1. At this point, I am becoming a broken disk, but this is NOT a country which is preparing for Peace; this is a country preparing for war, with us. At this pace, they will not need 5 or 10 years... this is just ONE YEAR of work. Thanks to @hizzo_jay for working on this.
2. Perm and Iskra plants are places where weapons to kill more Europeans are made right now, while you sleep and while you order your Latte at the bar. This place produces different types of missiles, and this is just after 1 year.

Alabuga plant: No Chain is stronger than its weakest link

New @tochnyi investigation on Shahed drones and the Alabuga plant, first in a mini-series.
If the Shahed is the arrow and the launch sites the bow, today we cover the blacksmith forging the arrow. 1. If you’d like to dive straight into the full investigation, you’ll find the link below. But for those following along here, this thread offers a summary of our main findings.

tochnyi.info/2025/08/alabab…

Putin’s ears within Europe: Uncovering Kaliningrad’s Hidden Antenna Array

Our latest at @tochnyi investigation into Putin's military expansion in Europe focuses on a new intelligence site under construction in Kaliningrad, just 25km from the Polish border. The site was discovered by @hizzo_jay 1. The full article can be found here:
tochnyi.info/2025/08/putins…

Regarding the challenge of defending against the saturation of drones from an adversary, many advocate for the use of solely “cheaper” mass-produced drones.

Despite this seeming like an obvious solution, it is not.

🧵 2/
The logic goes: if the enemy uses swarms of low-cost drones, the best way to respond is by producing more of your own. Quantity vs. quantity.

But this thinking ignores critical tactical, logistical, and strategic realities.

Un thread in italiano è sempre un po’ doloroso, perché mi ricorda che quando lo scrivo è perché vedo qualcosa in Italia che non va. L’aggressione subita da @Ivan_Grieco non è grave solo per il fatto in sé, ma forse è ancora più grave perché, scavando, si comprende come l’informazione in Italia sia totalmente in mano a incompetenti o propagandisti. Le manifestazioni per la pace sono sempre qualcosa di giusto e sacrosanto. Ricordo bene quando, all’alba dell’invasione dell’Iraq, il mondo intero provò a dire di no. In quel momento c’era tanta voglia di fare del bene e di evitare una guerra inutile. Io, personalmente, sostenevo l’intervento in Afghanistan, ma non quello in Iraq.

🕷️🧵 “Operation Spider's Web”: Ukraine’s bold and precision-engineered drone strike on Russian strategic air bases.

This thread will explore the more intriguing aspects of Ukraine’s recent drone strike on Russian airbases. On June 1, 2025, Ukraine executed meticulously planned, multi-pronged, and most advanced FPV drone missions to date operation targeting airbases that house long-range bombers. For a thorough analysis, refer to our linked main article. 1/6tochnyi.info/2025/06/a-deep…

⚡️Engels-2 Airbase strike: Beyond the clouds

1. The recent strike on the Engels-2 Airbase, specifically the attack on the ammunition depots containing the critical KH-101, has been very successful. There are several reasons behind this success, one is:

GEOINT 2. Based on the information currently available is possible to understand that the attack was actuated with the use of solely slow-moving drones. The key strength of this system is its ability to change path and follow long elusive trajectories.

Are UAV attacks on Russia effective?
1. I’m writing a short thread to address questions from @GrandpaRoy2 and other users from my recent short thread. Please note that my information relies on OSINT data and personal technical knowledge, so take it with a grain of salt. 2. The attacks involve specific platforms that have evolved through ongoing efforts to enhance Ukraine's long-range drone capabilities in terms of range, payload, manoeuvrability, and production.

1. Strike on the Bryansk Chemical plant

On 13 January 2025, news accompanied by video about a strike on the Bryansk Chemical plant emerged rapidly. The few videos show explosions in the distance, with no sound of drones, and several hits allegedly reported ATACMS. 2. The absence of incoming drones and no air defence is evident. Hits in sequence are followed by larger explosions, indicating a potential ballistic attack. A jet engine noise is heard at 2:12, possibly caused by noise distortion from the explosions.

📝 Reaching further and without limits

1. Long-range strike (LRS) weapons have emerged as a critical element in Ukraine’s war strategy, enabling precision strikes on Russian military infrastructure, logistics, and command structures. 2. Long-range strike weapons provide strategic impacts beyond the battlefield by targeting critical locations behind enemy lines. Their main functions include counter-population, strategic interdiction, counter-leadership, and counterforce. tochnyi.info/2024/11/reachi…

🧵Russian IRBM attack on Dnipro

1. It is always important to let the dust settle before making any analysis in these cases. Regarding the attack on Dnipro, we can say it is highly likely that it is not very significant for the kinetic aspect of the war in Ukraine. 2. In the first hours following the attack, many people, myself included, believed it was an ICBM. However, thanks to @John_A_Ridge and the initial information provided, we can confirm that it was actually an IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile). While this distinction is important, it is also a minor one.

1/n The 67th Arsenal of GRAU (53° 8’34.42″N 34°57’5.27″E ) successfully strike tonight has been covered in our latest research article on @tochnyi . Let’s have a look together on what it is, and why it is important.

tochnyi.info/2024/10/attack… 2/n the 67th Arsenal of GRAU is what we classify as a class 2 depot. It has mostly Soviet-era buildings and a series of old ECMs. The site is within the 500 km range from the Ukrainian border. Has a vast tree coverage and a substantial surface area.

📝 Attack on the Arsenals: Russia's Achilles' Heel

Our investigation at @tochnyi on Russian Ammunition Depots is out, I will give you a short introduction in this thread but you can find it in full on our website at:

tochnyi.info/2024/10/attack… 2/n First of all, it's important to note that not all ammunition depots are the same. I've decided to categorize those within 500 km of the Ukrainian border. We start with those which are old and not particularly rugged, which I define as Class 1. These are Soviet-era ammo depots. They have little to no soil protection and mostly use above-ground magazines. Sometimes, you can also find tons of ordnance left in the open or under conventional roofs, with no sidewalls at all.

🧵Oktyabrsky precision strike

1/6 Last night, there were two strikes, and my first thread on the Toropets bunker was just released. The image I'm sharing combines a CNES/Airbus 2024 optical image and a false colour image from Sentinel 1C. The depot can be divided into two macro areas: North with mostly unprotected AGM (Above Ground Magazine) and South with open-air stockpiles. The strike affected Some places more than others; I'll be delving into this to understand why. 2/6 This schematic illustrates why the southern region, despite its clear vulnerability, is less impacted by fires—at least those visible. Notably, the largest open-air storage area has been quite active. Stockpiles from 2021 until summer 2023, appear significantly depleted and are likely not being replenished with new materials. In addition, the central open-air section of the northern part of the depot seems largely empty.

🧵Reading under Toropets’ hashes

1/7 The Ukrainian strike on Toropets may have been one of the most successful attacks on an ammunition depot since the start of the war. The reasons behind this success are still under scrutiny. Many are discussing the potential use of the Storm Shadow missile or the large number of drones, possibly up to 100. It's clear there also has been incompetence within the Russian army. 2/7 First of all, while everyone is rushing to see the ashes, I spent some time examining how this site was built. The initial information we have gathered from 2013 to 2018 indicates that the forest ground has not been excavated. Soil has been moved, and construction started in a big rush. This is a problem because to offer more protection, you would dig a few meters into the ground and then build your concrete shell.

Short 🧵EW in the Kursk Operation

1/n There have been reports of ZSU push at Korenevo, following a successful targeting of bridges and pontoon bridges along the Seym River. Two newly constructed bridges have become targets for the Ukrainian Air Force. (@AndrewPerpetua Map) 2/n The offensive itself, taking many international observers by surprise, saw successful advances made by the Ukrainian Armed Forces within the first few hours and days of the operation. Operations in the Kursk area have been intensifying and were likely already taking shape by early June. During the lead-up to the offensive, there was an escalation in activity overall, but particularly in terms of drone strikes - which Andrew and his team documented at the time.

A new🧵 factories fueling Russia's war machine.
This is part of a long investigation we started at @tochnyi months ago to uncover the network of industries supporting military production beyond the commonly known defence manufacturers. Today we will explore the Krasny Oktyabr metallurgical plant in Volgograd. 1/n Since 2009, Russia has invested a large amount of resources into improving its metallurgical production facilities, an industry which stagnated after the fall of the Soviet Union. For the detailed research, here is the article’s link: tochnyi.info/2024/08/on-the…

🧵1/n Optical fibre and FPV drones

I have been reading a lot about wire-guided FPV drones, and despite I share my concern about their increased effectiveness due to their physical strength I am also quite optimistic about their future. Let’s try to see how. 2/n David detailed in his article on Forbes, he covered this twice, such methodology, which was discover already many months ago. It created a mixture of emotions among experts and commentators, but it can be seen as a natural response to a problem, EW.

forbes.com/sites/davidham…

1/n Since the start of the war in 2022, Russia has been strengthening its military industry and increasing its military budget. An investigation on Russia’s “hidden” factories, places not secret but somehow not advertised by the propaganda. @tochnyi tochnyi.info/2024/07/russia… @tochnyi 2/n The current level of attrition is consistently high, also thanks to the use of relatively inexpensive but effective drones such as FPV heavy bombers and kamikaze. A staggering number of observed strikes on vehicles, with a peak of 1126 observed in April.

🧨A short post on Nitrocellulose.

1/7 Cotton is crucial for textiles and producing nitrocellulose, a key ingredient in military propellants. Let’s explore the largest cotton producers and how this links to nitrocellulose production for defence. 2/7 🇨🇳China leads the world in cotton production with a production peak in 2022 of 6000 (1000 tonnes), followed by 🇮🇳India and 🇺🇸 the USA. There are also other important producers like Australia, Turkey and Brazil. Check out this chart for a visual comparison of their production volumes.

Piercing Russian heavy armor

My latest work is now on @tochnyi website, it wouldn't be possible without the support of the entire team, a special mention to @wendy_dyers for his proofreading, and to @clockworkChris for his marvellous graphics.

tochnyi.info/2024/06/pierci… 1/n Introduction
Understanding the impact of FPV drones on tanks in the Ukrainian war is complex due to several factors. Reliable and comprehensive data is essential but currently limited, with most data coming from Andrew Perpetua and his OSINT team, providing valuable but not exhaustive insights.

The evolving FPV drone technology and tactics by Ukrainian and Russian forces add complexity. Each side continuously develops and refines these drones, making it challenging to assess their impact accurately. Different drone models with various capabilities influence their effectiveness against tanks, leading to constant adaptation of strategies in response to drone threats.

Moreover, the quality of visual data, often from video footage, affects the accurate identification and counting of damaged or destroyed tanks. Poor video quality can lead to misidentification or underreporting, further complicating the assessment.