Based on the SFJ's description, sender information was recovered from a recipient device. Sender details were stored in a hash form, which SFJ cracked using rainbow tables of phone numbers and email addresses.
Cracking using scoped rainbow tables certainly will reduce the time it takes to crack each set, but I'd be very curious to know how long it takes to crack each. Time and pressure (and 10000 servers) can achieve almost anything.
Something I'm curious about is why is @Apple storing details like phone number and email, instead of a device id or something less identifiable.
It looks like recovering phone numbers is already well documented and a python tool is available for brute forcing the phone number.
I also disagree with the conclusion that it was a honeypot. Damn Vulnerable Linux, cyrpto mining, multiple command attempts for the same action. Looks more like a student learning pentesting and mining on the side.
@socradar from your analysis, did you see instances of Supershell being deployed without authorization? (And if so, why was it not included in the write-up?)
Righto. Lets talk about this data and how to use it. To start, I'm uploading a zip file of all samples as well to allow downloading in bulk. I'll also share out some more parts of this as we go. So, off we go...
For background, #CobaltStrike is an "adversary simulation tool" (pentesting tools vs malware sometimes are only philosophically different #FightMe). It is widely used for legitimate security testing, pre-ransomware operations and other malicious threat actors.
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The files provide are called Beacon. It's the malware deployed and controlled by CobaltStrike. While the two names are commonly misused interchangeably (even by myself). @Mandiant did a solid write-up on names. mandiant.com/resources/defi…
So reading @DrunkBinary's Tweets tonight reminded me of something important - attribution and taxonomy are intrinsically linked. Attribution is about linking and clustering activity - not necessarily doxing and indictments.
@DrunkBinary A lot of #ThreatIntel shops have staunchly started heavily pushing the "we don't do attribution" line - when what they really mean is "We don't want to come up with another name for this activity"
@DrunkBinary In some cases - some shops have taken this line as an excuse to treat every bloody incident / case as completely unique - which makes the job of incident response teams brutal