Kyrylo Budanov, Ukraine’s Chief of Defense Intelligence, on the current state of the war and its future trajectory:

Russia has not managed to achieve their goal yet. Has Russia's strategic goal changed? Unfortunately, the answer is still "No". 1/17⬇️ I think, this objective will never change.

The Russian Federation does not see itself as a federation, it sees itself as an empire.
An empire needs at least three states to exist: Russia, which is there, Belarus, which is partially there, and what’s missing is Ukraine. 2/17

Ukraine's Defense Intelligence on Russian plans against Ukraine:

Russian propaganda, including state-owned media, is actively promoting the narrative that the goals of the so-called Special Military Operation have already been achieved or are about to be achieved. 1/10⬇️ While this may not have been explicitly stated by the Kremlin, pro-government media and state-affiliated analysts are pushing this message in real time, reinforcing the official propaganda line. 2/10

Ukraine's Defense Intelligence on Russian plans against Ukraine:

Russian propaganda, including state-owned media, is actively promoting the narrative that the goals of the so-called Special Military Operation have already been achieved or are about to be achieved. 1/10⬇️ While this may not have been explicitly stated by the Kremlin, pro-government media and state-affiliated analysts are pushing this message in real time, reinforcing the official propaganda line. 2/10

Kyrylo Budanov’s insights on the beginning of the full-scale invasion.

The battles in Hostomel, Moshchun, and Irpin at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion prevented Moscow from executing its "Kyiv in three days" plan. 1/8⬇️ There were two key events that changed the course of Russia’s operation. The first was in Hostomel. This thwarted their plan. Why was this 'three plus ten' strategy—'Kyiv in three days'—conceived? 2/8

Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of Ukraine's Defense Intelligence (HUR), reflects on the past years and analyzes the future trajectory of the war.

There are two reasons there could be a ceasefire in Ukraine this year: At the very least, Russia requires a break - a ceasefire. 1/14 ⬇️ Another reason is its lack of sufficient strength, and the second is the immense financial burden it faces.

Russia acknowledged relying on entirely false data [prior to invasion], marking a complete failure of its special and intelligence services. 2/14

Annual assessment and forecasts from the Chiefs of Ukraine’s intelligence services. (Part 1)

Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of HUR:
Russia acknowledged relying on entirely false data [prior to invasion], marking a complete failure of its special and intelligence services. 1/14⬇️ These assessments were based on information from agents operating within Ukraine, leading to the expenditure of vast sums of money. Consequently, Russia's analysts drew flawed and irrational conclusions. 2/14

The Battle of Avdiivka: firsthand accounts from Ukrainian soldiers

Vladimir Kalibri, former deputy commander of the 110th Brigade (Apr 2022 – Feb 2023) said Russian forces dropped up to 100 guided bombs daily, while Ukrainian troops faced severe weapon and ammo shortages. 1/19⬇️ Of course, one of the key factors was our lack of ammunition, weapons, and aviation support. I personally experienced guided aerial bombs (KABs). They are highly demoralizing and played a significant role. The enemy could drop up to 100 KABs on Avdiivka in a single day. 2/19

Ukraine's Chief of Defense Intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov about ceasefire, potential peacekeepers in Ukraine and new Russian attempts of destabilization:
"While the Ukrainian and Russian sides currently hold diametrically opposed positions, a ceasefire is likely achievable" 1/6 ⬇️ How long it will last and how effective it will be is another matter. But I believe something will happen, as most of the necessary conditions are in place. 2/6

Very interesting points made by Valerii Zaluzhnyi, ex CinC and now Ambassador to the UK:

We are somewhat behind, particularly in the development of technology for deploying unmanned systems on fiber optics, which provide a significant advantage to Russia at the moment. 1/8 ⬇️ We also cannot achieve widespread use of weapons like guided air bombs, nor can we effectively defend against them, giving Russia another advantage. 2/8

Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence (HUR) shares insightful details about Russia-DPRK cooperation and the war against Ukraine.

Despite heavy casualties, North Korean forces remain actively engaged in joint operations with Russian troops. 1/12 ⬇️ Budanov estimated that about 4,000 troops had been killed or seriously wounded.
North Korean troops are embedded within Russian units, conducting joint operations in small groups rather than maintaining their own front-line positions. 2/12

Interesting points from the Commander of the anti-tank battalion of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, Oleh "Romakha" Romanov "I believe that Izium is a certain key to Donbas." 1/16⬇️ Izium is the last supply artery for our entire agglomeration, including Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka, which are currently defending Toretsk and Chasiv Yar. That’s why the situation in the Kharkiv sector is far from straightforward. 2/16

Interesting points from the Commander of the anti-tank battalion of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, Oleh "Romakha" Romanov
"I believe that Izium is a certain key to Donbas." 1/16 ⬇️ Izium is the last supply artery for our entire agglomeration, including Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka, which are currently defending Toretsk and Chasiv Yar. That’s why the situation in the Kharkiv sector is far from straightforward. 2/16

Pokrovsk: Limited Ukrainian Success

Russian attacks in the Pokrovsk area have slowed over the past two months. Instead of engaging in direct urban combat for Pokrovsk, Russian forces are attempting to bypass the city and cut off its supply lines. 1/11⬇️ Their primary objective is to gain full control of key logistical routes to and from Pokrovsk, particularly the T0504 highway to the west and east of the city. 2/11

Georgia is a clear example of how Russia disregards peace agreements without strict enforcement or adequate security guarantees.

The EU brokered the Six-Point Peace Plan between Georgia and Russia in 2008 after several days of war. Let’s examine each point individually. 1/10⬇️ Point 1 - No use of force:

In the war’s aftermath, cease-fire violations by Russia led to continued violence. Since 2008, Russian occupation forces have repeatedly killed, wounded, or illegally detained Georgian citizens near the occupation line. 2/10

It's seems relevant to go back and examine the EU brokered peace deal - the Six Point Plan - between Georgia and Russia in 2008, following several days of war:

Point 1 - No use of force:
In the war’s aftermath, cease-fire violations by Russia led to continued violence. 1/9⬇️ Since 2008, Russian occupation forces have repeatedly killed, wounded, or illegally detained Georgian citizens near the occupation line. 2/9

Profound insights from Commander of the 37th Separate Marine Brigade of Ukraine, Serhii Shatalov, on Ukraine’s strengths, challenges, and the path to ending the war.

On the Kurakhove direction: Russians have the initiative and a manpower advantage of at least 1:10. 1/21⬇️ The situation was challenging (in October), as it remains today. We carried out the mission with limited resources — operating without one battalion, which was stationed in Toretsk. 2/21

UP's insightful interview with General Serhii Naiev, the former Commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2020-2024)

"The military did not have a single document stating that Russia's offensive would begin on February 24, 2022." 1/28 ⬇️ Did you feel that politicians didn’t believe in the possibility of war, given what they were saying?

– My commander, General Zaluzhnyi, and I are military men. We follow the legally established procedures for preparing the Armed Forces to carry out their assigned tasks. 2/28

How the FSB Recruits Ukrainians to Sabotage Territorial Recruitment Centers (TCC) and Ukraine’s Efforts to Combat It.

Since the beginning of the year, Ukraine has witnessed nine sabotage attacks on Territorial Recruitment Centers (TCC) and police departments. 1/21 ⬇️ Recently, reports of sabotage at TCC and police departments have increased significantly. 2/21

A very interesting update on the Pokrovsk direction.

Oleksiy Herman, chief of the EW unit of the 111th Brigade (UAF), shares details about the situation:
Indeed, the intensity of Russian assaults has dropped significantly. 1/12⬇️ This is due to the enemy's heavy losses and, as I understand it, their difficulties with replenishment. 2/12

Very insightful details about North Korean soldiers in Kursk Oblast shared by Ukraine's Special Operation Forces.

According to a 🇺🇦 operator from the 84th Tactical Group, the troops sent to the Kursk region were DPRK Special Operations Forces, not regular soldiers. 1/23⬇️ "If the North Korean authorities find out that one of their soldiers has surrendered, their family will face severe repercussions—likely execution or forced labor." 2/23

Very insightful details about North Korean soldiers and how Ukraine's Special Operations Forces capture them in Kursk Oblast

Per to a 🇺🇦 operator from the 84th Tactical Group, the troops sent to the Kursk region were DPRK Special Operations Forces, not regular soldiers. 1/23⬇️ "If the North Korean authorities find out that one of their soldiers has surrendered, their family will face severe repercussions—likely execution or forced labor." 2/23