Recent criticism of Western-supplied equipment to Ukraine and the industries that produce it has characterised this equipment as “boutique”; i.e. a luxurious, over-engineered item with a lengthy manufacturing time. This narrative is also commonly found to promote the notion that inflated budgets and poor performances are inherent within manufacturing industries. Moreover, some critics have blamed Ukraine’s allies’ inadequacies in producing more ammunition and vehicles on these same manufacturing complexities. Along with addressing this criticism, we will examine why many pieces of artillery have been removed from the battlefield for repair.
Barrels are an essential component in weapon systems, guiding the ammunition through a long narrow cylindrical tube. Barrels are divided into three sections from the breech face: the combustion chamber, bore, and the muzzle. The graphic below illustrates a typical gun barrel design, depicting components such as the breech, bore, and muzzle [1]. The figure also shows a cross-sectional view of a gun barrel that depicts the grooves on the inner surface of the bore.
The projectile's outer diameter is slightly smaller to the barrel's inner diameter. When the trigger is pulled, the propellant burns and produces a large volume of gas. High-pressure gas combines with mechanical force to increase the ammunition's kinetic energy, pushing it towards the bore and muzzle of the barrel. The conversion of chemical to mechanical energy creates high-pressure and high-temperature conditions inside the chamber, leading to erosion and wear of the material after every firing cycle. This results in plastic deformation followed by permanent barrel failure. 1/10
2/10 In the past, barrels were retired because the walls of the barrels themselves became thinned due to wear. This was caused by the continuous process of erosion which occurred during firing; an erosion process of both the chemical and the mechanical type [1-2-3].
Technological advancements in materials and coatings have, however, helped to inhibit or alleviate barrel erosion. Despite this, overall, four main routes of failure exist for any gun barrel: wear and erosion, fatigue, plastic bore deformation and gas leakage/burst (as illustrated in the image below for reference).
The last two on this list are classed as catastrophic failures. The first sees the barrel deform plastically to the point where its geometry is compromised and rendered unsafe to operate. This can be triggered by improper use, or combustion of the propellant charges causing an anomalous increase in chamber pressure. The second is the creation of a fracture across the barrel’s thickness which causes gases to be expelled during operation. This could lead to a more substantial failure if the material used for construction is too brittle.
3/10 As you can imagine, gun barrels operated using correct procedure and are subject to frequent inspection are unlikely to malfunction. However, wear and erosion are inevitable.
Two factors contribute to the erosion and wear process: temperature and the velocity of the shell.
Propellant gases force the projectile forward down the barrel, past the ‘shot-start force’ of the driving band. The projectile exits the muzzle at high velocity, while the gases expand and follow behind it. The firing cycle is then able to be repeated. The lifespan of a gun barrel can generally range from anything from 100 to 1000 rounds [3]. When a gun barrel fires a projectile, it follows a thermodynamic cycle similar to that of a single-stroke engine. The pressure gradients during the projectile's movement within the bore can be observed from the image below, which depicts the nature of such gradients at different locations.
4/10 The nature of wear and erosion is often localised on the barrel’s rifling, where materials experience micro-structural change due to the cyclical high-temperatures to which they are subjected. The dependency on temperature and speed is demonstrated in the graph below, where we can see how barrel wear occurs at its highest in the combustion chamber and the muzzle section [3].
This explains why Russian artillery pieces having undergone catastrophic failure are frequently photographed with this having occurred close to the base of their barrels. This event is obviously not limited solely to Russian barrels. Pictured below is a Russian D20 [3b] which experienced a failure in its high-pressure section due to an abrupt increase of pressure from a faulty propellant charge.
5/10 Gun barrels, as mentioned before, undergo significant thermal, chemical, and/or mechanical degradation of the bore material during their exposure to hot combustion gases. If the steel bore is not protected it is fully exposed to these hot gases, which can result in thermally altered layers [3]. These are also known as ‘heat affected zones’ and occur both at and below the bore surface.
This, in turn, can lead to ‘heat checking’, characterised by an alligator skin appearance, as well as cracking of the bore surface itself. Both of these problems increase exponentially with continued firing. Additionally, hot gas-induced degradation of the fully exposed steel bore can cause thermo-chemical firing damage, leading to gas-wash erosion.
6/10 To prevent this, the bores are coated with a protective, often chromium-based, layer. Should this coating be damaged, however, the steel becomes partially exposed to the hot gases released during firing, leading to cracks and pits in the coating and gun steel.
As with an unprotected bore, thermal damage can cause heat affected zones at and below any exposed substrate, leading to ‘heat check’ cracking and platelet micro-cracking of the bore coating and steel [1]. Continued firing leads to bore coating shrinkage and a widening of the aforementioned ‘heat check’ cracks.
Thermochemical damage to the steel bore is caused by hot gas-induced degradation of the partially exposed interface between the coating and substrate. This causes an accelerated erosion rate, leading to micro-pit formation and abrupt spalling, chipping, and stripping of the protective coating. This phenomenon is depicted in the following graphic illustrating the process leading to erosion pit cracking.
7/10 We are nearing the end of the story about the initiation and growth of mechanical cracks. As you may recall from previous posts, barrels are subjected to cyclic loads in the form of internal pressure between each charge, which is accompanied by cyclic temperature changes across the thickness and length of the barrel.
In addition, wear and corrosion introduce imperfections in the rifling, which can lead to the initiation of cracking. The danger of such cracking is determined by its initial length and its ability to grow. As shown in the figure, quite deep cracks can develop in an A10 autocannon [4], but this does not necessarily mean that the barrel needs to be replaced immediately. Thus, barrel replacement depends on materials and their resilient properties, or, in simpler terms, the energy released when a fracture occurs. The longer the crack, the more energy is released [5]. This process cannot be stopped, but it can be observed and measured; estimations from which are then used to inform users about the maximum number of shells that should be fired for each barrel.
8/10 One common misconception about barrels pre-dating the 21st century is that our guns used to fire at a vastly sustained rate because they were simply more capable. This, as shown above, is simply not true. Even during the Vietnam War, gun barrels did not shoot continuously, and there are specific reasons for this.
To disprove this fallacy we can use research conducted on the thermal behaviour of the M102 barrel (used during Vietnam war), of 105mm calibre. This particular study utilised a computer simulation to chart the thermal issues detected following a rapid fire sequence of 10 rounds per minute [6]. The simulation showed that after firing 24 rounds, the risk of the propellant ‘cooking off’ became severe, leading to potentially catastrophic consequences for the system and its operators. In addition, the thermal gradient across the barrel thickness could introduce an increase in stresses and deformations which could further undermine the rifling’s lifespan.
9/10 The salient question we have to examine is how often a gun barrel needs to be changed. While this process is not cost-free, and can cost up to 100,000 dollars in a worst case scenario, its comparison requires the context of past practice. To do this, we must consider the key factor of EFC, or Equivalent Full Charges.
Typically, every gun barrel is capable of firing a range of ammunition types, yet not all of theses use the same amount of propellant. Therefore, calculating the life of any one barrel for its human crew can be tricky. When a round is fired with the highest charge admissible, the EFC is equal to 1. Any other combination will have a value between 0 and 1 [7].
To give a worked example of the EFC calculation, if the gun shoots 100 4H propellant charges, and 50 3H in a day, that’s a total EFC of 100 X 0.5 + 50 X 0.2 = 60. This means that over the 2500 only 60 would have been utilised.
These numbers are obtained using the table shown below [7] for 155mm Howitzers, including the M199, M284, and M776. Among all the charges reported, the M119A2 is the most demanding one in service and produces an EFC of 0.5 on an older M776.
10/10 From WW2 onwards, the standard for most howitzers has been 2500 rounds, but, in reality, the number of rounds each barrel can shoot varies and is, most of the time, higher. Older charges were much less efficient, with 1 round taking 1 EFC as shown with the M119A2 shell on the older M185 barrel. Propellant performance affects chamber pressure, muzzle velocity, and, resultantly, this particular aspect demands closer scrutiny within its own thread or article at a later date.
As mentioned before, the design of any barrel is key to its performance and lifespan, with the table illustrating these effects from older barrel designs. Following WW2, howitzer designs changed, making them progressively lighter as both higher performing and more mobile artillery systems were required.
Nowadays during normal operations, the average maximum charge is the 4H, which has a corrosion EFC of 0.5, meaning that a single howitzer can typically shoot up to 5000 shells. Recently, the resilience of these NATO barrels has been proven in Ukraine. Some reports have even claimed that some barrels successfully fired over 17,000 times, and mostly at maximum charge, without requiring a barrel change.
By comparison, during WW2, an M1 155mm howitzer was capable of firing 1500 shells, similar in weight to the modern M107, at distances up to 21km. Modern gun barrels can also fire newer shells such as the M795E1; a shell that can reach up to 28 km on a relatively short barrel (39 calibre). Weight and mobility advancements for towed artillery systems are also important to note. Towed artillery pieces can be moved rapidly compared to old-fashioned entrenched howitzers, which may be more vulnerable to both loitering munitions and long range weaponry.
It is therefore clear why designing and maintaining artillery barrels is so challenging, why they need to be replaced - and how we decide when it's time to do so. All in all, it's worth noting that artillery today is more lethal and agile than comparative weapons systems from WW2. The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the current state of this vital component of warfare is significantly more advanced than what existed in eras past. It also marks how perceptions change over time; what was considered a good weapons system today may be simply obsolete. On battlefields today, wars are fought with little to no safe zones due to the increase of precision strike weapons, but also due to the widespread adoption of loitering munitions and suicide drones.
References:
[1] Deepak Kumar, Sahil Kalra, Mayank Shekhar Jha, A concise review on degradation of gun barrels and its health monitoring techniques.
[2] B Wu, J Zheng, T F Luo, T Wang, Y C Zhou and X Huang, Damage and fracture of gun barrel under wear-fatigue interaction ()
[3] Richard G. Hasenbein, Wear and Erosion in Large Caliber Gun barrels. ( )
[3b]
[4]
[5] associated%20street%20 intensity%20 factor.
[6] Bin Wu, Gang Chen, Wei Xia, Heat transfer in a 155mm compound gun barrel with full length integral midwall cooling channels.
As always my greatest thanks to all the @tochnyi team and in particular to @CasualArtyFan for his help in the last part, where I needed lot of support and as always to @wendy_dyers for his incredible work of proof reading.
@tochnyi @CasualArtyFan @wendy_dyers If you would like this thread and want to read it more stuff visit us tochnyi.info/2024/01/from-w…
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1/n The 67th Arsenal of GRAU (53° 8’34.42″N 34°57’5.27″E ) successfully strike tonight has been covered in our latest research article on @tochnyi . Let’s have a look together on what it is, and why it is important.
2/n the 67th Arsenal of GRAU is what we classify as a class 2 depot. It has mostly Soviet-era buildings and a series of old ECMs. The site is within the 500 km range from the Ukrainian border. Has a vast tree coverage and a substantial surface area.
3/n This site is a class 2 due to the presence of Soviet-era ECM highlighted in red. It also shows the presence of large ammunition stocks in open air, highlighted in green, most of these are surrounded by soil embankments. The last feature is the vast use of above ground magazine. These however, are just warehouses with no sign of reinforcement. In some cases, these have minimal to no perimeter walls (highlighted in violet) and are mostly intended to protect ammunition from environmental conditions.
Our investigation at @tochnyi on Russian Ammunition Depots is out, I will give you a short introduction in this thread but you can find it in full on our website at:
2/n First of all, it's important to note that not all ammunition depots are the same. I've decided to categorize those within 500 km of the Ukrainian border. We start with those which are old and not particularly rugged, which I define as Class 1. These are Soviet-era ammo depots. They have little to no soil protection and mostly use above-ground magazines. Sometimes, you can also find tons of ordnance left in the open or under conventional roofs, with no sidewalls at all.
3/n Class 2 sites have a lot of similarities with Class 1, sharing most of the same flaws, such as poor use of embankments and arguable distancing between buildings. However, these sites have Soviet Era ECMs, which are easily recognisable due to their long and narrow structure. Here, an example is the 67th Arsenal GRAU.
1/6 Last night, there were two strikes, and my first thread on the Toropets bunker was just released. The image I'm sharing combines a CNES/Airbus 2024 optical image and a false colour image from Sentinel 1C. The depot can be divided into two macro areas: North with mostly unprotected AGM (Above Ground Magazine) and South with open-air stockpiles. The strike affected Some places more than others; I'll be delving into this to understand why.
2/6 This schematic illustrates why the southern region, despite its clear vulnerability, is less impacted by fires—at least those visible. Notably, the largest open-air storage area has been quite active. Stockpiles from 2021 until summer 2023, appear significantly depleted and are likely not being replenished with new materials. In addition, the central open-air section of the northern part of the depot seems largely empty.
3/6 I selected a few images of the open-air stockpile dated 2021 to better understand what stockpiles were there, at least theoretically. They look pretty much like stocks of missiles of different types possibly GRAD and other larger types. However, I am not able to identify at the moment. By looking at the video I realised you can appreciate the decrease in amount (up to summer 2023), which ultimately seems explaining why these areas were not targeted.
1/7 The Ukrainian strike on Toropets may have been one of the most successful attacks on an ammunition depot since the start of the war. The reasons behind this success are still under scrutiny. Many are discussing the potential use of the Storm Shadow missile or the large number of drones, possibly up to 100. It's clear there also has been incompetence within the Russian army.
2/7 First of all, while everyone is rushing to see the ashes, I spent some time examining how this site was built. The initial information we have gathered from 2013 to 2018 indicates that the forest ground has not been excavated. Soil has been moved, and construction started in a big rush. This is a problem because to offer more protection, you would dig a few meters into the ground and then build your concrete shell.
3/7 This is a 30 by 40-meter ECM. You can see the construction phases: first, the perimeter walls are erected, then the roof. You can appreciate the complete lack of excavation, as the construction is done on the ground. The last phase is the construction of the flat roof, which looks like a flat reinforced concrete roof with a rough estimate of 2.5 meters. It's very peculiar that there are eight venting ports.
1/n There have been reports of ZSU push at Korenevo, following a successful targeting of bridges and pontoon bridges along the Seym River. Two newly constructed bridges have become targets for the Ukrainian Air Force. (@AndrewPerpetua Map)
2/n The offensive itself, taking many international observers by surprise, saw successful advances made by the Ukrainian Armed Forces within the first few hours and days of the operation. Operations in the Kursk area have been intensifying and were likely already taking shape by early June. During the lead-up to the offensive, there was an escalation in activity overall, but particularly in terms of drone strikes - which Andrew and his team documented at the time.
3/n Seven strikes were carried out using FPV drones on substations of various sizes, or logistics points for electrical grid maintenance. These attacks occurred between the end of June and a few days before the start of the offensive on Kursk.
A new🧵 factories fueling Russia's war machine.
This is part of a long investigation we started at @tochnyi months ago to uncover the network of industries supporting military production beyond the commonly known defence manufacturers. Today we will explore the Krasny Oktyabr metallurgical plant in Volgograd.
1/n Since 2009, Russia has invested a large amount of resources into improving its metallurgical production facilities, an industry which stagnated after the fall of the Soviet Union. For the detailed research, here is the article’s link: tochnyi.info/2024/08/on-the…
2/n Krasny Oktyabr was destroyed during the siege of Stalingrad. It was rebuilt and became a major installation during the Cold War, producing millions of tons of steel annually. By 1986, the plant was responsible for 12% of the USSR's high-quality steel output, including 14% of its stainless steel. The plant is capable of producing over 500 different grades of steel.