Geospatial Analysis: Railroad Construction on Occupied Territories. 🧵Updated Thread:
1/ Frontelligence Insight examined satellite imagery of railroad constructions in occupied territories, specifically south of Donetsk and in Mariupol. Here is what we know:
2/Burne - Malovodne branch
To enhance logistics between Russia, Donetsk, and Mariupol, Russians are actively constructing a new railroad branch to the south of Donetsk. This branch aims to bypass a risky section of the frontline near Mariinka and Vuhledar.
3/ The new branch starts in the village of Burne and links up with the existing railroad at Malovodne. Based on satellite imagery, significant progress is evident in the construction of this railroad branch, making our team believe that it might be completed in 2024.
4/ Comparative analysis highlights a slowdown due to the construction of a bridge over the Kal'mius River. While composing this analysis, reports from the adviser to the Mariupol mayor suggested that Ukrainian forces had targeted the bridge while still under construction
5/ The vulnerability of this single point of failure to Ukrainian weaponry increases the likelihood of future strikes even after completion, impacting the functionality of the entire railroad branch.
6/ Taganrog - Crimea
Russians are also working on the railroad connecting Taganrog with Mariupol and Crimea to the rest of Russia. This serves as an alternative to the Crimean Bridge, aiming to shorten travel time. Frontelligence Insight has identified early construction stages
7/ In contrast to the previously mentioned railroad between Burne and Malovodne, this railroad branch is much longer and is still in the early stage of construction. Consequently, we assume that Russia won’t be able to complete this project by the end of 2024.
8/ Sattelite imagery shows that Russians also successfully restored the gas pump station and worked on the restoration of a gas pipeline between Mariupol and the broader continental region of Russia.
9/ This pipeline is likely a component of the Mariupol-Taganrog natural gas system. The significant investment in infrastructure suggests that the Russians are intending to transform the region into a fortified frontline stronghold with a robust military presence.
10/ To effectively target railroad bridges, Ukraine would require more powerful missiles designed for bridge destruction, like the German Taurus missiles. Overall, Russia is anticipated to improve and expand its military infrastructure on occupied territories in 2024
11/ With Ukraine facing challenges such as ammo shortages, undermanned units, and limited assistance from the US in 2024, a defensive approach will likely be adopted. Concurrently, Russian forces are expected to intensify their efforts in expanding their military infrastructure.
12/ The full analysis is accessible on the website listed in my bio. Kindly consider supporting us through BuyMeaCoffee, as our expenses rely solely on your public support, and maintaining quality without financing is still challenging for us. Don't forget to share and like!
13/ This is an updated thread to address inaccuracies and incorporate additional imagery. In the previous version, an image near Mariupol was mislabeled as a railroad instead of a pipeline, which is now corrected. We apologize for any confusion.
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One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.
🧵Thread
2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement.
Kursk Offensive: A Preliminary Assessment by Frontelligence Insight.
A condensed version of report for X. 🧵Thread:
1/ With Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Sudzha, the operation is clearly approaching its conclusion though it is not yet entirely over.
2/ To assess the operation, not in isolation, but within the broader context of the war, we broke down the Kursk operation into 3 key questions: whether its geopolitical objectives were met, whether the attrition rate was favorable, and whether it achieved battlefield success
3/ To determine equipment attrition, we analyzed data from OSINT analyst @naalsio26, who tracks losses across multiple frontlines. Our graphs show losses from August to March but are not exhaustive, as they exclude some retreat-related losses. The cut-off date was March 10.
Frontelligence Insight Special Report: AWOL Trends and Casualty Ratios in Russia and Ukraine
In assessing overall manpower casualty ratios, we analyzed Russian AWOL figures alongside Ukrainian estimates, factoring in KIA, MIA, and recruitment rates to assess the war’s prospects
2/ Thanks to @InformNapalm, a Ukrainian OSINT community, we analyzed a screenshot of a Russian presentation slide detailing desertion numbers. The percentage and corresponding figures allowed us to calculate the total number of AWOL cases across all Russian military districts.
3/ As shown in the translated graph, the Southern MD has the highest number of desertion cases. This is unsurprising, as it includes the former 1st and 2nd Army Corps (now the 51st and 3rd CAAs), which are largely composed of forcibly mobilized residents from occupied territories
One of the most critical yet unresolved questions of this war is the true impact of drone attacks inside Russia. Our team has been working with media organizations and volunteers to tackle this. But finding the answer isn’t easy, and we need your support. Here’s how you can help:
2/ The simplest and most effective way to support our investigation is through donations. This helps cover essential expenses like satellite imagery, expert analysis, and time. You can donate via BuyMeaCoffee:
3/ We’re also looking for volunteers to assess the damage, particularly those with expertise in damage surveys, industrial building damage assessments, and the oil and gas industry: especially in evaluating potential refinery damage. Feel free to contact us at
frontel@proton.me
As we move into the second month of the year, Frontelligence Insight has prepared an early assessment report covering recent developments on the frontlines and within both Ukrainian and Russian military forces. Below are some key highlights from the report. 1/ 🧵Thread:
2/ The frontline dynamics for Ukraine remain challenging, with setbacks in Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Kupyansk, and Toretsk. While leadership is working to address organizational and recruitment issues, it will take time for these changes to be implemented and impact the battlefield.
3/ Russian forces are facing high losses, with tens of thousands of AWOL cases and a significant depletion of armored vehicles, which are being replaced by civilian transport. Nevertheless, they continue advancing in areas where Ukrainian defenses are stretched with few people