This was a very interesting and illuminating read on PRC nuclear perspectives.
Perhaps the most salient points:

PRC boomers remain inherently vulnerable beyond the 1IC

US-USSR analogies are ineffective bc of asymmetry in arms-sensor pursuits

link.springer.com/article/10.100… I don’t know how many times we have to say it but the PRC really does not subscribe to Schelling (now, whether that matters is a different story) but they see those ideas as irrelevant which we should view as inherently destabilizing

The issue with the new FFG isn’t the VLS cell count.

Yes, with the ongoing retirement of the Tico’s impacting overall VLS count, we’re losing some firepower.

The problem with the FFG is that it’s a year behind schedule as the PRC pumps out new boats every couple weeks. This is why so many folks want to get creative and do things like weld containerized fires to LCS and give the Marines and Army free rein to buy up a bunch of land-based anti-ship missiles. That stops the bleeding and makes the PLA’s maneuver targeting process more difficult.

Depending on a variety of factors, we produce about 100-200 Tomahawk missiles a year. People love to talk about the cost of them and other systems cheap assymetric stuff. Thats the wrong thing to worry about.

Stockpile and replenishment is the real concern every time we burn one Now while we buy other missiles for other reasons/targets/capabilities, what I’m about to say mostly applies other production lines for high end systems.

When we talk about a continued campaign against the Houthis, we are burning *years* worth of stockpiles.

Lemme very quickly explain the whole “The US does not support Taiwanese independence” policy because after Blinken’s statement there’s a bunch of nonsense flying around. It is long-standing US policy (like, decades) to not support Taiwanese independence. This was seen both as a way to placate Beijing when we needed them to pester the Soviets, and to maintain stability across the Strait. It’s like saying the sky is blue.

However…

If we don’t develop the production capacity and missile stockpiles to kill the PLA, it’s gonna cost us a helluva lot more in blood and treasure than a multi-year procurement scheme will cost us.

Without those systems, we lose the war for Taiwan. Full stop.

https://twitter.com/connorobriennh/status/1670202451218104322

Of all of the things you choose to take issue with in the DoD budget, you take issue with the procurement of the specific systems we need to fight in the Pacific.

Why do I get the feeling this is about posturing for 2024

You’re not going to know until it’s in your systems and firing rounds on your position. As far as the PRC is concerned, transparency on AI is like asking for the keys to the kingdom.

You’re better off just building a better deterrent.

wsj.com/articles/u-s-g… Everyone wants the detente of the 1970s but nobody remembers how we got there and how close we came. You can’t fast forward to cooperation when cooperation harms core national interests and those interests trump global security.

The best short-hand description of modern PLA doctrine is that it is an attempt at American-style structure with Soviet-style controls and culture. It is in essence an attempt at doing to the PLA what the CCP did to the Chinese economy after it opened up. The problem is that culture eats strategy for lunch. If you’re watching PLA exercises and writings, what you’re looking for over the next few years is how they attempt to actually execute the joint force models they want to emulate at scale…and whether they can adapt to friction

ICYMI: my novel EX SUPRA is now available for purchase. EX SUPRA isn’t your usual technophile war story. It’s the story of war after the next war.

a.co/d/7vcJuHJ There are countless stories and articles out there, some of which I’ve written, about how to fight China, what the next war looks like, why you should care about Taiwan, etc.

EX SUPRA is what happens after we fail. The result of political division, disinformation, and cowardice.

In reading PLA doctrine, I’ve concluded that the baser logic that supports their mechanized operations goes as follows:
1) weigh everyone down with as much equipment as possible, look like the J4s worst nightmare of an MTOE. 2) create as many staff friction points as possible, and create bubbles of info, planning, and specialization that will only be called upon in the moment. Make no compensation for this friction.

Final thread for the morning:
Why did I write EX SUPRA and how should you read it?

BLUF: I wrote the kind of stories I wanted to read and wrote the lessons no one wants to believe or hear. /1

amazon.com/dp/B0B6L9TD6J?… Some stories are pulled from experiences, some are almost anime-esque, others are just based upon my love of classic sci fi.

“Cold War” is an ode to John Carpenter’s The Thing.

“The Missiles on Maple Street are Fake News” is a modern rendition of my fav Twilight Zone episode.

Caffeine in my veins and I’m ready to talk about the book. AMA obviously but there’s a few things I want to hit on.

1) There are *a lot* of references in this book to everything from HALO to BSG and even a subtle nod at my favorite rock band and a Hollywood director. 2) because of the above, I like to think of EX SUPRA as the first technothriller about a US-China conflict influenced by a particular generation of film and big budget shooter games.

“Light’s green, Godspeed ladies and gentlemen!”

My novel EX SUPRA is finally here and available for purchase.
amazon.com/dp/B0B6L9TD6J?… This is the story of the war after the next war.
In 2035, an AI-driven disinformation campaign turned us on ourselves. We became the enemy's first strike weapons, and as we set fire to our own country, the People's Liberation Army seized half of the Pacific.

As I look at what’s happening in the Donbas, I’m reminded of a casual wargame I participated in last year. It focused on WESTPAC but the lessons are the same:

If the enemy can take more pain and you run out of bullets and bodies, you don’t win just because you have better tech. So if Ukraine really is outnumbered 5 to 1 in the Donbas, I have some questions about their casualties and force allocation. Like a lot of questions in fact..

This is why I groan every time I’ve been asked “how do I talk to my enlisted?”

Idk man, maybe just like a normal human being.

https://twitter.com/NGruen1/status/1533689952587763712

The problem isn’t the institution, it’s the people that self-select away from the rest of the world.

Since the US Army has delayed the release of its new operational manual in order to account for lessons from Ukraine, I’d like to re-up my suggestions from early 2021 as they overlap.

iron-man-actual.medium.com/run-silent-fig… Rec #1: integrate organic SHORAD at the battalion level to protect against drones and loitering munitions.

Have seen a lot of folks talk about this today but haven’t seen anyone really break down why and how it matters operationally relative to other bases. What exactly does a Cambodian naval base do for the Chinese Navy? Let me explain.
washingtonpost.com/national-secur… First, we should note where other facilities beyond Chinese borders currently exist: a logistics facility in Djibouti, various artificial islands in the South China Sea, and a paramilitary base in Tajikistan that’s an extension of their genocide campaign in Xinjiang.

Between the decline in USN fleet size, no coherent shipbuilding plan, SECNAV’s comments that China can’t build good ships (it is in fact one of the things they’re best at), and now DEPSECDEF’s comments that Javs and Stingers aren’t needed for the wars of the future…man I dunno. What exactly is anyone in the DoD planning and resourcing for? I want someone to point to a threat, ideally the pacing threat (China), and tell me who, what, where, when, and for how a long a fight we are resourcing for.

I suspect whatever answer will exist only in fairy tales.

OK I’m sitting here waiting to go out and celebrate a buddy’s end of AD time so I’m gonna do a little plain speak explainer for why EABO (the Marine operational reforms) matters. I’ll try to avoid doctrinal terms and use as much contemporary, real world proof to support. /1 First, let me start by saying I’m not a Marine. I’m just some guy who cares about beating China in a war over Taiwan.

So that’s a good place to start: what is Expeditionary Advanced Base Ops?
In plain speak: it’s an amphibious insurgency.

Should this story prove to be correct in its framing, and not a panicked last second brute force attack to find out what was going on, then I expect everyone who said China and Russia would never collaborate on MilOps to stop talking about Indo-Pacific contingencies.

https://twitter.com/larisamlbrown/status/1509941356789174280

And if it was panicked, then it’s a pretty big indication of the fact that the PRC dedicates so much of its intelligence assets to Taiwan that it misses a lot of the bigger picture.

I don’t think the Navy is going to try to fix itself until it’s too late and there’s a bunch of USN hulls at the bottom of the WESTPAC so the other services should probably just pick up the slack and plan around the assumed losses. It would be great if the Navy can knock the PLAN on its ass, the budget nor present battle force size does not reflect this ambition.

Three separate fronts, only one of which is from your own territory and another which is choked by a single lane bridge, across hundreds of miles and different terrain, without rail lines to the front, and in which every person is armed with an AK, Molotov, camera or Javelin/NLAW Like holy shit what were you planning. Your southern axis might as well be the width of Barbarossa. Your northern axis looks like the PLA in 1979 in North Vietnam. Your Eastern axis is getting smashed to pieces. You don’t have air superiority and no apparent targeting intel.