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Jan 25, 2024 14 tweets 4 min read Read on X
Frontelligence Insight tracked logistical routes between Russia and North Korea, calculated delivery numbers, and identified storage points. We are disclosing North Korea’s ammo transport ecosystem – and revealing some of its crucial nodes for the first time.

🧵Thread: Image
2/ Frontelligence Insight has estimated the number of ammunition deliveries between September and December to be approximately 1.57 million artillery shells, combining 152mm and 122mm ammo. Image
3/ Evident from recent imagery, since October 2023, 20 ft shipping containers filled with ammunition are loaded onto sea vessels at Raijin port (Rason) and shipped to Dunai port near Vladivostok in Russia’s far east. Image
4/ Ammo shipments from North Korea in 2024 are observed in January imagery. Containers offloaded at Dunai port are transported by trucks to the port's railroad branch. Russians then load these containers onto trains for transportation across Russia to locations near Ukraine. Image
5/ Upon arrival in Russia, the artillery ammo in containers is directed to at least three identified locations where Russians store and distribute it:

- Tikhoretsk ammunition storage
- Mozdok ammunition storage
- Yegorlykskaya airfield
6/ The Tikhoretsk ammo depot in Rostov Oblast, serves as a consistent artillery ammo storage during the war. Satellite imagery from mid-August 2023 shows Russians preparing revetments for storage, with documented arrivals of 20 ft cargo containers by September Image
7/ Unlike the Tikhoretsk ammo depot, Mozdok is over 600 km away from the Ukrainian border, making immediate delivery of ammo to the frontlines unlikely. It might potentially function as storage for ballistic missiles used against Ukraine on December 30, 2023, and January 2, 2024 Image
8/ The Frontelligence Insight team analyzed satellite imagery of the area, determining that the initial shipments arrived at Mozdok in early October 2023. Like the Tikhoretsk ammo depot, containers are transported via trains and subsequently unloaded near the ammunition site. Image
9/ Yegorlykskaya airfield

Yegorlykskaya, a small rural town in Rostov Oblast, about 90 km from the Tikhoretsk Ammo Depot, discreetly serves as an additional ammunition storage site. Unlike other known locations, Yegorlykskaya has no previous associations with ammo storage Image
10/ By October, objects resembling crates and containers began to appear in the area. The timeline, discreet location near the railroad, and the appearance of objects resembling containers in revetments strongly indicate that this location is likely associated with ammo logistics Image
11/ After arriving at the designated locations, the ammunition is transported using civilian and military trucks. The destination includes specific military units or temporary makeshift ammo dumps approximately halfway to the intended unit.
12/ Given that Russia produced approximately 2 million artillery rounds in 2023 and received approximately 1.57 million rounds from North Korea, it’s likely that Russia will continue to increase its domestic production while covering current needs through foreign deliveries
13/ While these numbers may not enable Russia to use artillery as extensively as in 2022, they still provide Russia with an artillery firepower advantage when considering the Ukrainian ammo situation.
14/ Kindly like and share the first message of our thread. Consider supporting us through BuyMeaCoffee, as our expenses rely solely on your public support, and maintaining quality without financing is still challenging for us. Thank youbuymeacoffee.com/frontelligence

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More from @Tatarigami_UA

Apr 10
While our team continues working on the latest updates, here are a few updates on the current state of the frontline:

1/ Despite holding the advantage along much of the frontline, Russia’s winter campaign yielded limited results - indicating Ukraine’s situation is not dire
2/ The Pokrovsk area now appears more stable than in February. At that time, Russian forces had established a foothold in Zvirove, with deeper advances into Pokrovsk looking imminent. Since then, not only have the Russians stalled, but they have actually lost some ground.
3/ The overall composition and number of Russian forces near Sumy oblast currently seem insufficient to support a large-scale offensive operation deep into the region.
Read 7 tweets
Mar 30
One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?
Read 8 tweets
Mar 25
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.

🧵Thread Image
2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement. Image
Read 23 tweets
Mar 21
Kursk Offensive: A Preliminary Assessment by Frontelligence Insight.
A condensed version of report for X. 🧵Thread:

1/ With Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Sudzha, the operation is clearly approaching its conclusion though it is not yet entirely over.Image
2/ To assess the operation, not in isolation, but within the broader context of the war, we broke down the Kursk operation into 3 key questions: whether its geopolitical objectives were met, whether the attrition rate was favorable, and whether it achieved battlefield success
3/ To determine equipment attrition, we analyzed data from OSINT analyst @naalsio26, who tracks losses across multiple frontlines. Our graphs show losses from August to March but are not exhaustive, as they exclude some retreat-related losses. The cut-off date was March 10. Image
Read 20 tweets
Mar 5
Frontelligence Insight Special Report: AWOL Trends and Casualty Ratios in Russia and Ukraine

In assessing overall manpower casualty ratios, we analyzed Russian AWOL figures alongside Ukrainian estimates, factoring in KIA, MIA, and recruitment rates to assess the war’s prospectsImage
2/ Thanks to @InformNapalm, a Ukrainian OSINT community, we analyzed a screenshot of a Russian presentation slide detailing desertion numbers. The percentage and corresponding figures allowed us to calculate the total number of AWOL cases across all Russian military districts. Image
3/ As shown in the translated graph, the Southern MD has the highest number of desertion cases. This is unsurprising, as it includes the former 1st and 2nd Army Corps (now the 51st and 3rd CAAs), which are largely composed of forcibly mobilized residents from occupied territories Image
Read 14 tweets
Feb 4
One of the most critical yet unresolved questions of this war is the true impact of drone attacks inside Russia. Our team has been working with media organizations and volunteers to tackle this. But finding the answer isn’t easy, and we need your support. Here’s how you can help: Image
2/ The simplest and most effective way to support our investigation is through donations. This helps cover essential expenses like satellite imagery, expert analysis, and time. You can donate via BuyMeaCoffee:

buymeacoffee.com/frontelligence
3/ We’re also looking for volunteers to assess the damage, particularly those with expertise in damage surveys, industrial building damage assessments, and the oil and gas industry: especially in evaluating potential refinery damage. Feel free to contact us at
frontel@proton.me
Read 4 tweets

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