The case for the Russian missile that struck Kharkiv on January 2 being a North Koran Hwasong-11 variant is a very, very strong. A short thread building on the work of the #OSINTatMIIS team, especially the amazing @DuitsmanMS. politico.com/news/2024/01/0…
A point of clarification. North Korea manufactures several variants of the Hwasong-11 including the Hwasong-11A (US designation: KN-23) and the Hwasong-11B (KN-24). We're still not sure which variant was used in the attack on Kharkiv. I made a chart to help you out.
Based on the description of the graphic that the USG handed out, which mentioned both the KN-23 and KN-24, it seems the USG isn't certain either. TBH, the variants look very similar when shiny and new. What's left of the missile at the end of the ride is pretty well-done. reuters.com/world/europe/r…
For our comparison, we have many pictures of North Korean Hwasong-11 SRBMs under production at the February 11 Machine Plant near Hamhung. We also have many pictures of Iskander debris from combat in Georgia, Azerbaijan and now Ukraine.
There are two points to make: First, the debris in Kharkiv is very similar to North Korea's Hwasong 11 A/B. Second, the debris is distinctly unlike Russia's Iskander. Let's look at two bits of the missile: the top of the solid rocket motor and the base.
The top of the motor has a metal plate covering the access port for the igniter. The North Koreans bolt that plate on the Hwasong-11 A/B with 20 evenly spaced bolts. The Russians use 18 bolts in six groups of three for Iskander. The debris has 20 evenly spaced bolts.
Another coincidence -- a variant of the Hwasong-11 has an irregular pattern of fastening points around the edge of the casing at the top of the motor. The pattern on the debris matches perfectly. We're not sure which variant (A or B) has that pattern, but we know one does.
The bottom of the missile has four jet vanes for steering the missile. The mechanism that moves the vanes is housed in a little box. The housing on the Hwasong-11 A and B is blocky and trapezoidal. The housing on the Iskander is rounded. The housing in the debris is trapezoid.
The Ukrainians actually unbolted at least one of the housings and took a picture of it. It looks identical to what we see on the Hwasong-11 A and B.
Last but not least, the base of the Russia's Iskander has circular ports to house penetration aids (countermeasures to fool missile defenses.) North Korea's Hwasong-11 A and B have no PENAIDS in the base, which is smooth as a baby's bottom. The base in the wreckage is smooth.
This is a damning set of similarities. The missile is certainly not an Iskander. The case for this being a Hwasong-11 variant is very, very strong. In fact, I can't imagine a stronger case short of a worker leaving a signed note from Kim Jong Un inside the guidance compartment.
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Why am I so unimpressed by these strikes? Israel and the US have failed to target significant elements of Iran's nuclear materials and production infrastructure. RISING LION and MIDNIGHT HAMMER are tactically brilliant, but may turn out to be strategic failures. 🧵 1/17
Netanyahu's justification for conducting this strike was that "Iran has produced enough highly enriched uranium for nine atom bombs -- nine." He refers to Iran's stockpile of ~400 kg of 60% U-235 which, if further enriched, would be enough for 9-10 weapons. Let's consider. 2/17
The 400 kg of HEU was largely stored in underground tunnels near the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. Despite extensive Israeli and US attacks the facility, there does not seem to have been any effort to destroy these tunnels or the material that was in them. 3/17
References to "tactical" nuclear weapons in this otherwise great @guardian story by @hugolowell are misleading. The US would drop a strategic B61-11 nuclear earth penetrator with a yield of 300 or 400 kilotons. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 15 and 21 kt. theguardian.com/world/2025/jun…
Here are the nuclear weapons in the US "enduring stockpile" from @ENERGY's stockpile management plant. Note that the B61-11 nuclear earth penetrator is labeled as a "strategic bomb" -- and for good reason. energy.gov/sites/default/…
The yield of the B61-11 is classified, but it is a converted B61-7 bomb. The yield of the -7 and -11 are usually given as more than 300 kilotons. @nukestrat says the B61-11 was increased to 400 kt. Either way, this is a very powerful nuclear weapon.
I see @SangerNYT asked why Israel hasn't hit the stockpile of enriched uranium. My understanding is that the hex is stored in the tunnels at Isfahan and Israel hasn't been able to destroy the hard, deeply buried targets. Thread.
Isfahan UCF has some tunnels that are are about 100 m under a mountain that Israel has not yet tried to hit. The Iranians were pretty proud of these tunnels, which were constructed around the same time as Fordow by the same dwarves (aka the Passive Defense Organization).
This is pretty esoteric knowledge that is only covered in specialists journals like ... the @nytimes. 😉 (Sorry, I just appreciate Bill Broad and want to give him some love.)
This is probably the the new North Korean uranium enrichment facility that @iaeaorg DG @rafaelmgrossi briefed the Board of Governors about. @sam_lair and I have a summary on the blog. Nice shot by our friends at @planet. armscontrolwonk.com/archive/122048…
The dimensions, layout and other features do resemble the Kangson UEP when it was constructed. Here is a 2002 image of the Kangson under construction -- the central enrichment hall is about 93 m long, which is the right length for two 164-centifuge cascades end-to-end.
Trump's offer to Iran, as reported by @BarakRavid, is a dollar-store-JCPOA.
The JCPOA -- which Trump abandoned -- had all of these provisions, usually in ways that were stronger or more carefully constructed.
He's trying to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. A thread.
@BarakRavid Here is the original story. The proposal was "described to Axios by two sources with direct knowledge — one of whom provided a point-by-point breakdown." This is a paraphrase, so sometimes its hard to know what they are getting at. axios.com/2025/06/02/ira…
@BarakRavid Here is the text of the JCPOA. You don't have to take my word for it; you can look it up yourself. europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460…
The claim of 25 missiles a month is falsely attributed to the @DI_Ukraine. What @DI_Ukraine says, according to other news outlets, is 25 IRBMs per YEAR, not per MONTH. babel.ua/news/113282-ro…
Oreshnik is the first two stages of the Yars missile. Oreshnik production rates should be similar to Yars production rates, which the Russians claim is "about 20 launchers and their supporting systems per year." web.archive.org/web/2021041112…