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Jan 9, 2024 13 tweets 4 min read Read on X
Geospatial Analysis: Railroad Construction on Occupied Territories. 🧵Updated Thread:

1/ Frontelligence Insight examined satellite imagery of railroad constructions in occupied territories, specifically south of Donetsk and in Mariupol. Here is what we know: Image
2/Burne - Malovodne branch

To enhance logistics between Russia, Donetsk, and Mariupol, Russians are actively constructing a new railroad branch to the south of Donetsk. This branch aims to bypass a risky section of the frontline near Mariinka and Vuhledar. Image
3/ The new branch starts in the village of Burne and links up with the existing railroad at Malovodne. Based on satellite imagery, significant progress is evident in the construction of this railroad branch, making our team believe that it might be completed in 2024. Image
4/ Comparative analysis highlights a slowdown due to the construction of a bridge over the Kal'mius River. While composing this analysis, reports from the adviser to the Mariupol mayor suggested that Ukrainian forces had targeted the bridge while still under construction
5/ The vulnerability of this single point of failure to Ukrainian weaponry increases the likelihood of future strikes even after completion, impacting the functionality of the entire railroad branch. Image
6/ Taganrog - Crimea

Russians are also working on the railroad connecting Taganrog with Mariupol and Crimea to the rest of Russia. This serves as an alternative to the Crimean Bridge, aiming to shorten travel time. Frontelligence Insight has identified early construction stages Image
7/ In contrast to the previously mentioned railroad between Burne and Malovodne, this railroad branch is much longer and is still in the early stage of construction. Consequently, we assume that Russia won’t be able to complete this project by the end of 2024.
8/ Sattelite imagery shows that Russians also successfully restored the gas pump station and worked on the restoration of a gas pipeline between Mariupol and the broader continental region of Russia. Image
9/ This pipeline is likely a component of the Mariupol-Taganrog natural gas system. The significant investment in infrastructure suggests that the Russians are intending to transform the region into a fortified frontline stronghold with a robust military presence. Image
10/ To effectively target railroad bridges, Ukraine would require more powerful missiles designed for bridge destruction, like the German Taurus missiles. Overall, Russia is anticipated to improve and expand its military infrastructure on occupied territories in 2024 Image
11/ With Ukraine facing challenges such as ammo shortages, undermanned units, and limited assistance from the US in 2024, a defensive approach will likely be adopted. Concurrently, Russian forces are expected to intensify their efforts in expanding their military infrastructure. Image
12/ The full analysis is accessible on the website listed in my bio. Kindly consider supporting us through BuyMeaCoffee, as our expenses rely solely on your public support, and maintaining quality without financing is still challenging for us. Don't forget to share and like!
13/ This is an updated thread to address inaccuracies and incorporate additional imagery. In the previous version, an image near Mariupol was mislabeled as a railroad instead of a pipeline, which is now corrected. We apologize for any confusion.

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More from @Tatarigami_UA

May 19
Through the Optics of War: An analysis of leaked confidential data from Russia’s military-industrial complex by Frontelligence Insight — from thermal scopes and laser anti-UAV programs to Chinese import schemes and production bottlenecks in the optoelectronic sector. 🧵Thread: Image
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These questions — and more — are explored in a special interview with Russian economist Vladimir Milov.

🧵Thread: Image
2/ Tariff wars:

China’s economic slowdown has closed its market to many Russian products, hitting major industries hard. The China-focused Russian coal industry is struggling, and Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels
3/ Tariff war will obviously exacerbate the Chinese slowdown. The slower Chinese growth, the less market for Russian goods. Share of China in the total Russian exports is as high as a third now - we're heavily dependent on this market and its well-being.
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Apr 19
Thread🧵

1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.
2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.
3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war
Read 7 tweets
Apr 10
While our team continues working on the latest updates, here are a few updates on the current state of the frontline:

1/ Despite holding the advantage along much of the frontline, Russia’s winter campaign yielded limited results - indicating Ukraine’s situation is not dire
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3/ The overall composition and number of Russian forces near Sumy oblast currently seem insufficient to support a large-scale offensive operation deep into the region.
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Mar 30
One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
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Mar 25
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.

🧵Thread Image
2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement. Image
Read 23 tweets

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