🧵THE BAKHMUT CRUCIBLE
Part 3 - Shell Game: Ukrainian Ground Forces' Unstable Command Structure

Zaluzhny's replacement by Syrsky is a timely reminder to examine the AFU chains of higher command, which are extraordinarily flexible and irregular entities
TLDR: Syrsky Schmyrsky A caveat first: this study is very limited in its source material so several details still need confirmation

A "rule of three separate confirmatory reports" can help with accuracy, along with recalibrating source scrutiny. Avoid spoon feeds, question all

https://twitter.com/MNormanDavies/status/1521809763020988417

🧵UKRAINIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (GUR)
Child of NATO's Gladio

Recent intrigues around GUR Chief Budanov's rise compel some review of his organization
TLDR: It has both NATO (and Nazi) stamps literally all over it And not just "NATO's stamp"

though it has that twice by way of direct branding

🧵RABOTINO POCKET: COLLAPSING THE BAG

The extravagantly hyped AFU 2023 counteroffensive concentrated most of its flourishes on the Tokmak-Melitopol Axis ...springboard for a breathlessly awaited 'Crimean Beach Party'

It became an operational cul de sac

https://twitter.com/MNormanDavies/status/1740248790211363020

The costly farce seems to be finally drawing to an end, at least in this season of Kiev's theater program

Reports of Ukrainian rout may be premature, or exaggeration of events at a local and low level

Or RuAF advances are as cautious and methodical as much elsewhere

https://twitter.com/GeromanAT/status/1740292228617306232

🧵Ukrainian Counter-offensive
The Normandy Comparisons

As Kiev's Summer 2023 campaign faltered repeatedly, a whole chorus of Western apologia arose to help feed and bolster the failure

This was in direct parallel with Western largesse in continual supply of arms and ammunition
The NATO-sourced Normandy analogies were clearly deliberate, pre-meditated and coordinated

Just as the offensive's obvious long-planned Main Effort - Tokmak-Melitopol - was timed exactly to the anniversary of the Normandy D-Day landings i.e.,

6 June

🧵Ukrainian Nazis
or 'the Rise and Fall of the Weird Reich'

Pt 1
Not only Russians have long alleged that Kiev's post-coup regime not only tolerated Nazism but oversaw its revival to foment anti-Russian and other racist hatred and criminality

NB: original jpeg creator unclear Wherever did critiques of Ukraine get that idea of a revived Nazi danger?

Are they exaggerated?

Here is some investigation to test Russia's allegations and complaint

🧵 UKRAINE’S ZAPOROZHYE OFFENSIVE
Operations Order (OPORD): ‘General Outline of Operations / Commander’s Summary’

It seems clear the Russian Army had explicit forewarning of plans for the AFU’s plans main recent attack

That would all but guarantee disastrous failure for the AFU Text released appears to be quite genuine as part transcription and translation of an AFU OPORD summary

It posted quite early to this URL, but doubtless elsewhere too >

thedreizinreport.com/2023/05/08/dre…

🧵UKRAINE’S ARTILLERY. An Order of Battle study

The AFU’s main indirect fire arm has an unusual “deconstructed” quality which defies normal military organization (like much of the AFU)

TLDR: AFU artillery brigades have not deployed as actual brigades

Some background first... The Russia-Ukraine War shows a prevalence and importance of artillery, a term usually meaning mortars, howitzers, rocket tubes, precision-guided munition and some long-range missile strike

This thread discusses mostly the 2nd & 3rd above, but not exclusively

It’s institutional

🧵 THE BAKHMUT CRUCIBLE
Part 1
Ukrainian Logistics: Varicose Veins vs Interior Lines The eastern Ukraine town Bakhmut, known by Russia as Artyomovsk, has posed a crucial defence for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and their colleagues among the Interior Ministry's National Guard (NGU) troops, Border Guards (DPSU), Police, & sundry volunteer formations and units

🧵UKRAINE'S MILITARY CRISIS: an Order of Battle study #RussiaUkraineWar

How did Russia's army, with far fewer deployed troops than Ukraine's, expand territorial dominance in Ukraine far greater than it had on 24 February?

Short answer?

Ukraine’s army was too big for its boots The above assertion's not even abstract hyperbole

Through April and even more recently, after nearly half a year’s escalated combat with Russia, mobilized Ukraine still sought boot donors to shod its troops, whether as recruits and conscripts, or already in training or the field

🧵 This piece has much positive UA cheerleading: "We'll win!"🇺🇦

Seems @peterson__scott wrote embed-style ("Reporting for this story was supported by Oleksandr Naselenko")

But when it particularizes UA troops' war experience it paints a different picture
csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2… If we distil basic facts from among the report's Xmas-wish fantasy we get sobering realities in the following areas

COMMAND & CONTROL

DEFENSIVE WORKS DEFICIENCIES

LACK OF TRAINING

INCREASED UA CASUALTIES

LITTLE LEAVE / REST

RECON/SURVEILLANCE/TARGET-ACQUISITION DEFICIENCIES

You contradict yourself on the most basic claims, so any allegation is abortive

You said the Russians left on 1 Apr, but then you have your interview subject Irina saying her son got killed THEN the RU troops fled, all by your claim, on 10 March

Why that 21-day twilight zone?

https://twitter.com/BowenBBC/status/1510738861286113282

And worse

You said "After they [Blair-style pause] killed her son, SHE fled & the Russian soldiers took over the house"

But then your translation has Irina saying "THEY killed him & fled"

Which party fled after Alexei got killed?

If there was a crime, your report is hindrance