Finland has quietly filled its wartime stockpiles and is activating some of the so-called “production reservation agreements” which means that companies produce at the armed forces’ request what is needed for logistics - basically wartime economy light
The Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) received extra money right in the spring of 2022 and started working on increasing stockpiles immediately, “luckily before many other European states woke up to the issue”, says the logistics chief - which means that the orders have been coming in
The analysis what is needed is based both on long-term assessments and the analysis of Ukraine’s ammunition consumption. Finland is already producing 5 times more heavy artillery munitions than pre-2022 but the capacity isn’t at max yet
It’s not only about ammo though, but everything that is needed to sustain long-time war fighting operations. Luckily thanks to its security of supply “philosophy”, Finland had stockpiles of raw materials and production lines ready to be taken into use if needed
Apart from domestic arms industry, like Patria, the “production reservation agreements” include a number of civilian companies as well. Sometimes the FDF have supplied the companies with the necessary production equipment that is now to be test-activated.
Beyond the domestic arrangements, Finland is working on at least doubling its ammunition production capacity, which can make it one of the largest producers in Europe. The aim is twofold: to secure own stockpiles and to maintain capacity to support Ukraine for years to come
@jhafsegerstad So as I understand it, it’s a bit of both: because of the försörjningsberedskap ”philosophy” as I called it, the basics are in place - some production capacity that the FDF has paid for and also supplies. Capacity will be now increased according to the pre-existing contracts
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Interesting discussion by @FRHoffmann1 & @liviuhorovitz about the likelihood of a NATO-Russia war.
Also in light of the recent BILD-leak of a German armed forces worst-case scenario (I assume as part of a wargame) dating such a contingency to as early as 2025, some thoughts:
While it’s hard to assess what exactly the Bundeswehr scenario included, as I haven’t seen the original document, it sounded quite similar to the classic fait accompli scenarios NATO has been wargaming in the past decade and that the tripwire posture was based on.
The situation has changed from Russia’s pov since Finland became NATO member. The long border creates a new dilemma to be considered when planning an attack on the Baltics. Even if Russia wouldn’t base its calculation on conventional force correlation, it can’t ignore it either
I don’t think it’s likely that we’re headed to a World War 3 that comes with a big (nuclear) bang. It’s more likely that we could see a cascading series and coincidence of wars in different parts of the world (rather world wars than a World War).
The effect would be, as we already see now: difficulty to focus attention and resources when too many things are happening at the same time.
Much will depend on the US ability to contain this development in the parts of the world where it has extended deterrence obligations.
And that ability, in turn, will depend on the political trajectory in the US, i.e. whether the commitment holds to stick to treaty obligations and other commitments to allies and partners. (See Trump 2.0)
Wow this is quite something in the promised land of strategic non-communication: Finnish security and intelligence service is giving a presser about Russian disturbance and influence attempts in Finland.
“Russia can endure the war, but it may not be able to endure the peace”
- aim of cyber- and other attacks not so much to cause real damage (partly because Finland has invested in resilience and is a hard target) but to sow fear
- Finland is not a prioritised object of Russian attention but Russia observes how 🇫🇮 NATO membership shapes
- the Kremlin presents its actions as reactions to Western “aggression” to domestic audiences, to obscure culpability
- “whoever is behind the pipeline damage, Russia profits from it most”
- all of this was to be expected
It’s starting, the comments “it’s gonna get messy, there will lots of civilian victims” when the IDF is responding.
That’s also because Hamas has been using human shields as its strategy from the start. See e.g. this NATO report from the period 2007-2014: stratcomcoe.org/publications/d…
“Hamas relies on the Israeli government’s aim to minimise collateral damage, and is also aware of the West’s sensitivity towards civilian casualties […] it is also aimed at gaining diplomatic and public opinion-related leverage…
…by presenting Israel and IDF as an aggressor that indiscriminately strikes civilians”.
Note that these are Palestinian civilians Hamas uses in Gaza as human shields. This has been their strategy from the beginning.
At the annual ambassadors’ conference this week, President Niinistö emphasised in his speech that Russia has been escalating month after month in Ukraine. Important to keep driving home this point.
Some notes about what was said - and what not - in the speeches this year:
President Niinistö also reminded that although diplomatic efforts and staying in conversation is a key feature of Finnish foreign policy, at the moment it’s not possible with Russia because of the enemy narrative the Kremlin is spreading about Finland. presidentti.fi/en/speeches/sp…
Also Foreign Minister Valtonen stated that Russia has broken the previous bilateral relationship and it doesn’t exist anymore on the political level. She reminded that Russia is the sole responsible here and no amount of alternative truths will change that um.fi/current-affair…