A scene-setter followed by some questions for those who have insisted, from day 1 of the invasion, that Russia would (quickly) crush Ukraine: 🧵
1/13 In recent months, the Russia’s three-pronged attack in Ukraine’s north and northeast, aimed at Sumy, Kharkiv, and Kupiansk, though unevenly, has failed. Northeast of Kharkiv the main attack vectors stretched from Lyptsi in the west to Vovchank in the east: ~40 miles.

Ukraine Battlefield 🧵

Current Russia strategy is pretty evident: Use the window of opportunity before US & EUR arms arrive in large volumes to stretch Ukrainian forces across a ~600 mile front that extends from the Kharkiv sector in the north to Krynky in Kherson. 1/13 This is clear from the positioning of RUS forces in the sectors facing (for eg) Krynky; Rabotyne; Velyka Novosilka, Vuhledar; Krasnohorivka; areas west and northwest of Avdiivka; Yampolivka; Terny; and Kharkiv. 2/13

1/4 🧵Many see Avdiivka’s fall as proof that Russia’s superiority in firepower & troops has turned the tide against Ukraine. RUS has made some gains west of Avdiivka, but on other fronts (Krynky, Rabotyne, Bakhmut, Kupiansk) RUS losses have been high & offensives unsuccessful. 2/4 Many assessments stress that superiority in numbers ensures that the Russian army will prove impossible for Ukraine to stop and that Ukraine is headed for defeat—soon. They also dwell on Ukraine’s various problems (which certainly exist).

1/14 Recent analyses of the war in Ukraine, even in top magazines such @ForeignAffairs, contain debatable claims. Below are four examples: 🧵 2/ ONE: Among the reasons Ukraine’s counteroffensive failed was the failure to concentrate the bulk of its forces at one point on the southern front rather than dispersing them. But the front is 600 miles long & Russia, with a far bigger army, had massed for attack at various

1/23 The UKR-RUS war: Year 2023: Long 🧵:

i) Despite an vast advantage in firepower (eg: ~5:1 heavy self-propelled howitzers and nearly 7:1 in MLRS and drones) RUS’s net territorial gain in 2023 was all of ~100 miles by late fall and losses substantial—a poor showing 2/for the world’s 2d-most powerful military.

ii) UKR’s counteroffensive (CF), hyped by UKR and the US, albeit for different reasons, didn’t achieve much. But it could never have. The southern front, the focus of the CF, is largely flat.

1/7 A recent @nytimes piece described withering RUS attacks against the bridgehead UKR marines have created at Krynky, on the left (RUS-held) bank of the Dnipro, ~20 mls. upstream from Kherson. Russian attacks on Krynky have certainly been intense and UKR has paid a steep price. 2/ RUS has, for example, used SU-34 fighter-bombers to release glide bombs from afar against Krynky, as well as tanks, IFVs, artillery, & TOS-1 thermobaric rocket launchers. But—and this is the key point—it’s not a one-way fight, which is how @nytimes paints it.

1/ Is Russia winning in Ukraine?
.@TheEconomist (Nov 30) thinks so—but with a “for now” escape clause.


However, its clams fails—on several counts. A 🧵:economist.com/leaders/2023/1… 2/ i) “Winning” is never defined in the piece. Consider land gained. Ukraine has regained +50% of the land it lost since the March 2022 invasion. As for net territorial gains in 2023, Russia comes out ahead—but with a mere 200 square miles.

1/6🧵Ukraine’s real problem isn’t military

An @AP &NORC poll shows nearly 50% of Americans think too much $ is being spent on aid to Ukraine. Add to that the ⬆️ pervasive narrative that Ukraine’s stalled counteroffensive proves it can’t win & must cut a deal with Russia. 2/ Ukraine certainly has military problems. But it’s not as if Russia has had wild success: it’s barely gained any ground since early Oct 2022 despite massive advantages in every variable germane to war, save morale and generalship.

1/13 Some thoughts & doubts following Hamas’s Oct 7 attack:

Like many, I found Israel’s decision to deprive an entire population (30% lives in poverty) of essential supplies & to drop many thousands of bombs on highly-urbanized, densely-populated Gaza excessive & unjust. 2/ Yet I also know that any country w/ the power to retaliate would have (recall the US after 9/11) & had that right. The injustice was the enormity and scope of the retaliation & its huge, foreseeable toll on civilians, especially children.

1/ No reasonable person can fault the Israeli government (and I find nothing to admire in this particular one) for retaliating after Hamas murdered and abducted many of its citizens. No government, anywhere, which had the means to respond, would—and could—have done otherwise. 2/ But much of Gaza—a third of whose population lives below the poverty line—has been turned into an urban wasteland. And Gaza will suffer even greater damage & death. After every single bombing of a building or neighborhood, the IDF insists that Hamas fighters were hiding there.

1/ Thrust of this @politico piece is that golden opportunities were missed to reach a negotiated settlement w/ RUS, above all in November, by which time UKR had retaken Kharkiv province & right bank Kherson, & could have bargained holding a strong hand.

politico.com/newsletters/na… 2/ But it leaves out some crucial points. First, on Feb 20, before the war, Emmanuel Macron called Putin, proposing a summit with Biden to discuss Europe’s security architecture. No follow up from Putin.

1/11 Thoughts following the Prigozhin drama: A British acquaintance wrote to ask what I made of it—now that the dust has settled, or seems to have. My response: Begin by considering what occurred in the abstract—i.e., by leaving out all proper names. 2/ There’s a country run by a leader who seeks to project strength and control at every turn. Suddenly, a warlord, who owes everything to the leader’s patronage, drives into one of its major southern cities unopposed, accompanied by heavily-armed fighters.

1/20 Thread on trip to Donbas, including Bakhmut, where I was within three miles of the frontline. I saw many places that have been in the news during this war, either because they’ve been the scenes of major battles and/or have been shelled by Russia extensively 2/ These include Izium, Balakliya, Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Kostyantinivka, which is about 29 miles from Bakhmut, but which sprawls to within a few miles of that town.

1/ Thoughts on Bakhmut: i) When Ukraine opted to stay & fight, prominent Western military pundits were quick to call it a blunder; ii) UKR has certainly suffered steep losses, so, undeniably, has Russia, which has nevertheless failed to take the town—despite 11 mos. of effort. 2/ ii) If UKR had w/d, it would have had to defend another place further west—that too have led to casualties; iii) RUS has advanced deep into the Bakhmut, but UKR has kept key supply roads (that run to Bakhmut via Chasiv Yar & Ivanivske) open &, to that end, defended Khromove;

1/3 In an @nytimes oped, Yale historian—and a fine one—@TimothyDSnyder insists that Russia’s nuclear threats are an intimidation tactic—bluster Putin won’t act on. He may be right, but we can’t know b/c he himself notes that war isn’t predictable, never mind his own prediction. 2/ Snyder adds that that nuclear powers do in fact lose wars. He offers as evidence the wars in Afghanistan (USSR and later the US), Algeria (France), Vietnam (US), and Lebanon (Israel).

1/ Some thoughts on the increasing calls for talks toward a political settlement in #Ukraine—ones based on laudable motives: eg, ending the death and destruction, avoiding escalation. Here are some problems with the pleas for a negotiated settlement: 2/ The positions of RUS & UKR are a Grand Canyon apart. RUS says it’s open to talks IF UKR recognizes the 4 provinces it annexed as sovereign Russian territory. UKR wants, at minimum, a return to the pre-Feb 24 lines plus war crimes trials. No sign that either side has shifted.

1/ On the PRC Balloon Controversy: With the US having shot down the PRC balloon (and leave aside whether it was for surveillance or for monitoring weather: it doesn’t now matter), the PRC leadership may be in bit of a fix. 2/ Chinese netizens (and this is by no means peculiar to China) tend to be very nationalistic re what they see as foreign disrespect for China. So the social media there will likely light up, demanding a tough response from PRC government.

1/ Developments to watch in UKR in 2023—a thread.

i) i) Will RUS hold the Svatove-Kreminna defense line (Luhansk) or will UKR breach it & advance further east?
ii) Will UKR hold the Solder-Bakhmut-Vuhledar line (Donetsk), eventually thwarting the mos-long RUS attack on Bakhmut? 2/ ii) Will UKR take Melitipol (Zaporizhzhia oblast), advance to Berdiansk on the Sea of Azov, thus cutting the RUS land corridor to Crimea?
iii) Will the relentless RUS attack on UKR’s power grid eventually create a new refugee wave to EUR, as economic conditions there worsen?