Thread by @revishvilig

In this tweet, I will elaborate on Russia’s strategy in 2024.

Here is the strategic outlook:

Russia’s major effort will remain to capture all of Donbas and consolidate its control over newly occupied territories of Ukraine, cementing the occupation regimes there. 1/18 ⬇️

Furthermore, Moscow will continue to erase Ukrainian identity through “Russification” including indoctrination in schools, forced passportization, eradication of the Ukrainian culture, etc. in the occupied areas. 2/18

- Russia will persistently carry out missile and drone strikes against Ukraine for 3 main reasons: 1. Instill fear and demoralize civilians in order to diminish support for the resistance and the will to fight. 3/18

2. Undercut Ukraine’s military-industrial output 3. Target both commercial and military supply lines and key military infrastructure. 4/18

- Russia will attempt to reestablish control over the Western part of the Black Sea after retreating due to the successful Ukrainian air, naval and drone strikes. 5/18

Moscow is expected to undermine Ukrainian grain exports, which returned nearly to pre-war levels, in order to further exert pressure on Kyiv and destabilize its economy. 6/18

- The politicization of the Ukraine aid by MAGA Republicans and turning into an election issue emboldens the Kremlin in terms of outlasting the Western support for Kyiv. It is not necessarily about the outcome of the US elections, 7/18

Russia benefits from the political polarization and chaos delaying the assistance to Ukraine. Trump’s election as the President brings uncertainty and unpredictability about America’s international commitment further waning aid to Ukraine. 8/18

Moscow is likely employing tactics to interfere in U.S. elections, aiming to sow division, distrust, and controversy among the American public. 9/18

- Putin is strongly convinced he can outlast and outmaneuver Ukraine’s partners, especially after reaching a new equilibrium following the mutiny, failing to meet initial strategic goals and withstanding sanctions and economic pressure. 10/18

- Russia’s vital interest remains to have enhanced military cooperation with Iran and North Korea to preserve numerical superiority, especially in terms of artillery shells. 11/18

Due to the North Korean supplies, Russia is currently able to fire 10,000 shells a day, as opposed to Ukrainians firing a reduced 2,000 daily as a result of dwindling support. 12/18

- DPRK is facing an acute food crisis and shortages of fuel and oil. It also has a need for sophisticated Russian military technology. All these factors enable Moscow to acquire more ballistic missiles from Pyongyang. 13/18

- Reorienting and pivoting to China is crucial for Russia’s wartime economy. Last year, the trade between the two countries exponentially grew, hitting unprecedented levels. Russia receives almost 80% of its components, especially electronics from or through China. 14/18

China will remain cautious and reserved in its approach to Russia’s full-scale invasion as Beijing has a lot more at stake politically and financially than DPRK or Iran. 15/18

A lot of discussions lately about Russia potentially attacking the Baltic countries in the coming years, however, in the short term, Moldova is facing an acute threat of destabilization from Russia as it prepares for upcoming presidential elections. 16/18

Georgia could also be a target for Russian interference, especially if the ruling Georgian Dream party loses parliamentary elections in October. 17/18

The key question is what the West should do to counter Russian ambitions in 2024. I will propose the steps in a follow-up tweet. 18/18