Today’s downing of an IL-76 inside Russia is yet another indication of the maturing Ukrainian strike complex, which encompasses long range attacks against ground, maritime and aerial targets to degrade Russia’ strategic war-making capacity. 1/15 🧵
2/ The downing of IL-76 is just the latest example of Ukraine ‘stretching’ its air defence capabilities by forward deploying longer range systems and ambushing high-value Russia air force assets. wsj.com/world/ukraine-…
3/ Other examples include the Russian A-50 airborne C2 aircraft downed last week, as well as the December ambush that destroyed three Russian fighter bombers in Kherson in December last year. This attacks a key Russian asymmetry over Ukraine & holds airfields in Russia at risk.
4/ Since the beginning of the war, Ukraine has developed a variety of capabilities that now comprise a mature and sophisticated strike complex. These include long range missiles, different maritime attack drones, long range UAV recon and strike systems. navalnews.com/naval-news/202…
5/ Beyond the weapon systems, Ukraine’s strike complex has 4 other elements.
6/ First, Reconnaissance and surveillance. The finding and mensuration of targets is an important part of any strike system. You can’t strike what you can’t find. Ukraine has access to these kinds of capabilities from its allies and from its indigenous systems.
7/ Second, joint planning & coordination. Ukraine use NATO joint targeting doctrine & has a joint targeting staff. Integrated targeting ensures better use of resources, & improved integration of strike operations with strategic and operational objectives.
8/ 3rd, Survivability. To plan & conduct strike operations, Ukraine needs to protect its capability. It has become adept at deception & camouflage operations to ensure that high value systems and the locations of strike aircraft & missiles are hidden from Russian intelligence.
9/ Finally, assessment. Ukrainians undertake post-strike assessments to ascertain whether strikes achieve objectives, and if not, what Russian methods defeated the strike enroute or at the target. This is a key part of strategic learning & adapting Ukraine’s strike complex.
10/ Ukraine's strike complex appears to be maturing just as it is needed most. This year, Ukraine is likely to assume a strategically defensive posture. It allows Ukraine the time to reconstitute its military & mobilise new troops / formations. kyivindependent.com/ukraine-war-la…
11/ It also permits time for rebuilding of Western defence industry, and the conservation of resources this year so they can be built up and then expended in 2025 offensives.
12/ However strategic strike alone does not win wars. It is key for strategic success but only if integrated with the array of support, command & close combat activities employed to destroy Russian forces, seize territory and sustain the support of international partners.
13/ Ukraine’s strike complex is an impressive achievement & will be vital to Ukraine’s 2024 military strategy. It will provide breathing space for Ukraine's Armed Forces, help attrit Russian forces and assist Ukraine to achieve some of its strategic influence objectives.
15/ Thank you to the following whose links and images were used in this thread: @CovertShores @Forbes @IAPonomarenko @DefenceU @BBC @KyivIndependent @NATO @WSJ
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This is becoming a growing scandal for the Australian government, which refuses to provide reasonable answers to questions about why these aircraft can’t be transferred to #Ukraine. 1/9 🧵
2/ For those who propose they are ‘too complex’ for Ukraine to operate, I present the evidence of M1 and Leopard 2 tanks, HiMARS, SCALP missiles and the Patriot air defence system. All of which Ukraine has mastered.
3/ For those who claim ‘supportability’ issues, Taipans in Ukraine would be much closer to the European support bases used by nearly a dozen other military organisations for these helicopters. The same argument was used to initially deny tanks, missiles and F16s to #Ukraine.
Battlefield failure can be the harbinger of defeat, or the beginning of adaptation & intellectual renewal that leads to victory. This is the challenge that faces #Ukraine after President Zelensky accepted that the 2023 counteroffensive failed to meets its objectives. 1/17 🧵
2/ This was accompanied by the late 2023 paper by General Zaluzhny on Positional Warfare. Unfortunately, too many have equated positional warfare with stalemate. That is unfortunate because they are certainly not the same.
3/ What is Positional Warfare? A 1990 RUSI Journal article examined the concept as part of a wider exploration of the likely forms of war open to European armies in the wake of the Cold War. Their definition of the application of Positional Warfare is worth quoting…
A shocking series of Russian massed missile and drone attacks across #Ukraine. What does Putin & Russia aim to achieve, and what do the attacks tell us about the coercive power of strategic air, missile and drone attacks? 1/18 🧵
2/ At its most simple, these attacks are a larger scale version of the type of attacks on civilian infrastructure that Russia has mastered during this war. They aim to terrorise, and degrade civilian morale.
3/ But they are also aimed at responding to the last couple of weeks successes by the Ukrainians in their strike campaign. Russian fighter bombers and naval vessels have been destroyed by the UAF recently. Gerasimov knows this hurts Russian prestige.
A short thread on the year ahead. At Duntroon officer training, we were told on morning parades to ‘ponder the day ahead’. It was wise advice. Currently, strategists will be pondering the year ahead for national security affairs. 1/15🧵
2/ In #Ukraine, Russia seeks to project an air of inevitable victory with a range of offensive activities. This is important tactically, as they seek to reverse Ukrainian gains from 2023.
3/ It is also importantly politically as Russia approaches its 2024 elections, continues its global misinformation campaigns about western patience, and offers a ‘ceasefire’ that allows them time to reconstitute their forces for future offensives.
2/ First, the adulation with which he was received last December has largely evaporated. With recent polls indicating growing U.S. disinterest in supporting Ukraine, some members of Congress see little interest in supporting this issue if it impacts their electoral prospects.
3/ Second, the centrality of US support is under appreciated by many in Congress. While not taking away from the courage and sacrifice of Ukrainians, US weapons and intelligence are critical to their fight.
Since the release of the Zaluzhnyy paper, there has been discussion about how to help #Ukraine break out of Positional Warfare. There is no big secret way to do this. It requires just one thing from the West: Commitment. 1/10 🧵 mickryan.substack.com/p/breaking-out…
2/ Western nations must commit anew to their aid to #Ukraine. This commitment has four elements: strategic, industrial, innovation and informational.
3/ The West needs to commit to a new strategy that looks beyond defending Ukraine and embraces the defeat of Russia. Not only does this send a signal of resolve to Ukraine, and other NATO allies who face an aggressive Russia, it also says to Putin that he can’t wait out the West.