Frontelligence Insight tracked logistical routes between Russia and North Korea, calculated delivery numbers, and identified storage points. We are disclosing North Korea’s ammo transport ecosystem – and revealing some of its crucial nodes for the first time.
🧵Thread:
2/ Frontelligence Insight has estimated the number of ammunition deliveries between September and December to be approximately 1.57 million artillery shells, combining 152mm and 122mm ammo.
3/ Evident from recent imagery, since October 2023, 20 ft shipping containers filled with ammunition are loaded onto sea vessels at Raijin port (Rason) and shipped to Dunai port near Vladivostok in Russia’s far east.
4/ Ammo shipments from North Korea in 2024 are observed in January imagery. Containers offloaded at Dunai port are transported by trucks to the port's railroad branch. Russians then load these containers onto trains for transportation across Russia to locations near Ukraine.
5/ Upon arrival in Russia, the artillery ammo in containers is directed to at least three identified locations where Russians store and distribute it:
6/ The Tikhoretsk ammo depot in Rostov Oblast, serves as a consistent artillery ammo storage during the war. Satellite imagery from mid-August 2023 shows Russians preparing revetments for storage, with documented arrivals of 20 ft cargo containers by September
7/ Unlike the Tikhoretsk ammo depot, Mozdok is over 600 km away from the Ukrainian border, making immediate delivery of ammo to the frontlines unlikely. It might potentially function as storage for ballistic missiles used against Ukraine on December 30, 2023, and January 2, 2024
8/ The Frontelligence Insight team analyzed satellite imagery of the area, determining that the initial shipments arrived at Mozdok in early October 2023. Like the Tikhoretsk ammo depot, containers are transported via trains and subsequently unloaded near the ammunition site.
9/ Yegorlykskaya airfield
Yegorlykskaya, a small rural town in Rostov Oblast, about 90 km from the Tikhoretsk Ammo Depot, discreetly serves as an additional ammunition storage site. Unlike other known locations, Yegorlykskaya has no previous associations with ammo storage
10/ By October, objects resembling crates and containers began to appear in the area. The timeline, discreet location near the railroad, and the appearance of objects resembling containers in revetments strongly indicate that this location is likely associated with ammo logistics
11/ After arriving at the designated locations, the ammunition is transported using civilian and military trucks. The destination includes specific military units or temporary makeshift ammo dumps approximately halfway to the intended unit.
12/ Given that Russia produced approximately 2 million artillery rounds in 2023 and received approximately 1.57 million rounds from North Korea, it’s likely that Russia will continue to increase its domestic production while covering current needs through foreign deliveries
13/ While these numbers may not enable Russia to use artillery as extensively as in 2022, they still provide Russia with an artillery firepower advantage when considering the Ukrainian ammo situation.
14/ Kindly like and share the first message of our thread. Consider supporting us through BuyMeaCoffee, as our expenses rely solely on your public support, and maintaining quality without financing is still challenging for us. Thank youbuymeacoffee.com/frontelligence
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
According to Russian milblogger Fighterbomber, who has a wide network within the Russian Air Force, an Il-76 was shot down in Sudan on November 4 by the Rapid Support Forces. According to him, the aircraft had been purchased in Kyrgyzstan a month and a half ago for $12 million
2/ A video showing a burning object falling from the sky, likely the claimed Il-76, has also been recorded and published
3/ While I do not have solid sources in Sudan, one of my contacts located there has confirmed that reports about a downed Il-76 have been circulating within the RSF since yesterday. Government forces are actively using the Air Force to supply besieged cities
Some observers have described the fall of Pokrovsk as “sudden.” That may be true if one followed the wrong analysts. In reality, the defense deterioration was apparent as early as 2024 and became unmistakable by 2025, as the underlying dynamics made the outcome nearly inevitable:
2/ That the city continued to hold out until November is, in itself, an achievement. Still, the rapid loss of positions in summer/fall 2024, which left logistics vulnerable and exposed the flanks, combined with manpower shortages, largely dictated the outcome now unfolding
3/ Launching a counteroffensive capable of retaking the city and securing its flanks, or even holding for another year, would have required diverting significant resources from other sectors of the front, a tradeoff that would result in disastrous situation elsewhere.
North Korea and Russia are rapidly building their first road bridge to enhance logistics and expand military and economic ties. Frontelligence Insight has analyzed satellite imagery and project documents to estimate its completion and potential impact. 🧵Thread:
2/ Today, Russia and North Korea have no direct road connection. The only land crossing is the 1950s-era Korea - Russia Friendship Railroad Bridge. Air and maritime routes, via Pyongyang Airport and ports like Rajin, exist, but their capacity and costs are often suboptimal.
3/ In the summer of 2024, Russia confirmed plans to build a road bridge over the Tumen River, with construction led by Russia’s TunnelYuzhStroy. The project is budgeted at ~9 billion rubles (~$110M), spanning 4.7 km in total, with the bridge itself about 1 km long
A multi-day analysis of battlefield dynamics and internal Russian data: both public and non-public, points to multiple trends and key points which we summarized. 🧵Thread:
2/ Ukraine’s deep strike drone campaign has inflicted significant direct and secondary damage across Russia, contributing to a perceptible shift in perceptions of the war’s trajectory and its cost benefit among both military command and law enforcement senior leadership.
3/ According to analyzed communications from dozens of senior Russian officers in Moscow and in the field, there is a growing perception that the war has effectively reached a strategic and political dead end - sustained primarily by President Putin’s personal insistence
SLB, the world’s largest offshore drilling company headquartered in Texas, continues to operate in Russia despite international sanctions, according to documents published by the analytical firm @dallasparkua. 🧵Thread:
2/ In March 2022, SLB publicly announced that it would suspend all new investments in the Russian market in response to international sanctions. This was in the statement from Chief Executive Officer Olivier Le Peuch, issued from the company’s Houston headquarter
3/ In October 2022, the company underwent a global rebranding, changing its name from Schlumberger to SLB. The Russian subsidiary retained the name Schlumberger Technology Company. However, leaked correspondence point that it continues to be integrated into SLB’s global framework
Breaking: On October 13, Russia’s Government Legislative Commission backed a Defense Ministry bill allowing the use of reservists for defense-related tasks in peacetime. The measure expands the military’s authority to call up reservists for wartime needs. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to the draft law, “special assemblies” are military call-ups for specific defense missions during armed conflicts, counterterrorism operations, or when forces are deployed abroad. Only reservists will be subject to these special assemblies.
3/ Russia’s mobilization reserve consists of individuals who have voluntarily signed contracts to remain in reserve. Putin established the country’s mobilization manpower reserve in 2015 through an executive decree.