The issue with the new FFG isn’t the VLS cell count.
Yes, with the ongoing retirement of the Tico’s impacting overall VLS count, we’re losing some firepower.
The problem with the FFG is that it’s a year behind schedule as the PRC pumps out new boats every couple weeks.
This is why so many folks want to get creative and do things like weld containerized fires to LCS and give the Marines and Army free rein to buy up a bunch of land-based anti-ship missiles. That stops the bleeding and makes the PLA’s maneuver targeting process more difficult.
But there’s an upper limit to that compensation. You have to start producing more ships, at a faster rate, that actually work as designed, in order to really regain overmatch.
You can hold at risk an invasion fleet with lots of things: missiles, mines, loitering munitions and swarms.
But, and boy do I hate to make this comparison, but just like the infantry on land, you need ships, with real firepower and armor, to take and hold those waterways.
All of the duct tape things we’re doing to hold off the PLA are short term gap fillers for the series of grave fuck ups we made (and continue to make) on Pacific policy, strategy, and force posture. Duct tape only holds for so long without something strong reinforcing it.
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Depending on a variety of factors, we produce about 100-200 Tomahawk missiles a year. People love to talk about the cost of them and other systems cheap assymetric stuff. Thats the wrong thing to worry about.
Stockpile and replenishment is the real concern every time we burn one
Now while we buy other missiles for other reasons/targets/capabilities, what I’m about to say mostly applies other production lines for high end systems.
When we talk about a continued campaign against the Houthis, we are burning *years* worth of stockpiles.
For the last many years due to minimal interest from bean counters of sustaining larger production lines and years of CRs and budget caps, we have been basically only been putting back what we burn (at best) even when we know we need a lot more to be ready for a China fight
Lemme very quickly explain the whole “The US does not support Taiwanese independence” policy because after Blinken’s statement there’s a bunch of nonsense flying around.
It is long-standing US policy (like, decades) to not support Taiwanese independence. This was seen both as a way to placate Beijing when we needed them to pester the Soviets, and to maintain stability across the Strait. It’s like saying the sky is blue.
However…
As Taiwanese civic identity evolves, the Pacific becomes the central focus of our foreign policy (instead of secondary to the Middle East or Europe), and the PLA grows closer every day to becoming capable (and it is Xi’s intention) to bring Taiwan back under Beijing’s control….
If we don’t develop the production capacity and missile stockpiles to kill the PLA, it’s gonna cost us a helluva lot more in blood and treasure than a multi-year procurement scheme will cost us.
Without those systems, we lose the war for Taiwan. Full stop.
Of all of the things you choose to take issue with in the DoD budget, you take issue with the procurement of the specific systems we need to fight in the Pacific.
Why do I get the feeling this is about posturing for 2024
Before you even get to sinking the PLAN with LRASMs and smart mines, you have to be able to contest the airspace over Taiwan and protect the fleet from air attack. You cannot do that without adequate AMRAAM and SM-6 missiles.
You’re not going to know until it’s in your systems and firing rounds on your position. As far as the PRC is concerned, transparency on AI is like asking for the keys to the kingdom.
You’re better off just building a better deterrent.
Everyone wants the detente of the 1970s but nobody remembers how we got there and how close we came. You can’t fast forward to cooperation when cooperation harms core national interests and those interests trump global security.
If you want my answer to PRC AI development…it’s a sabotage and sanction campaign. Cut them off at the knees and don’t let their legs grow back.
Prioritize spoiling their data, slowing their chip development, and cutting off cooperation.
The best short-hand description of modern PLA doctrine is that it is an attempt at American-style structure with Soviet-style controls and culture. It is in essence an attempt at doing to the PLA what the CCP did to the Chinese economy after it opened up.
The problem is that culture eats strategy for lunch. If you’re watching PLA exercises and writings, what you’re looking for over the next few years is how they attempt to actually execute the joint force models they want to emulate at scale…and whether they can adapt to friction
And by friction, I mean the difference between what the doctrine says should happen, and what the dominant culture of the PLA decides what will happen during execution. If you’re the PLA, you want this battle to happen before you hit the beaches. Ideally.
There are countless stories and articles out there, some of which I’ve written, about how to fight China, what the next war looks like, why you should care about Taiwan, etc.
EX SUPRA is what happens after we fail. The result of political division, disinformation, and cowardice.
In October 2024, Taiwan falls to the PLA as the US stands by in an election year.
Over the next decade, the Second Space Race goes kinetic, the world economy is deflated by chip shortage caused by the destruction of TSMC, and America is torn apart by its own domestic politics.