnyi.info/2024/08/on-the…

🧵1/n Optical fibre and FPV drones

I have been reading a lot about wire-guided FPV drones, and despite I share my concern about their increased effectiveness due to their physical strength I am also quite optimistic about their future. Let’s try to see how. 2/n David detailed in his article on Forbes, he covered this twice, such methodology, which was discover already many months ago. It created a mixture of emotions among experts and commentators, but it can be seen as a natural response to a problem, EW.

forbes.com/sites/davidham…

1/n Since the start of the war in 2022, Russia has been strengthening its military industry and increasing its military budget. An investigation on Russia’s “hidden” factories, places not secret but somehow not advertised by the propaganda. @tochnyi tochnyi.info/2024/07/russia… @tochnyi 2/n The current level of attrition is consistently high, also thanks to the use of relatively inexpensive but effective drones such as FPV heavy bombers and kamikaze. A staggering number of observed strikes on vehicles, with a peak of 1126 observed in April.

🧨A short post on Nitrocellulose.

1/7 Cotton is crucial for textiles and producing nitrocellulose, a key ingredient in military propellants. Let’s explore the largest cotton producers and how this links to nitrocellulose production for defence. 2/7 🇨🇳China leads the world in cotton production with a production peak in 2022 of 6000 (1000 tonnes), followed by 🇮🇳India and 🇺🇸 the USA. There are also other important producers like Australia, Turkey and Brazil. Check out this chart for a visual comparison of their production volumes.

Piercing Russian heavy armor

My latest work is now on @tochnyi website, it wouldn't be possible without the support of the entire team, a special mention to @wendy_dyers for his proofreading, and to @clockworkChris for his marvellous graphics.

tochnyi.info/2024/06/pierci… 1/n Introduction
Understanding the impact of FPV drones on tanks in the Ukrainian war is complex due to several factors. Reliable and comprehensive data is essential but currently limited, with most data coming from Andrew Perpetua and his OSINT team, providing valuable but not exhaustive insights.

The evolving FPV drone technology and tactics by Ukrainian and Russian forces add complexity. Each side continuously develops and refines these drones, making it challenging to assess their impact accurately. Different drone models with various capabilities influence their effectiveness against tanks, leading to constant adaptation of strategies in response to drone threats.

Moreover, the quality of visual data, often from video footage, affects the accurate identification and counting of damaged or destroyed tanks. Poor video quality can lead to misidentification or underreporting, further complicating the assessment.

Long 🧵 on drones 1/n

Since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, drones have slowly taken the front pages. Initially, it was the Bayraktar TB2, which brought a drone directly to the front line for the first time in a large-scale combat operation. 2/n

Analysts across the entire spectrum, from professional and academic to open-source intelligence, have observed the rise of small commercial surveillance drones for reconnaissance and, increasingly, for more kinetic operations.

For the first time in history, we have seen the successful use of naval drones in the role of direct strike assets.

FPV Drones: Avdiivka's Western Front (31-04-2024)

The fall of Avdiivka on the 17th of February 2024 is one of the more sobering junctures of the Ukrainian-Russian war. This article intends not to investigate the circumstances which led to the fall of Avdiivka but will try to understand the situation the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) faced there.

Full article:
tochnyi.info/2024/04/fpv-dr… 1/n To explore the progression of FPV drone usage and its impact on the conflict, it is important to understand that the data analyzed within this article is based on geolocated and verified attacks recorded by operators, and released in either edited or unedited versions on Telegram channels. The strikes recorded in this database, despite having been verified and geolocated with extreme care, represent only a portion of all total attacks.

1/7 We can start with the graphs that depict the strikes on infantry and vehicles. The data is based on information gathered by @AndrewPerpetua and @giK1893 . As I write this thread, the current situation is very different from what I had expected. The current level of use of FPV drones from the Russian side has plummeted in all stats. Ukraine performed nearly the same number of strikes on infantry and vehicles in March, a week ahead of the month's end. This growth is swift, considering the initial numbers and the apparent difficulties observed in December. There is still a week of data to collect, and we will see in the weeks to come if Russia has a backlog of information to release, or if there are simply fewer drones in operation. We will deal with this specific topic at the end.
2/7 The latest data shows that Ukrainian forces have achieved remarkable results when it comes to striking enemy positions, managing to score more hits in less than a month. On the other hand, Russian forces seem to be struggling to keep up. Trenches remain the most hazardous place to be, as they account for a staggering 70.2% of all the strikes conducted so far.

FPV usage update 17-03-2024

Data from @AndrewPerpetua and @giK1893, and the support of @tochnyi members.

1/6

In this latest update on FPV drone usage, I have decided to enhance our understanding of the situation by introducing a couple of graphs. These visual aids will shed light on the monthly performance of each side and their efforts in targeting logistical assets.

As we are currently in the middle of the month, it’s noteworthy that Ukrainian forces have shown remarkable performance compared to the Russians. Surprisingly, the Russians are lagging behind in both metrics, particularly in strikes on infantry and vehicles.

This unexpected turn of events is particularly striking in the infantry category, where a significant parity has typically been observed between the two sides, barring exceptions like that of February 2024. If the current trend persists, it will become increasingly apparent that these discrepancies are likely attributed to Russian challenges in deploying an adequate number of drones.
2/6

Data on positions also shows a change, currently in favor of the Ukrainian forces. Looking back, it’s incredible to see such a shift, especially considering their relatively defensive posture. While the data is partial and subject to potential drastic changes, examining previous statistics reveals that this aligns with the overall trend. Trenches are the most frequently targeted positions, accounting for a staggering 70% of total strikes.

1/4 I believe it's a good time to give a quick update on FPV drone usage. Let's start with the progression and total numbers. As we know from my last update, February was one of the most intense months for FPV drone usage, and it's now confirmed that the growth is at least quadratic and shows no signs of stopping. As of March 9th, Ukrainians have already used 721 drones, and at this rate of growth, they will reach January's results in just a week.

In terms of overall usage, Russia is falling behind. There are different possibilities for why this is happening - lack of drones, lack of pilots, lack of dedicated ammunition - but I think a combination of the first two factors is the most likely. Overall, Russia doesn't have the staggering numbers claimed by its propaganda.
2/4 Ukraine currently holds a significant advantage in both infantry and vehicle categories. This is a result of recent failed attacks by Russian forces. Ukrainian troops have been effectively utilizing FPV drones as a defensive tool, which could potentially initiate a new era of mobile defence doctrine. I recently discussed the concept of area defence and its limitations in an article, which can be found at . It is encouraging to see the new leadership utilising more mobility in their defence strategy. However, only time will tell if this move proves to be successful.tochnyi.info/2024/03/trench…

I know is not completely related but I think is time to give an update on the work done by several FPV manufacturer including @wilendhornets to which I cast my best wish with their fundraiser.

It is not new news that Ukrainian drone operators have been targeting mechanised infantry and vehicles, particularly those used for logistics. Over the past few weeks, there has been a significant increase in strikes on logistical vehicles. Overall, the trend is consistent, and it is apparent that the Russians are losing more assets than the Ukrainians. 1/5 @wilendhornets 2/5 In terms of strikes against positions we see as always an advantage of the Russians, but differently from the past months now, the gap is smaller. This is due to changes in tactics and adaptation, but also our improved tracking methods.

Finally a long work has been published on drone warfare thanks to the data of @AndrewPerpetua and the help of @eDrotning , @wendy_dyers and the rest of our @tochnyi family. If you would like to read it in full ... lets start

As my previous article [1] and thread on X [2] highlighted, assessing the evolving impact of FPV drones is crucial to understanding their role in the dynamics of this war. A data-based approach allows us to both estimate the future evolution of this technology and establish a more accurate picture of the capabilities of the opposing forces. To obtain the most reliable data currently available, I have utilized a database created by @AndrewPerpetua. This database contains not only information on FPV drone strikes, but also on a range of other types of attacks as well as a variety of other data on the continuing Russian invasion of Ukraine. Andrew and his team spend a considerable amount of time verifying and geolocating each strike. Andrew also updates his losses chart with data from satellite imagery, consistently providing an unbiased and as precise a database as possible, underscoring his reputation within this field.

While it is true that the available data has likely not recorded every single strike that has taken place, this analysis will show that it certainly covers a significant portion of them. This data and the approach taken to its analysis aims to provide clarity from ambiguity, particularly from that generated by misinformation and disinformation. This enables us to establish a clearer understanding of the current situation and its continuing developments.

To illustrate the impact of the data collected by Andrew and the efforts made by myself to understand it, I provide an overview of the density contour map for drone usage by both sides. The red peaks in the ‘hot zones’ overlay the January 2023 frontline and serve as a testament to the value of the work done by Andrew and @Tochnyi.tochnyi.info/2024/01/update… 2/n We will begin by examining recent trends in FPV strikes on infantry, as illustrated in the first chart. Since my initial analysis, this situation has continued to evolve. Currently, the Russians lead in this area, having recently outpaced the Ukrainians in terms of numbers of strikes. From November 2023, the number of Russian strikes overtook Ukraine’s, at 564 to 495 respectively.  As of January 2024, with 8 days left in the month, they have thus far registered 655 strikes, 91 more than they did in December 2023 and more than Ukraine’s 533 strikes. This growing trend is alarming, indicative of an effective strategy to weaken the Ukrainian military by targeting its infantry at a time when Ukraine has reported a shortfall of manpower. As of today, the total count of FPV drone strikes stands at 1752 from Russia and 1779 from Ukraine, giving the Russians a lead of 47 strikes to date.

Recent criticism of Western-supplied equipment to Ukraine and the industries that produce it has characterised this equipment as “boutique”; i.e. a luxurious, over-engineered item with a lengthy manufacturing time. This narrative is also commonly found to promote the notion that inflated budgets and poor performances are inherent within manufacturing industries. Moreover, some critics have blamed Ukraine’s allies’ inadequacies in producing more ammunition and vehicles on these same manufacturing complexities.  Along with addressing this criticism, we will examine why many pieces of artillery have been removed from the battlefield for repair.

Barrels are an essential component in weapon systems, guiding the ammunition through a long narrow cylindrical tube. Barrels are divided into three sections from the breech face: the combustion chamber, bore, and the muzzle. The graphic below illustrates a typical gun barrel design, depicting components such as the breech, bore, and muzzle [1]. The figure also shows a cross-sectional view of a gun barrel that depicts the grooves on the inner surface of the bore.

The projectile's outer diameter is slightly smaller to the barrel's inner diameter. When the trigger is pulled, the propellant burns and produces a large volume of gas. High-pressure gas combines with mechanical force to increase the ammunition's kinetic energy, pushing it towards the bore and muzzle of the barrel. The conversion of chemical to mechanical energy creates high-pressure and high-temperature conditions inside the chamber, leading to erosion and wear of the material after every firing cycle. This results in plastic deformation followed by permanent barrel failure. 1/10 2/10 In the past, barrels were retired because the walls of the barrels themselves became thinned due to wear. This was caused by the continuous process of erosion which occurred during firing; an erosion process of both the chemical and the mechanical type [1-2-3].

Technological advancements in materials and coatings have, however, helped to inhibit or alleviate barrel erosion. Despite this, overall, four main routes of failure exist for any gun barrel: wear and erosion, fatigue, plastic bore deformation and gas leakage/burst (as illustrated in the image below for reference).

The last two on this list are classed as catastrophic failures. The first sees the barrel deform plastically to the point where its geometry is compromised and rendered unsafe to operate. This can be triggered by improper use, or combustion of the propellant charges causing an anomalous increase in chamber pressure. The second is the creation of a fracture across the barrel’s thickness which causes gases to be expelled during operation. This could lead to a more substantial failure if the material used for construction is too brittle.

The use of FPV drones from both Ukraine and Russia has long been a constant feature of daily updates from the front lines. The following research has been conducted on Ukrainian and Russian drone usage, using data collected between August and December 2023 by @AndrewPerpetua, and aims to evaluate the usage of FPV and Lancet drones.

To begin with, it is known that Ukraine has sourced a significant number of FPV drones from various companies and private initiatives, with some of these coming from foreign sources. Accurate figures attributed to foreign producers are difficult to obtain and therefore any estimate would be speculative. Russia, however, has heavily publicized its own increase of FPV drone production and several research articles have already covered this topic [1]. To date, the topic of loitering munitions, particularly the production of Lancet drones, has been covered in both Russia and western media but extrapolation from recent data is yet to be conducted [2]. 1/5 2/5 We can begin by examining the total number of attacks on infantry, over a recent 4 four month period, carried out by both sides using FPV (First Person View) technology. This will exclude any attacks carried out using reusable drones. I have decided to use data from August 2023 to December 2023 as this time marks a period during which @AndrewPerpetua identified and cataloged each individual type of FPV and Lancet strike.

This data shows a progressive increase in drone strikes against infantry. Until November 2023, the Ukrainians were consistently able to score more strikes on infantry than the Russians. However, this situation changed in December, but not with the expected dominance one might have expected following Russia’s 2023 production of FPV drones on a large, state-driven scale. Lancet figures are irrelevant in this context since the cost of a Lancet drone only justifies its use on high-value targets, with open source evidence consistently demonstrating this.