Frontelligence Insight tracked logistical routes between Russia and North Korea, calculated delivery numbers, and identified storage points. We are disclosing North Korea’s ammo transport ecosystem – and revealing some of its crucial nodes for the first time.
🧵Thread:
2/ Frontelligence Insight has estimated the number of ammunition deliveries between September and December to be approximately 1.57 million artillery shells, combining 152mm and 122mm ammo.
3/ Evident from recent imagery, since October 2023, 20 ft shipping containers filled with ammunition are loaded onto sea vessels at Raijin port (Rason) and shipped to Dunai port near Vladivostok in Russia’s far east.
4/ Ammo shipments from North Korea in 2024 are observed in January imagery. Containers offloaded at Dunai port are transported by trucks to the port's railroad branch. Russians then load these containers onto trains for transportation across Russia to locations near Ukraine.
5/ Upon arrival in Russia, the artillery ammo in containers is directed to at least three identified locations where Russians store and distribute it:
6/ The Tikhoretsk ammo depot in Rostov Oblast, serves as a consistent artillery ammo storage during the war. Satellite imagery from mid-August 2023 shows Russians preparing revetments for storage, with documented arrivals of 20 ft cargo containers by September
7/ Unlike the Tikhoretsk ammo depot, Mozdok is over 600 km away from the Ukrainian border, making immediate delivery of ammo to the frontlines unlikely. It might potentially function as storage for ballistic missiles used against Ukraine on December 30, 2023, and January 2, 2024
8/ The Frontelligence Insight team analyzed satellite imagery of the area, determining that the initial shipments arrived at Mozdok in early October 2023. Like the Tikhoretsk ammo depot, containers are transported via trains and subsequently unloaded near the ammunition site.
9/ Yegorlykskaya airfield
Yegorlykskaya, a small rural town in Rostov Oblast, about 90 km from the Tikhoretsk Ammo Depot, discreetly serves as an additional ammunition storage site. Unlike other known locations, Yegorlykskaya has no previous associations with ammo storage
10/ By October, objects resembling crates and containers began to appear in the area. The timeline, discreet location near the railroad, and the appearance of objects resembling containers in revetments strongly indicate that this location is likely associated with ammo logistics
11/ After arriving at the designated locations, the ammunition is transported using civilian and military trucks. The destination includes specific military units or temporary makeshift ammo dumps approximately halfway to the intended unit.
12/ Given that Russia produced approximately 2 million artillery rounds in 2023 and received approximately 1.57 million rounds from North Korea, it’s likely that Russia will continue to increase its domestic production while covering current needs through foreign deliveries
13/ While these numbers may not enable Russia to use artillery as extensively as in 2022, they still provide Russia with an artillery firepower advantage when considering the Ukrainian ammo situation.
14/ Kindly like and share the first message of our thread. Consider supporting us through BuyMeaCoffee, as our expenses rely solely on your public support, and maintaining quality without financing is still challenging for us. Thank youbuymeacoffee.com/frontelligence
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
The crisis in Crimea continues, with conditions worsening. After Crimea's occupation head, Sergey Aksyonov, claimed steps were being taken to address the situation in a recent Telegram post, hundreds of locals flooded the comments, challenging his narrative. 🧵Translations:
2/ "Please, just do something! Have you forgotten about northern Crimea? Have you abandoned the people? Soon people will be starving, and we are already close to breaking down! At least say something! Declare an evacuation, do anything at all! This is not life, this is suffering"
3/ "I wonder if Aksyonov (governor) would be willing to bring his family and come stay with us in Dzhankoy, sitting through the complete blackout that has already lasted a week, while telling us to hold on until mid-August."
The situation in Crimea is becoming critical. As authorities remain largely silent, residents are flooding the Telegram channel of the head of Crimea with complaints about power outages, communication disruptions, fuel shortages, and water supply issues. Thread with translations:
1/ "Why is gasoline so expensive? It's twice the price compared to the mainland! Are people here supposed to be twice as rich or something? 😳"
2/ "The city of Dzhankoy has been without electricity for more than 24 hours. If the situation does not improve in the near future, a collective complaint will be drafted and sent to Moscow tomorrow."
The grooming of Orban's regime as a Trojan horse inside the EU and NATO is no longer speculative: it's now evidence-based, confirmed by leaked Budapest-Moscow communications. Agentstvo reports that roughly half of all Russian embassy staff maintain ties to intelligence services:
2/ The EU officially identifies Russia as one of its primary security threats. Yet Orban has been systematically distancing Hungary from both the EU and NATO, deteriorating relations with neighbors including Ukraine, while growing increasingly reliant on Russian influence.
3/ Moscow has no genuine interest in Hungary itself, or in the country's long-term wellbeing. What it wants is a lever - to undermine EU institutions, erode European support for Ukraine, and seed distrust between member states toward one of their own EU members and NATO allies
There’s been a lot of discussion about the potential threat FPV drones could pose to US forces on the ground, with some going as far as claiming that American troops would suffer heavy casualties from FPV drones. That’s possible, but it’s also worth questioning the assumptions:
2/ First, it’s not clear to what extent Iran has actually trained and prepared its ground forces for large-scale use of small drones. Even relatively decentralized militaries still operate within ORBAT and logistics. So far, there isn’t strong evidence of systemic changes within the Iranian army to support widespread FPV deployment.
3/ Second, we’ve seen relatively little FPV usage from Iran-supported groups like Hamas or Hezbollah, despite continuous war with Israel. A few examples have emerged from Iraq, but we’re talking about a handful of videos at most. That’s not a level of a large-scale implementation
With an uncertain battlefield position, Russia has intensified hybrid operations to shape European public opinion. A key element is the spread of narratives portraying Ukraine as using “energy blackmail” against Europe, often echoed by politically sympathetic actors. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the full-scale invasion began, Russian missile and drone strikes have targeted Ukraine’s energy system, damaging power plants, gas facilities, and transmission networks nationwide. Ukraine has lost about 11.5 GW of capacity, with damage reportedly exceeding $24.8 billion
3/ The war has also affected energy transport infrastructure. Ukrainian oil facilities have been attacked more than 400 times since the invasion began. On 27 January 2026, a strike damaged equipment working for the Druzhba pipeline near Brody in western Ukraine.