Ukrainian operations on the eastern bank of the Dnipro river, in the village of Krynky, have been ongoing since October 2023.
In this thread, I'll analyze the current situation and the future of the bridgehead in Krynky.
The thread includes high-resolution satellite images. 1/
A brief timeline of the events in the Dnipro River Delta since the liberation of Kherson. The “river war” has been a long process, often conducted in challenging conditions.
However, it has not generally been discussed as much in the media as some other sectors. 2/
In the village of Krynky, Ukrainian forces have been fighting a difficult battle for a prolonged time. The area controlled by Ukraine is small and natural cover is very limited. There is a forest next to the village, but it seems the Ukrainians have not advanced far into it. 3/
Russians have been using artillery, rocket launcher systems and aerial bombs against the Ukrainian positions in the village. The infrastructure has suffered significant damage and the ground is full of craters. We can see an example of that in this picture. 4/
The large aerial bomb craters may act as an indicator of the width of the permanent Ukrainian presence in the village. They are found along a distance of about 2400 metres, mostly near the first row of houses. This also correlates with recent geolocated material from the area. 5/
The river banks have also been actively bombed, and the craters quickly fill with water. The main supply route is most likely the Konka river, where Russia, of course, tries to monitor all larger Ukrainian movements and prevent logistics from working. 6/
The entire village is not under Ukrainian control. At the moment it seems that Ukraine is largely focused on holding on to what it has achieved, instead of attempting to gain full control. Ukrainian officials have also recognized the difficulties of the operation. 7/
Over the course of months, Russia had built fortifications in Krynky in two ranks – right next to the river and closer to the forest. Some of these have been captured by Ukraine. Russia also seems to have dug new positions on the east side of the village during the battle. 8/
Russians have launched multiple counterattacks against the bridgehead. Videos suggest that they do not attempt larger, coordinated assaults, but instead repeatedly send small detachments against Ukrainian positions, often from the same directions, with no significant results. 9/
Here we can see a part of the Russian losses. Various vehicles and a tank were destroyed or abandoned over the course of weeks. Advancing along this road has not brought success, but the Russians still seem to think it's a militarily reasonable avenue of approach. 10/
Some have mentioned that cutting the road M14 could be one of Ukraine’s goals, as it would complicate Russian logistics. I would see it more as a small setback for the Russians, but they could still supply their troops using other, slightly longer routes. 11/
From the satellite images, we can see that Russia is also prepared to defend the area beyond Krynky, including the M14. Even half a kilometre long trench can be seen, among other defensive positions. 12/
Ukrainian efforts have been mostly focused on lighter infantry operations. No heavier Ukrainian equipment has been seen in Krynky, as a mechanized offensive would require bridges over the Dnipro river or at least a larger Ukrainian controlled bridgehead. 13/
Bringing mechanized units over the river and supplying them would eventually become a difficult task, as Ukraine would lack air and fire superiority, especially when Russia would decide to shift its focus more decisively to the area due to increased Ukrainian activity. 14/
The end goal of Ukraine is unclear. At the moment they're able to tie certain Russian forces to the area, and they have conducted successful artillery & drone strikes against targets deep in the rear. 🇷🇺 losses here are significantly higher than 🇺🇦. 15/
Still, the fight consumes and ties Ukrainian resources as well. Fighting an attritional battle in a location like Krynky is difficult, and some reports and interviews indicate that even though Ukraine isn't losing a large amount of equipment, it’s continuously losing men. 16/
When looking at the exchange ratio, it’s also a good question whether keeping Ukrainians in the ruins of Krynky is absolutely beneficial for Ukraine. Could it still be possible to cause a decent level of damage to the Russians, without the arduous bridgehead? 17/
The objective may also be political – to show that Ukraine is still able to continue offensive operations in significant directions, even if greater goals do not seem to materialize. Without breakthrough attempts in Zaporizhzhia, the future in Krynky does not look bright. 18/
One reason we don't see more significant efforts against the bridgehead may be that the Russians don’t prioritize it very highly. As the current units are able to control the situation with seemingly acceptable losses, they might feel that no larger operations are needed. 19/
I also don't think the Russians have specific master plan to attrit the Ukrainians in the village. The reportedly weak level of Russian coordination and competence against Ukraine’s rather effective defence allow the situation to continue without a quick end in sight. 20/
Our team at @Black_BirdGroup continues to map and analyze the war. Our interactive map can be found here.
Images in this thread are roughly two weeks old, as I don't want to endanger Ukrainian OPSEC in any way. 21/21
Some additional images for geolocators! Your work is priceless, and as I'm using geolocations as a part of my analysis, I want to give something back.
I also want to thank @wihurinrahasto for making threads like these actually possible. External funding is very important in order to continue our work.
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According to Ukrainian 1st Corps (Azov), the situation east of Dobropillia has been stabilized and the Russians have been pushed out of six villages. They also reported that the combined Russian losses in the area are 385 men, 37 vehicles, 2 AFVs and 1 tank.
A few thoughts: 1/🧵
It is evident that this operation was not merely a few infiltration groups slipping past Ukrainian lines only to be destroyed. While it may have begun as a lighter operation, Russian forces were prepared to exploit breakthroughs, successfully advancing into the Ukrainian rear. 2/
If the reported losses are accurate, it implies multiple Russian battalions were engaged in the battle, with many still fighting, as Russia has not lost all gained territory. The Russians are now likely trying to consolidate and defend the southern part of the corridor. 3/
Russians have recently advanced deep in the area east of Dobropillia. The situation has concerning elements which can escalate it into a serious crisis, but at this stage we’re still not witnessing a disaster – and by definition, not even a breakthrough. I’ll explain. 1/
The situation had been deteriorating for some time. The Russians had been attempting to advance in the Dobropillia direction earlier this month. A gray zone had formed in the area, as the Ukrainians struggled to maintain a firm defence against the infiltrating enemy. 2/
Russia has an advantage in expendable manpower – once it finds a weak spot, it can aggressively try to exploit it by pushing more infantry into the area. Small infiltration groups will try to advance as far as possible, which is enabled by the porous Ukrainian defences. 3/
According to our data, the Russians did not accelerate their advance during June. The pace isn't slow, but most of the Russian gains last month were in less crucial areas.
It can be argued that Russia mostly wasted June without achieving significant success. 1/
The situation isn't great for Ukraine, but it could be worse.
The salient between Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka is still an issue, but it didn't rapidly expand in June. The front in Sumy was also stabilized. The worst-case scenarios didn't materialize, at least not yet. 2/
A large part of the Russian gains were south of Pokrovsk, where they are pushing towards the administrative borders of Donetsk oblast. Entering Dnipropetrovsk oblast doesn't change the general situation much, even though there's a lot of Russian propaganda about it. 3/
On June 1, Ukraine conducted a successful operation targeting Russian strategic bombers and other aircraft.
Our battle damage assessment can confirm the following losses: 12 destroyed and 3 damaged aircraft, of which 14 are strategic bombers and 1 is a transport aircraft. 1/
From videos and satellite images, 23 distinct aircraft were identified in total as potentially targeted. The condition of 4 aircraft seen in videos remains unclear. Available evidence doesn’t allow for assessing potential damage or whether nearby drones even detonated. 2/
The highest possible number for total losses is 19, if all aircraft in unknown condition are actually damaged. However, this can’t be confirmed at the moment.
In 4 cases, it appears the drones likely missed, did not explode or cause visible damage for other reasons. 3/
Ukraine has struck multiple strategic bombers in Olenya, Murmansk oblast, 1800 km from Ukraine. This is one of the most successful drone strikes against against Russian air bases in the entire war. The extent of the damage is yet unclear, but I can already say it's significant. 1/
Russia had transferred the valuable planes to Olenya to avoid the exact scenario we're seeing on the videos and photos coming from the area. Bombers operating from the field have repeatedly struck Ukraine with cruise missiles. 2/
These are major and expensive losses for Russia that can't be replaced quickly.
Additionally, the air base in Belaya, roughly 4300 km from Ukraine, has been hit. Also Dyagilevo and Ivanovo air bases are burning. This is a very, very successful day for Ukraine. 3/
During April and May, the Russians formed a dangerous salient against the Ukrainian defenses between Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk.
The so-called spring offensive has progressed relatively quickly, and serious issues may lie ahead in the near future. 1/
Defending forces in the area initially consisted of newer, less capable brigades, such as the 142nd, 155th & 157th. Elements from other units were also present. Reserves have been brought in – first the 36th marine brigade, and now the 82nd air assault brigade, among others. 2/
Russia's probable operational objectives for the coming months in the area include:
Formation of an encirclement threat around Kostiantynivka
Formation of an encirclement threat around Pokrovsk
Disruption of Ukrainian supply & command elements in the cities in the AO 3/