Ukrainian operations on the eastern bank of the Dnipro river, in the village of Krynky, have been ongoing since October 2023.
In this thread, I'll analyze the current situation and the future of the bridgehead in Krynky.
The thread includes high-resolution satellite images. 1/
A brief timeline of the events in the Dnipro River Delta since the liberation of Kherson. The “river war” has been a long process, often conducted in challenging conditions.
However, it has not generally been discussed as much in the media as some other sectors. 2/
In the village of Krynky, Ukrainian forces have been fighting a difficult battle for a prolonged time. The area controlled by Ukraine is small and natural cover is very limited. There is a forest next to the village, but it seems the Ukrainians have not advanced far into it. 3/
Russians have been using artillery, rocket launcher systems and aerial bombs against the Ukrainian positions in the village. The infrastructure has suffered significant damage and the ground is full of craters. We can see an example of that in this picture. 4/
The large aerial bomb craters may act as an indicator of the width of the permanent Ukrainian presence in the village. They are found along a distance of about 2400 metres, mostly near the first row of houses. This also correlates with recent geolocated material from the area. 5/
The river banks have also been actively bombed, and the craters quickly fill with water. The main supply route is most likely the Konka river, where Russia, of course, tries to monitor all larger Ukrainian movements and prevent logistics from working. 6/
The entire village is not under Ukrainian control. At the moment it seems that Ukraine is largely focused on holding on to what it has achieved, instead of attempting to gain full control. Ukrainian officials have also recognized the difficulties of the operation. 7/
Over the course of months, Russia had built fortifications in Krynky in two ranks – right next to the river and closer to the forest. Some of these have been captured by Ukraine. Russia also seems to have dug new positions on the east side of the village during the battle. 8/
Russians have launched multiple counterattacks against the bridgehead. Videos suggest that they do not attempt larger, coordinated assaults, but instead repeatedly send small detachments against Ukrainian positions, often from the same directions, with no significant results. 9/
Here we can see a part of the Russian losses. Various vehicles and a tank were destroyed or abandoned over the course of weeks. Advancing along this road has not brought success, but the Russians still seem to think it's a militarily reasonable avenue of approach. 10/
Some have mentioned that cutting the road M14 could be one of Ukraine’s goals, as it would complicate Russian logistics. I would see it more as a small setback for the Russians, but they could still supply their troops using other, slightly longer routes. 11/
From the satellite images, we can see that Russia is also prepared to defend the area beyond Krynky, including the M14. Even half a kilometre long trench can be seen, among other defensive positions. 12/
Ukrainian efforts have been mostly focused on lighter infantry operations. No heavier Ukrainian equipment has been seen in Krynky, as a mechanized offensive would require bridges over the Dnipro river or at least a larger Ukrainian controlled bridgehead. 13/
Bringing mechanized units over the river and supplying them would eventually become a difficult task, as Ukraine would lack air and fire superiority, especially when Russia would decide to shift its focus more decisively to the area due to increased Ukrainian activity. 14/
The end goal of Ukraine is unclear. At the moment they're able to tie certain Russian forces to the area, and they have conducted successful artillery & drone strikes against targets deep in the rear. 🇷🇺 losses here are significantly higher than 🇺🇦. 15/
Still, the fight consumes and ties Ukrainian resources as well. Fighting an attritional battle in a location like Krynky is difficult, and some reports and interviews indicate that even though Ukraine isn't losing a large amount of equipment, it’s continuously losing men. 16/
When looking at the exchange ratio, it’s also a good question whether keeping Ukrainians in the ruins of Krynky is absolutely beneficial for Ukraine. Could it still be possible to cause a decent level of damage to the Russians, without the arduous bridgehead? 17/
The objective may also be political – to show that Ukraine is still able to continue offensive operations in significant directions, even if greater goals do not seem to materialize. Without breakthrough attempts in Zaporizhzhia, the future in Krynky does not look bright. 18/
One reason we don't see more significant efforts against the bridgehead may be that the Russians don’t prioritize it very highly. As the current units are able to control the situation with seemingly acceptable losses, they might feel that no larger operations are needed. 19/
I also don't think the Russians have specific master plan to attrit the Ukrainians in the village. The reportedly weak level of Russian coordination and competence against Ukraine’s rather effective defence allow the situation to continue without a quick end in sight. 20/
Our team at @Black_BirdGroup continues to map and analyze the war. Our interactive map can be found here.
Images in this thread are roughly two weeks old, as I don't want to endanger Ukrainian OPSEC in any way. 21/21
Some additional images for geolocators! Your work is priceless, and as I'm using geolocations as a part of my analysis, I want to give something back.
I also want to thank @wihurinrahasto for making threads like these actually possible. External funding is very important in order to continue our work.
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Jos Suomi ei voi lähettää edes yhtä pataljoonaa tulitaukoa takaamaan Ukrainaan, en ihan ymmärrä, miksi me olisimme oikeutettuja odottamaan aidosti vaikeita turvallisuuspoliittisiä päätöksiä vaativaa apua keneltäkään kriisitilanteessa.
"Koska Nato" ei ole riittävä argumentti. 1/
Toisekseen, jos Suomen Puolustusvoimat ovat siinä tilassa, ettei edes yhden pataljoonan varustaminen ja lähettäminen onnistu edes silloin, kun koko Euroopan turvallisuusjärjestyksen sorvaaminen on käynnissä, en ihan ymmärrä mihin puolustusbudjettimme oikein uppoaa. 2/
Pataljoona tai kaksi Ukrainaan tulitaukoa takaamaan toisi Suomeen myös arvokasta oppia ja osaamista, josta nimenomaan on kriisitilanteessa hyötyä. Reserviläisiä löytyy kyllä, ei jää vapaaehtoisista kiinni. Tämä olisi investointi, joka tuottaisi turvallisuutta myös Suomeen. 3/
Ukraine has been fighting for three years in increasingly difficult conditions. Today, the Nordic and Baltic countries announced that they will “pledge to provide equipment and training for a scalable brigade-sized unit”. It’s a textbook example of too little, too late. 1/
As far as I understand from this statement, there will be a new Ukrainian brigade based on Nordic & Baltic training and equipment. In theory, this is positive news. This could, at its best, produce a highly capable unit, trained by some of the best militaries in Europe. 2/
But here’s the catch: this brigade is being formed at a time when Ukraine faces a chronic manpower shortage. Simply put, Ukraine doesn’t lack brigades, it lacks men. Depending on its structure, this Nordic-Baltic-trained brigade could be somewhere between 3000-5000 soldiers. 3/
Ukraine has carried out a series of counterattacks in several directions, especially southeast of Pokrovsk. They have entered Pishchane, but currently it's unclear if they have fully retaken the village.
At the same time, the Russians are still attacking in the area too. 1/
Ukrainians are achieving limited success. It's likely an attempt to further grind down the Russian attacks which have slowed down during the last two months. The Ukrainians certainly also want to contain the threat of an encirclement around Pokrovsk. 2/
The Russians have multiple simultaneous issues and they have taken significant losses for many months. At some point the offensive has to slow down, and we may be seeing that currently. I don't expect a major collapse to happen, but this is still a positive signal for Ukraine. 3/
After six months of combat in the Kursk salient, the Ukrainians launched another attack in the southeastern direction of Sudzha. The Ukrainians seemingly breached the first Russian defences, and an armored column managed to advance up to 5-7 kilometers deep towards Ulanok. 1/
The attack was carried out by a battlegroup of likely 1-2 battalions in size, also equipped with engineering vehicles. Ukraine has a relatively large grouping of air assault, mechanized and other brigades in Kursk, but it’s unclear which participated in this operation. 2/
The attack appeared to advance on a narrow front towards Ulanok. The troops took control of the small villages of Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseevka along the road. It is unclear how far the Ukrainians advanced – possibly as far as the outskirts of the village of Ulanok. 3/
Vellyka Novosilka and Kurakhove have fallen, and Russians continue their offensive towards Pokrovsk.
In this thread I will examine what is to be expected of the most critical area of the eastern front in the near future, and what can the Russians realistically achieve. 1/
The losses of Velyka Novosilka and also Kurakhove ultimately had a rather limited impact on the broader dynamics of the battlefield in the southern and central Donetsk directions. The defensive importance of the towns had already decreased earlier, as the flanks fell. 2/
Apart from simply reaching the administrative borders of the Donetsk region, there is little to be achieved in the Velyka Novosilka direction now. There are only small villages, fields and some limiting terrain. Ukrainians have fortified many dominant heights and ridges. 3/
Ukrainians have continued their attacks in Kursk. Today, an armored column advanced towards Bolshoye Soldatskoye, and reportedly fighting is ongoing in other villages too.
I find it unlikely that these actions could produce very significant results. 1/
The Ukrainians are facing a stronger enemy. It's possible they achieve some tactical success with the element of surprise, and in the best case scenarios they may be able to enter some villages. In the big picture, however, the general situation will likely remain the same. 2/
The Ukrainians have lost more than half of the area in Kursk that they controlled at most in August-September 2024. Even if the new attacks were to advance ten kilometers, the battles would still be fought in the same general areas where fighting has been going on for months. 3/