Thread by @spartyflyboy

Russia vs NATO - A Scenario🧵

Russian aggression isn't limited to Ukraine. Before the backdrop of constant threats to the Baltics and other European nations, the question when and where RF might strike again is of eminent importance.
This🧵explores an early option for Russia.
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Strategic Foresight
Much of the debate when🇷🇺can strike again centers around estimates for🇷🇺's recovery from the enormous attrition by Ukraine. As @FRHoffmann1 explains the notion of🇷🇺engaging in a prolonged large war as in Ukraine might be misleading.
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https://x.com/FRHoffmann1/status/1746589423251403236?s=20

Arguably🇷🇺planers did not expect the invasion of Ukraine to develop into an attrition nightmare. The demonstrated🇷🇺modus operandi is a hybrid attack with intent for a swift military engagement component.
Foresight demands to explore the options for an early hybrid engagement.
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Russian Strategic Goals
🇷🇺is open about the intent to destroy/weaken Western democracies and alliances like the EU or NATO. 🇷🇺is already conducting extensive ops to destabilize Western political systems and fuels elements of polycrisis in support.
This could stall UA mil aid.
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Of particular🇷🇺interest are the Baltics.🇷🇺considers them seceded provinces. They are also staunch advocates to deter🇷🇺while being under NATO's mutual defense policy umbrella.
Successful action vs the Baltics would serve several🇷🇺strategic goals and undermine NATO as guarantor.
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Russian Capabilities
🇷🇺war against🇺🇦 binds almost all forces available for a larger military engagement. 🇷🇺yet retains significant intel and SOF capabilities.
NATO Posture
Enhanced presence on eastern flank w/ air power appears sufficient to currently prevent a larger🇷🇺attack.
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Suwalki Gap
Successful🇷🇺military action in the Suwalki Gap would require military force build up. Conducted under direct observation by heavy NATO ISR presence.
Any🇷🇺attack preparation could be timely deterred by NATO deployments. Suwalki threats would be🇷🇺distraction effort.
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Limited Russian Incursion
A more promising scenario, well within current🇷🇺capabilities, would be a limited🇷🇺incursion e.g at the🇷🇺/🇪🇪border. Employed🇷🇺assets would be mostly SOF (green men), intel officers, civilians and Rosgvardia.
Focus on disruption, not territorial gains.
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Russian Pretext & Hybrid Operation
Essential asset for a🇷🇺op would be elements of the🇷🇺diaspora in🇪🇪. Hybrid🇷🇺attack utilizing migrants led to closure of the border via the xmas holidays.
This, and deportations of🇷🇺nationals, caused extensive dissatisfaction in the🇷🇺diaspora.
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In face of FSB activities in the🇷🇺diaspora,🇪🇪has elected to conduct aggressive countermeasures. This will increasingly limit🇷🇺ability to utilize civilians in a hybrid attack.
🇷🇺in turn reacted by building up the usual pretext of a need to protect "human rights of Russians".
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"Protecting Russians" in other sovereign nations is a repeatedly demonstrated narrative to justify a🇷🇺incursion. 🇷🇺is creating a faux "🇷🇺human rights" umbrella that is in conflict with NATO's military guarantee of🇪🇪sovereignty.
🇷🇺will try to resolve this via hybrid operation.
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Scenario: Humanitarian Border Crisis
If🇷🇺so choses to conduct a hybrid operation vs NATO via🇪🇪, the first phase would be to stir up unrest in the🇷🇺diaspora. In the whole Baltic, Finland and eventually supported by demonstrations in other countries with diaspora, like Germany.
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Unrest across the region will make it harder to assess where🇷🇺will place the main effort.
In the 2nd phase the protests will move towards the border, possibly demanding opening for humanitarian reasons. NATO troops could be deployed to secure the border as riots bind police.
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Phase 3 will see🇷🇺civilians join protests on the🇷🇺side of the border, an increasing number of SOF "little green men" posing as civilians mixed in.
NATO forces can't engage here as it's a police issue.
Protests will stretch police thin, especially in Narva and at checkpoints.
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Depending on🇪🇪police and force deployment🇷🇺will develop 1-2 attack vectors. A mix of "patriots", 🇷🇺civilians and SOF would then storm the border brushing police aside, potentially using small arms, laying the blame on🇪🇪for using "violence" against "defenseless"🇷🇺civilians.
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Phase 4 would see 🇷🇺SOF expand the area of control using🇷🇺civilians as shield. In case of unexpected resistance or frictions,🇷🇺SOF may elect to shoot at🇷🇺civilians that are held back by🇪🇪forces. Even a 100+ mass casualty event is possible in the attempt to shock🇪🇪forces back.
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Phase 5 would see the insertion of fast, lightly armed (AK,RPG) Rosgvardia, eventually using civ cars, to secure the relatively small incursion perimeter.
Narva, utilizing urban environment to deter military expulsion attempts, could be ideal.
🇷🇺civilians serve as shields.
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Constraints of NATO Response
The hypothetical hybrid attack would make it difficult for NATO forces to engage. 🇷🇺would threaten with escalation while NATO military would be confronting a wild mix of🇷🇺civilians, SOF & Rosgvardia.
In the end🇷🇺might expand her nuclear umbrella.
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Depending on🇷🇺activation of the diaspora, protests could also severely hamper NATO logistics and mobility. Blocking gates of garrisons, protests that close roads might deny NATO forces timely and decisive reaction.
The situation would demand police instead of military action.
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Diplomacy, NATO & Baltic Sovereignty
The discussed scenario is designed to deliver🇷🇺a fast stalemate after trespassing with tiny footprint on🇪🇪soil. Ideally short before an important conference like the MSC. Then a mil response automatism is less likely & diplomats take over.
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In the face of direct military confrontation over a limited incursion,🇷🇺might rightfully expect that NATO seeks a diplomatic solution. Especially if a civilian mass casualty event (see Chechnya war pretext) was employed.
🇷🇺will then set demands infringing on🇪🇪sovereignty.
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🇷🇺demands may be the🇪🇪guarantee to keep border open, stop deportations and have🇷🇺as 2nd official language.
NATO's promise to defend every inch of territory would then be devalued, trust of Baltic states undermined.
This scenario is a🇷🇺game of chicken with NATO pol leadership.
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Strategic & Geopolitical Relevance
If the discussed scenario is successfully employed it will reduce NATO's credibility. Depending on if the diplomatic pipeline is engaged and how prominent Western detente voices are, this will also affect other regions of crisis like CN/TW.
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🇷🇺might succeed to demonstrate how even a militarily far inferior but decisive actor can overpower the indecisive liberal democracies.
At a time in which the global struggle autocracy vs democracy is also a threat at home, such a small event could have catastrophic results.
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Prevention
Continued indecisiveness vs🇷🇺hybrid aggression is bedrock to the current dilemma. Unlike in the past, even small🇷🇺provocations, subcritical escalation and interference in our societies need swift, strong response.
Before all, deterrence needs Ukraine's victory.
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It's telling a story, that a call for resounding Ukrainian victory is necessary. This story is one of not stopping🇷🇺aggression early. As with almost any conflict, the longer aggression lasts, the harder it is to stop.
The Baltic states know🇷🇺well and learned this lesson.
26/END

For a more detailed read about the Narva scenario, this article is out today:
piontk052.comv.info/material.php?i…