Since 2014, 2022 and more recently winter 2023, Ukraine has been building a huge defensive system. The multilayered “Donbass Line” composed of many trench network is quite similar to Russian Surovikin system.
🧵THREAD on Ukrainian in depth defenses⬇️
1/25
When we talk of defensive trench network, the huge Surovikin line is the first thing we think about: trenches, bunkers, mines, dragon teeths…
This particular system, sometimes compared to the Maginot line was one of the assets that stopped Ukrainian summer counteroffensive.
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Since it is already mapped by many, it is not useful to talk about it.
However, I’ve also mapped pre-2022 Russian defenses. It is interesting to see that these particular trenches system can still be used in case of a Ukrainian breakthrough.
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Let’s talk about Ukrainian defensive lines I called “Donbass line”.
Donbass line is quite different and more complex than Russian Surovikin system: it is composed of highly defended fortified system, separated by fields.
Zoom in⬇️ 4/
If we take the example of Ukrainsk-Muraka line (facing south near Kourakhove), we can see on this Sentinel-2 imagery that each system is separated by a kilometer at least.
Each fort can defend itself from every direction: you have to take all of them to advance.
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Contrary to Russian line, Ukrainian one is composed of many forts that are defending each other.
The 2014-15 Popasna-Luhanske line is a good example: to breakthrough, you have to assure that no other fort has fire control on you. (This particular line was however abandoned)
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The line 0:
This was the 2014-2022 line, it was composed of 2 systems near Marioupol (overrun in a few days because of the lack of personal), 2 lines near Popasna (Ukr retreated to the city) and one line between Marinka and Horlivka, with some part still standing.
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The really first line built from February to June 2022, preparing the retreat of Sievierodonetsk was built from southern Bakhmout to Siversk, passing through Soledar
This defensive system had 2 lines, both were overrun in Bakhmout and Soledar but are still standing in Siversk. 8/
At the same time, Ukrainians built lines 1, 2 and 3 in northern Donbass. Today, they are still building these lines.
Line one: Siverski-Donets river/Tchasiv Yar/Toretsk. 9/
Line two and three are the defenses of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk: 2 lines are protecting Sloviansk from the North, an anti tank ditcj and 1 line protecting the twin cities from the west.
+ 2 lines protecting Kostiantinivka/Droujkivka.
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Now, as some may ask themselves, the defenses after Avdiivka are already prepared but non-sufficient: main line is 17km from the city.
This line is however behind a river and lakes, making it a natural barrier.
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The final objective of the Russian offensive may be to reach Pokrovsk, the last big city and industrial center of Ukrainian Donbass (with Kramatorsk).
The Ukrainian Armed Forces have built a two layered trench system all around the city. 13/
Support lines:
Donbass is a thing, but there are 3 other fronts: Kherson, South (Zaporijia) and Louhansk/Kharkiv.
Apart from Mykolaiv defense network and old Russian Kherson defenses, I haven’t found any Ukrainian line in the oblast. 14/
In Zaporijia oblast, there are at least 2 main defensive lines, plus a line defending the city itself. In Louhansk frontline, we have the Lyman-Borova line quite impressive. There is also a line near Izioum.
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Currently, I’m investigating Ukrainian defenses on Russian border: the Koupiansk-Vovtchansk line, the Kharkiv defenses and border defenses in Sumy and Tchernihiv oblast.
For now I havn’t find many things, suggesting it is just the beginning.
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How does those systems look like? This image is a high resolution one (from google earth pro): you can see part of the western Sloviansk defense.
A Ukrainian trench is never linear, and it is not always linked to avoid loosing a whole line if one part has fallen.
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Ukrainians made fun of Russian anti-tank ditches and dragon teeths, but they are now using it. You can also see this new basement to protect soldiers from artillery and FPV shells.
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To geolocalise these trench network, I used 4 elements:
-Google earth updates (from June to august 2022)
-Sentinel-2 imageries, most of them until may-july 2022 (since it is the best time to see trenches)
-Geolocated Videos showing trenches (Kreminna forest)
-Esri Imageries
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Since some may ask, this work is not helping Russia. Why?
-We mapped Russian positions and defenses before
-Russia has satellites, and IA that can detect these lines
-For most of it, it is now nearly 6-month-old
-The map is indicative and non-exhaustive
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I’ve been mapping Ukrainian and Russian defensive lines since nearly 2 years, this is the first part of my final project, it will be updated and improved many times in a row.
Here is the link to have it on your computer. Please credit me when using it!
21/google.com/maps/d/edit?mi…
Keep in mind that when I’m using Sentinel-2, I can’t be precise, and there may be errors since it is sometime really difficult to know if there is a trench or not.
I will improve the map with updates of Maxar imageries in Google Earth.
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Here you can find the link for my interpretation of the lines. Since it is not a continuous defensive system, it is only an interpretation of hundreds of trenches. As tweet #21, you can download both trenches and defensive lines.
23/google.com/maps/d/edit?mi…
Since some people have already asked me, if you want to buy me a coffee for my volunteer work (tens of hours of work in my free time), you can here:
Thank you
24/buymeacoffee.com/clement.molin
This is the end of the thread
If you like it, you can repost the first tweet. Make sure to follow both my account @clement_molin and my think tank @atummundi
I will do a French version soon.
25/25
@escortert @Pouletvolant3 @frog_of_war @wolski_jaros @guillaume_ancel @Michel_Goya @ObsDelphi @CartesDuMonde @AudrandS @Black_BirdGroup @emilkastehelmi @GeoConfirmed @UAControlMap @Stevius21 @Danspiun @Tatarigami_UA @NOELreports @IntelCrab @egea_blog (some that may be interested)
Le réveil européen 🇪🇺 tant annoncé en 2022 n'a eu lieu que dans la tête et le discours des dirigeants après 4 ans de guerre.
On nous a promis un "tournant historique" qui n'arrive pas et pendant ce temps nos adversaire s'affutent. L'heure est à un premier bilan.
🧵THREAD🧵1/7⬇️
Les grands sommets, Versailles en tête, étaient censés inculquer une nouvelle dynamique. Une Europe puissance, capable de tenir tête à la Russie seule.
Les discours martiaux appelant au réarmement, à la défense européenne, au basculement stratégique n'ont pas donné de véritable suite.
D'abord, il a fallu du temps, beaucoup de temps pour se réveiller. Quand certains avaient commencés en 2014, d'autre sont partis de presque 0 en 2022, comme l'Allemagne. Il y a un bon élève, la Pologne, qui dépense 4.8% de son PIB pour la défense, qui recrute énormément pour l'armée, mais, en achetant principalement hors UE.
Les autres font mieux, mais la lenteur du processus est frappante. Certains ne se sentent même pas concernés (Espagne ou Italie)...
Entre 60 et 80% des armes achetés par les états membre de l'UE depuis 2022 ne proviennent pas de l'UE.
64% sont achetés directement aux Etats-Unis. Un symbole, le F35, choisit par 13 !!! Etats européens. En sachant que :*
-Le F35 est très cher
-Sa maintenance est complexe
-Les Etats-Unis peuvent l'empêcher de voler
-C'est un avion qui est très performant mais fragile, très couteux à faire voler…
Dans le cas des Etats-Unis, malgré 4 ans de guerre à l'est (et une aide américaine qui baisse constamment), les pays européens n'ont pas vraiment changé de doctrine. Certes, l'Europe aide plus l'Ukraine que les Etats-Unis, mais elle continue de compter sur Washington pour sa défense.
Big victory for the Sudanese 🇸🇩 Army after they lifted the 2.5 years long siege of the city of Dilling
It is the biggest victory for the SAF since they liberated the capital city a year ago. At the same time, RSF attempted to open a new front in Blue Nile.
Massive forces led by the 5th division of El Obeid, the 10th division of Abu Jubaynah as well as the brigades 53rd and 38th and joint forces entered today the city of Dilling in South Kordofan.
After a month long counter-offensive south of El Obeid, those forces took the Rapid Support Forces by surprise, pushed on open terrain between the Nuba mountains and reached Habila this morning.
After that, they continued their push and reached the city of Dilling, one of the two remaining encircled garrison (after most fell, apart from Kadugli, capital city of south Kordofan, still encircled.
Held by the 54th infantry brigade alone, the city stood 2.5 years.
Who are the actors, why are they fighting ? Is the conflict origine from money, gold, oil, power, religion or ethnicities ? Which foreign powers are involved ?
Here, you will find a general guide of the Sudan war :
🧵THREAD🧵1/24 ⬇️
When did it start ?
On april 15th 2023. Where ? In Khartoum, the capital city, unlike previous conflicts.
Sudan was already partly at war before, discontinuously since 1983 (1983-2005, 2nd South Sudan war, 2003-2020, Darfur war, 2011-2020, South Kordofan and Blue Nile war).
Who is fighting :
The Sudanese Armed Forces :
The SAF are based in Khartoum and Port Sudan; they defend the state's borders and internal stability. Their leader is Al-Burhan, and the military commanders are heirs to the military-Islamist regime of Omar al-Bashir (1989-2019).
A partir de la situation actuelle et sans entrer dans l'éventualité de négociations/cessez le feu, voyons 6 scénarios de la poursuite de l'offensive russe, par rapport aux objectifs stratégiques de Moscou 🇷🇺.
🧵THREAD🧵1/12 ⬇️
D'abord, je vous invite à relire le point de l'année dernière sur le même sujet, qui s'est avéré proche de la réalité
Ce ne sont que des hypothèses à partir de la situation actuelle, je ne dis pas que ça va se passer comme ça.
The war in Ukraine 🇺🇦 has changed so much that the differencies on the maps are sometimes measured in 5, 10, or even 15km !
A number of pro-Russian 🇷🇺 accounts use a flag, a lone dead soldier as proof of control (or perhaps it's pro-Russian propaganda or even their own imagination).
The result? Completely absurd maps that does not show the reality on the ground, and when an error is admitted, a Ukrainian counter-offensive that came out of nowhere is presented.
1/8 ⬇️
Thanks to this map, ukraineviews.org, we can see the difference between the areas of control according to the main mappers of the war in Ukraine. The maps are roughly half pro-Russian and half pro-Ukrainian.
Let's take the example of a specific area of the front, southeast of Pokrovsk:
According to pro-Russian mappers, the Russian army controls the villages of Bratske, Vidradne, Hai and Oleksivka.
According to most pro-Ukrainian mappers (some are neutral), these villages are either in the gray zone or controlled by the Ukrainians.
What are the proofs to suggest something ?
For Bratske : A single video (!) dated January 8th, showing two Russian soldiers with a flag. Is this irrefutable proof of a Russian presence? Does it mean the Russians control the village (i.e., they have forces there and are using it as a base for launching offensives)?
As Playfra explained here: x.com/Playfra0/statu…, barbed wire has been placed in multiple villages along the front line in this sector. This directly contradicts the control lines of some mappers.
For Vidradne, not a single video confirms the Russian claims. For Hai, there is a video of soldiers with the flag from two months ago. Since then, the barbed wire in front of the village has been reinforced, yet several maps show the village as Russian. In Oleksivka, we have plenty of videos of Russians from before 2026. Since then, nothing. Where is the evidence of effective control?
After losing the Battle of Mykolaiv, Russian forces retreated behind new defensive lines along the border of Kherson Oblast.
Russian forces arriving from the Kyiv Front took considerably longer than the first Ukrainian brigades sent as reinforcements. These brigades brought reinforcements that pushed the Russians back behind the Inhulets River and established defensive lines in front of Mykolaiv.