Geospatial Analysis: Railroad Construction on Occupied Territories. 🧵Updated Thread:
1/ Frontelligence Insight examined satellite imagery of railroad constructions in occupied territories, specifically south of Donetsk and in Mariupol. Here is what we know:
2/Burne - Malovodne branch
To enhance logistics between Russia, Donetsk, and Mariupol, Russians are actively constructing a new railroad branch to the south of Donetsk. This branch aims to bypass a risky section of the frontline near Mariinka and Vuhledar.
3/ The new branch starts in the village of Burne and links up with the existing railroad at Malovodne. Based on satellite imagery, significant progress is evident in the construction of this railroad branch, making our team believe that it might be completed in 2024.
4/ Comparative analysis highlights a slowdown due to the construction of a bridge over the Kal'mius River. While composing this analysis, reports from the adviser to the Mariupol mayor suggested that Ukrainian forces had targeted the bridge while still under construction
5/ The vulnerability of this single point of failure to Ukrainian weaponry increases the likelihood of future strikes even after completion, impacting the functionality of the entire railroad branch.
6/ Taganrog - Crimea
Russians are also working on the railroad connecting Taganrog with Mariupol and Crimea to the rest of Russia. This serves as an alternative to the Crimean Bridge, aiming to shorten travel time. Frontelligence Insight has identified early construction stages
7/ In contrast to the previously mentioned railroad between Burne and Malovodne, this railroad branch is much longer and is still in the early stage of construction. Consequently, we assume that Russia won’t be able to complete this project by the end of 2024.
8/ Sattelite imagery shows that Russians also successfully restored the gas pump station and worked on the restoration of a gas pipeline between Mariupol and the broader continental region of Russia.
9/ This pipeline is likely a component of the Mariupol-Taganrog natural gas system. The significant investment in infrastructure suggests that the Russians are intending to transform the region into a fortified frontline stronghold with a robust military presence.
10/ To effectively target railroad bridges, Ukraine would require more powerful missiles designed for bridge destruction, like the German Taurus missiles. Overall, Russia is anticipated to improve and expand its military infrastructure on occupied territories in 2024
11/ With Ukraine facing challenges such as ammo shortages, undermanned units, and limited assistance from the US in 2024, a defensive approach will likely be adopted. Concurrently, Russian forces are expected to intensify their efforts in expanding their military infrastructure.
12/ The full analysis is accessible on the website listed in my bio. Kindly consider supporting us through BuyMeaCoffee, as our expenses rely solely on your public support, and maintaining quality without financing is still challenging for us. Don't forget to share and like!
13/ This is an updated thread to address inaccuracies and incorporate additional imagery. In the previous version, an image near Mariupol was mislabeled as a railroad instead of a pipeline, which is now corrected. We apologize for any confusion.
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Two days after being conscripted into Russia's army, Maxim Suvorov signed a contract. Less than a month later, he fell on the battlefield - one of many casualties of Russia’s new practice of filling contract ranks with conscripts. A detailed case showcasing recruitment problems:
2/ Frontelligence Insight has previously reported on Russia’s struggle to meet recruitment targets with monetary bonuses, pushing the military to seek alternatives, including pressuring conscripts to sign contracts. The recent death of a conscript allowed us to trace his story
3/ Our investigation begins with an obituary posted on a local Russian social media group dedicated to fallen soldiers in various conflicts. According to the post, Maxim was conscripted on June 25 and signed a contract on June 27. To verify this, we sought additional evidence
Reminder: the account that posted a photo said to show Iryna Zarutska, with a BLM poster in the background, drew 18 million views. In May 2025, France’s defense and security secretariat tied this account to Storm-1516, a state-backed Russian disinfo group. But there’s more:
2/ According to a report by VIGINUM, the French agency for countering foreign digital interference and disinformation under the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, this unit is a Russian information manipulation set (IMS) linked to Russia’s intelligence (GRU)
3/ EclecticIQ, a Dutch cybersecurity and threat-intelligence firm, identified the LordBebo account as linked to the Storm-1516 disinformation unit in its report on disinformation campaigns. My team also looked into the matter and found a rather interesting pattern:
A recurring question is whether Russia categorizes AWOL cases as a way to conceal combat deaths in its official reports. The short answer is no. The longer answer is more complicated, and requires looking at how AWOL is treated within the Russian military system. 🧵Short thread:
2/ Most AWOL cases can escalate into actual criminal proceedings if all other measures to bring soldiers back fail. High rates of desertion or absence trigger investigations on record - problems that weigh more heavily on commanders and unit statistics than combat losses do
3/ Casualties themselves are rarely the main concern, provided objectives set by higher command are met. By contrast, desertion is seen as evidence of weak leadership and poor control over subordinates. KIA and MIA are regarded as an acceptable cost of war; AWOL is not.
AWOL and desertion cases in the Russian army have doubled and tripled in recent months, with battlefield desertions rising sharply, according to tens of thousands of records reviewed by Frontelligence Insight. 🧵This thread summarizes the key insights drawn from the data:
2/ Before proceeding, we thank the Ukrainian project @hochuzhit_com for providing additional documents containing the full list of service members. While the source is trusted, we carried out our own inspection and verification to confirm the list’s authenticity.
3/ Our team randomly selected 21 cases from the file and used third-party services to verify each soldier’s name, date of birth, and address or region. In 19 cases the data fully matched; the two discrepancies were in addresses, likely due to changes before/after enlistment
Since July, our team has published 4 major investigations: on foreign mercenaries and Cuban fighters in Russia’s ranks; procurement and targeting pod issues with the Su-57; and China’s role in Shahed UAV production. We also analyzed Russian losses in units and North Korean arms:
2/ We’ve also completed, but not yet published, data on Russian desertions and losses in several major units. Our research on artillery barrels is wrapping up, after which we’ll also release exclusive investigations into Russia’s weapons production
3/ None of this would be possible without your continued financial support and donations. Some of our earlier investigations have already helped several governments pursue their own inquiries into sanctions evasion
So far, Ukraine’s stabilization measures around Pokrovsk look broadly promising. While many speculated that Kyiv might strike elsewhere, Ukrainian forces have instead pushed back Russian troops in an area where Moscow’s leadership had placed its biggest bet. 🧵Thread:
2/ With only days left before the fall season, the chances of Russia taking Pokrovsk by summer’s end are virtually nil. Amid the so-called “peace talks,” the lack of progress risks undermining Russia’s resolve to fight for “years”, as they like to boast
3/ That does not mean Russia will stop advancing. But if the political goal remains the takeover of Donbas, achieving it by the end of this year appears impossible.