The extravagantly hyped AFU 2023 counteroffensive concentrated most of its flourishes on the Tokmak-Melitopol Axis ...springboard for a breathlessly awaited 'Crimean Beach Party'
When detail on Russian advances emerges we sometimes see ruthless determination like someone tearing wings off a fly
Mapped pushes and withdrawals here see AFU forces cooped into entrenchments which Russian troops first faced from their forward slopes
opposite to AFU needs
The ancient military commandment "seize the high ground", sacred to say spotters and machine gunners, may seem irrelevant in this war of redundant ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) technology and coverage
But as AFU strength wanes further, such brutal topographical and tactical reality poses immediate danger to their entire front
On the Rabotino Axis the salient's central approach offers the AFU few suitable and ready defences even among those taken from the Surovikin Line's forward screen
Although recent reports seem to describe modest Russian advances here, they would imply grave danger for the AFU position from much greater coverage by Russian observed indirect fire, as well as direct-fire weapons, whose ranges and arcs now threaten a continual nightmare for the AFU in its efforts to maintain hard-won but meager lines of advance
Russian seizure of that south-central spur threatened to form two small pockets of exposed AFU troops doomed to annihilation
Their withdrawal may have left a screening force nearer the Russian advance but if so their downhill positions are hardly much better than what they left
Withdrawn AFU troops had a reduced access to nearby entrenchments
Being dug in can buy time and protection, but not much when downhill of the enemy, while all movement at such positions is restricted severely
Then there's the matter of Russian Shell *Supremacy*
Not mere indirect fire superiority, but ongoing domination since the attrition war took off by May 2022
AFU members' first-hand complaints describe its range from a low of *four to one*
The higher ratios become unthinkable
The operation was always a futile waste, bound to fail
Newly acquired Leopard 2 MBTs and Bradley IFVs were touted as its Wonder Weapons
But these only added more targets in the Russian ISR matrix, yielding strikes on AFU troops as far back as assembly areas and form-up points
Cost in lives is irreplaceable
AFU casualties as released are nowhere near open: rank and other selectivity confirm strict controls on that detail
But a tiny sample of that 'blood trail' nonetheless shows disproportionately high toll among those who never left the starting mark
Worse for the AFU, prolonged incursion (rather than actual breakthrough) would compel more reserves just to secure wide flanks
At nearly twice the area's normal frontline, the axis of advance would end up needing near double force strength just to hold
...before covering losses
Indeed AFU forces redeployed from the Vasilevka AO to the west, near the Dniepr bend, for just that purpose
...thus fast confirming the total abandonment of any offensive effort in that area, if such had ever been serious to begin with
Again, all this was discernible in just a cursory glance at official blood trails
More bizarre was redeployment of 47 Mech Bde from the Rabotino Axis to the northern flank of Avdeevka AO much farther east
It appears that 118 Mech made the switch, but it could have been a mix of available battalions
With a sluggish advance this was a congested front anyway
But 47's shift to Avdeevka now confirmed that this offensive effort too was for all intents over
Regardless, the AFU had committed to a salient and needed to salvage a sense of achievement
Additional forces came from the east too, out of the Vremyevsky Ridge push, to shore up the dam
23 Mech Bde regrouped after its minefield-artillery ordeal similar to that of 47 Mech Bde
23 Mech deployed amid reports of a reserve brigade being disbanded
Operational games of 'musical chairs' had characterised much AFU decision since the SMO's start
I called it "robbing Taras to pay Mykola" - confirming failure and exhaustion at each southern AFU axis of advance
The Orekhov-Tokmak AO's bizarre mission depended upon suitably weird indeed unmilitary command arrangements
Alexander Tarnavsky, southeastern front chief, wore rank barely enough to pull over the many brigade commanders below him
Brigadier-General Tarnavsky appears a practical enough veteran whose role has been more like front coordinator just holding the line to prevent disaster
Tarnavsky was clearly deemed unsuited to run a grandiose counteroffensive
So Kiev improvized, manipulating rank to undermine his command
Major General Mirgorodsky, the officer appointed to lead this main effort, was nominally subordinate to Tarnavsky i.e., under his front command
But Mirgorodsky outranked his new boss
Compromise or innovation? Maybe both, but all to fight Kiev's war under intense NATO pressure
Thus did Major-General Mirgorodsky virtually parachute into (or onto) OSU Tavriya in the manner of original airborne roles
...but behind friendly lines
Young, keen, eager and probably over-promoted
His mission became purely political from that level
By mid-June the AFU set out merely to prove that a breakthrough to the Black Sea was impossible
Formations rotated into a new fire bag, or kotel
Mirgorodsky doubtless has courage, motivation and discipline
But these military virtues become vices when relied upon for futile misadventures like the Orekhov-Rabotino Salient
The anomalous indeed unmilitary command arrangement helped make that political absurdity possible
OTU Marun's formations deployed overwhelmingly from reserves and refits outside of Tarnavsky's AO
Like a ruthless 'cab rank' system, rotating battalions through to the forward lines
Mirgorodsky's was an entirely ad hoc command, more improvized than the usual makeshift OTU formation
For Marun's chief to outrank his commander meant here that he had political favor to perform a more distasteful job
Most demanding were his task's futility and unclear purpose
Ukraine's counteroffensive began amid intense debate, dispute and compromises
Military objectives changed beyond recognition in order to suit political pressures
A heady mix of hype overtook 'Crimea' into a yet more awkwardly reckless "attack and win various parts of the front"
The next thread will follow up to examine more closely how the AFU compromised its own counteroffensive
It will also consider in more depth just why it did so
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Zaluzhny's replacement by Syrsky is a timely reminder to examine the AFU chains of higher command, which are extraordinarily flexible and irregular entities
TLDR: Syrsky Schmyrsky
A caveat first: this study is very limited in its source material so several details still need confirmation
A "rule of three separate confirmatory reports" can help with accuracy, along with recalibrating source scrutiny. Avoid spoon feeds, question all
🧵UKRAINIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (GUR)
Child of NATO's Gladio
Recent intrigues around GUR Chief Budanov's rise compel some review of his organization
TLDR: It has both NATO (and Nazi) stamps literally all over it
And not just "NATO's stamp"
though it has that twice by way of direct branding
Symbols are important to depict and convey very clear even complex messages in an instant. Succinct messaging cuts through euphemism and denial by words (or Minsk agreements)
One need not be a geographer to see GUR's official hostility against Russia itself since at least 2016
🧵Ukrainian Counter-offensive
The Normandy Comparisons
As Kiev's Summer 2023 campaign faltered repeatedly, a whole chorus of Western apologia arose to help feed and bolster the failure
This was in direct parallel with Western largesse in continual supply of arms and ammunition
The NATO-sourced Normandy analogies were clearly deliberate, pre-meditated and coordinated
Just as the offensive's obvious long-planned Main Effort - Tokmak-Melitopol - was timed exactly to the anniversary of the Normandy D-Day landings i.e.,
6 June
It seemed to be another effort too to counter vast evidence that many of Kiev's troops would actually rather sympathize and work with those SS formations among Normandy's Axis occupiers
An obvious magical date may confound those westerners complaining NATO is on the wrong side
🧵Ukrainian Nazis
or 'the Rise and Fall of the Weird Reich'
Pt 1
Not only Russians have long alleged that Kiev's post-coup regime not only tolerated Nazism but oversaw its revival to foment anti-Russian and other racist hatred and criminality
NB: original jpeg creator unclear
Wherever did critiques of Ukraine get that idea of a revived Nazi danger?
Are they exaggerated?
Here is some investigation to test Russia's allegations and complaint
The Region witnessed large-scale Nazi atrocities up close in World War 2
Just as it experienced the manipulation of ethnic identities - 'Ukrainian' prominent among them - to help carry out such atrocities
The AFU’s main indirect fire arm has an unusual “deconstructed” quality which defies normal military organization (like much of the AFU)
TLDR: AFU artillery brigades have not deployed as actual brigades
Some background first...
The Russia-Ukraine War shows a prevalence and importance of artillery, a term usually meaning mortars, howitzers, rocket tubes, precision-guided munition and some long-range missile strike
This thread discusses mostly the 2nd & 3rd above, but not exclusively
It’s institutional
Artillery assumed high status in military cultures since its birth. The destructive technology of indirect fire nearly always dwarfed and out-ranged that of main rival arms infantry and cavalry
It attracted huge investment
and loathing: overrun gun crews could expect no quarter