1/14 Recent analyses of the war in Ukraine, even in top magazines such @ForeignAffairs, contain debatable claims. Below are four examples: 🧵
2/ ONE: Among the reasons Ukraine’s counteroffensive failed was the failure to concentrate the bulk of its forces at one point on the southern front rather than dispersing them. But the front is 600 miles long & Russia, with a far bigger army, had massed for attack at various
3/ points along it. Had Ukraine not deployed forces to defend those other points, the Russians would have broken through—and kept going.
4/ TWO: Russian defensive lines are so formidable that Ukraine can never break through. Maybe it will and maybe it won’t, but the so-called Surovikin fortifications do not extend along the entire front and in Kherson, such defenses as do exist, are far less extensive. Hence the
5/ significance of UKR’s Krynky bridgehead on the RUS-held bank of the Dnipro in Kherson.
THREE: Drones have been part of the war since the get-go and there’s been no big change in their role. In fact, recent changes in drone tech. have dramatically changed the cost exchange
6/ ratio, with cheap drones demolishing multi-million dollar tanks as well as IFVs that cost $ 400K and more. Indeed, but for drones, especially the FPV type, the Ukrainian foothold at Krynky, on the Russian-held left bank of the Dnipro, would have been overrun long ago because
7/ it’s held by a small number of marines who have used drones to destroy lots of attacking armor. And this has happened not only in Krynky but also in other places, such as Avdiivka. Russia has made major investments in drones in recent months—something that a drone operator
8/ explained to me during a discussion in Izyum. Then of course there’s the emergence of sea drones, which we’ve seen in action in the Black Sea, including in the last few days.
Indeed, among UKR’s military weaknesses is the lack of sufficient drones, especially FPV variants.
9/ The majority of the drones its troops use are still supplied by volunteers who raise money by seeking donations.
FOUR: Russian countermeasures have robbed Western missiles of much of their effectiveness. Russia has indeed adapted & improved its ECM, but Ukraine continues
10/ to use western missiles, notably HIMARS and Storm Shadow, with devastating effect, as witness last week’s attack on attack on the Russian airbase at Belbek that killed ~11 officers, including likely a general, and damaged three warplanes.
11/ The Russian Black Sea Fleet has partly been moved to eastern Crimea, & even to Novorossiisk, precisely because of Ukraine’s devastating missile attacks.
12/Re ATACMS; among the egs. of Ukraine’s use of it was an attack in October on Berdiansk, destroying several military helicopters, an ammunition storage site, and an air defense system. Russia claims to have intercepted ATACMs twice but I know of no independent verification.
13/Ultimately, Ukraine’s military prospects hinge less on the points I’ve flagged for discussion here and much more on whether US military aid continues and whether Ukraine can mobilize and train ~500k additional soldiers—and whether Europe steps up far more than it has.
14/14 A final, unrelated, point: Western military experts are telling Ukraine to avoid an offensive and to switch to defense. Ukraine’s generals and military experts KNOW this, esp given the uncertainties re US military aid and the latter have written about “active defense.”
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i) Despite an vast advantage in firepower (eg: ~5:1 heavy self-propelled howitzers and nearly 7:1 in MLRS and drones) RUS’s net territorial gain in 2023 was all of ~100 miles by late fall and losses substantial—a poor showing
2/for the world’s 2d-most powerful military.
ii) UKR’s counteroffensive (CF), hyped by UKR and the US, albeit for different reasons, didn’t achieve much. But it could never have. The southern front, the focus of the CF, is largely flat.
3/ Such terrain makes advancing UKR armored & mechanized forces extremely vulnerable to artillery, air strikes (helicopters and fixed wing aircraft), and drones. Plus RUS had mined the area thoroughly, built layered defense lines (the “Surovikin lines”) & had air superiority.
1/7 A recent @nytimes piece described withering RUS attacks against the bridgehead UKR marines have created at Krynky, on the left (RUS-held) bank of the Dnipro, ~20 mls. upstream from Kherson. Russian attacks on Krynky have certainly been intense and UKR has paid a steep price.
2/ RUS has, for example, used SU-34 fighter-bombers to release glide bombs from afar against Krynky, as well as tanks, IFVs, artillery, & TOS-1 thermobaric rocket launchers. But—and this is the key point—it’s not a one-way fight, which is how @nytimes paints it.
3/ UKR forces on the Dnipro’s right-bank across from Krinsky occupy high ground. They’ve used that advantage to train tank and artillery fire at RUS tanks, IFVs, & infantry units. UKR’s defense of Krynky has also used drones to spot and target RUS units and equipment.
2/ i) “Winning” is never defined in the piece. Consider land gained. Ukraine has regained +50% of the land it lost since the March 2022 invasion. As for net territorial gains in 2023, Russia comes out ahead—but with a mere 200 square miles.
3/ii) Between late March and early November 2022, Ukraine forced the Russian army out of the north and Kharkiv province, plus the portion of Kherson provinces on the Dnipro’s right bank.
An @AP &NORC poll shows nearly 50% of Americans think too much $ is being spent on aid to Ukraine. Add to that the ⬆️ pervasive narrative that Ukraine’s stalled counteroffensive proves it can’t win & must cut a deal with Russia.
2/ Ukraine certainly has military problems. But it’s not as if Russia has had wild success: it’s barely gained any ground since early Oct 2022 despite massive advantages in every variable germane to war, save morale and generalship.
3/ The much bigger problem Ukraine faces is political. The U.S. in particular oscillated between its professed commitment to Ukraine’s success and its fear of escalation. So, the F-16s that were originally denied to Ukraine were approved—but halfway into the counteroffensive.
1/13 Some thoughts & doubts following Hamas’s Oct 7 attack:
Like many, I found Israel’s decision to deprive an entire population (30% lives in poverty) of essential supplies & to drop many thousands of bombs on highly-urbanized, densely-populated Gaza excessive & unjust.
2/ Yet I also know that any country w/ the power to retaliate would have (recall the US after 9/11) & had that right. The injustice was the enormity and scope of the retaliation & its huge, foreseeable toll on civilians, especially children.
3/ But can I specify what precisely would have been a just Israeli reaction, aside from not cutting off basic supplies, which inflicted serious harm on all Gazans? Generalities about proportionality & the need to protect civilians from injury & death aside, I cannot.
1/ No reasonable person can fault the Israeli government (and I find nothing to admire in this particular one) for retaliating after Hamas murdered and abducted many of its citizens. No government, anywhere, which had the means to respond, would—and could—have done otherwise.
2/ But much of Gaza—a third of whose population lives below the poverty line—has been turned into an urban wasteland. And Gaza will suffer even greater damage & death. After every single bombing of a building or neighborhood, the IDF insists that Hamas fighters were hiding there.
3/ This after Israel’s security establishment failed to detect an attack Hamas planned for many months. But now, amidst the chaos in Gaza, is it credible that Israel’s intelligence services have suddenly acquired the capacity to to pinpoint the location of Hamas operatives?