This reform agenda, laid out in President Zelenskyy's speech today about the dismissal of General Zaluzhnyi, is worth studying. There are some very interesting aspects. 1/8 🧵
2/ First, a strategy for 2024. Clearly the President is unhappy with the current proposed military strategy for #Ukraine in the coming year. Getting this right, and balancing defensive and offensive operations as well as reconstituting the force, is a big task.
3/ 2nd, there is reference to logistics issues. This is not a new issue; it has been examined by analysts for some time. But it is obviously a priority for Zelenskyy because it has battlefield implications & implications for Ukraine's relationship with those providing support.
4/ 3rd, personnel issues. Once again, not an issue that is new to the Ukrainians or those analysing the war. But it is clearly hurting the military and is hurting Zelenskyy politically. The mobilisation debate is part of this but not the entirety of the challenge to be resolved.
5/ 4th, training. The counter offensive showed shortfalls in combined arms scaling as well as the integration of supporting elements. There have also been issues with basic training because of time available for training. Much that NATO can do to assist here.
6/ 5th, the size and number of headquarters. Ukraine is not the only military with this problem! But, large, numerous HQ are a drain on people and it imposes delay in wartime decision making and adaptation. An important issue for resolution.
7/ Finally, the new drone force highlights the need for wider transformation in how military forces - in Ukraine and beyond - need to think differently about their warfighting concepts and organisations. Much to be done here, in Ukraine and in the west.
There are many lessons from the war in #Ukraine. But to be most useful, these lessons need to be considered through the context of different regions and political environments beyond eastern Europe. 1/7 🧵🇺🇦
2/ Sir Michael Howard wrote in The Use and Abuse of Military History, "without some such knowledge of the broader background to military operations one is likely to reach totally erroneous conclusions about their nature, and the reasons for their failure and success." Context matters.
3/ As such, I am starting a new series to translate the lessons from #Ukraine for application in the #Pacific. The method I will use in this study includes consideration of three key elements.
For a little while now I have wanted to write about the Russian turtle tanks. These weird and unwieldy beasts provide a discrete solution to a contemporary battlefield problem - generating successful offensive operations. 1/10 🧵🇺🇦🇺🇦
2/ On the weekend, the Ukrainian ground forces were able to capture one of these Russian turtle tanks. It will be a useful source of intelligence, particularly the EW suite that it is equipped with. But it will also provide insights into weaknesses that can be attacked with FPV.
3/ These turtle tanks have already appeared in several 'generations': Gen 1: tank with metal tortise shell; Gen 2: tank with metal tortise shell and EW suite; and, Gen 3: tank with metal tortise shell, EW suite, additional cages and mine roller.
In the past 48 hours, the U.S. and Ukraine signed a new security agreement on the sidelines of the G7 meeting being held in Italy. What is the nature of the new agreement between Ukraine and the U.S. and what are the potential implications over the next decade? 1/9 🧵 🇺🇦
2/ There are four key elements of the agreement.
3/ First, the agreement sets out a ten-year horizon. But, the deal won’t be ratified by the US Congress. And hopefully, Ukraine will be in NATO well before the ten year period ends.
I wanted to talk a little more about this great thread from @sambendett One of the interesting aspects of this thread is how it recognises the cycle of adaptation in military affairs. 1/8 🧵 🇺🇦
2/ Richard Simpkin wrote about the 50 year cycle in Race to the Swift - a great book which is still relevant after 40 years. I have also published multiple articles about the ongoing adaptation battle in this war.
3/ But we have also seen much faster adaptation cycles during this war in #Ukraine. As the thread points out, the drone-on-drone fights are happening regularly but we did not adequately prepare for this in western military organisations.
After two years of war, and some early successes in offensive operations, adaptations on both sides have led to an increasingly difficult environment for the conduct of offensive operations. The defence is now the stronger form of war – at least in Ukraine. 1/14 (Image: @DefenceU)
2/ As the Ukrainian counteroffensive last year, and the lack of significant progress in Russia’s 2024 offensives against a much weaker Ukrainian force demonstrate, successful offensive operations are very difficult in the current environment.
3/ This phenomenon has been explored by military theorists in recent years. Brilliant articles by the late Dave Johnson, T.X. Hammes, Frank Hoffman, & Alex Verhinin since the start of Russia’s large-scale invasion have examined the shift to defensive dominance in military operations. I recommend them all.
Is there an ongoing revolution in military affairs in Ukraine? This is a topic I have been pondering for a while. So, a short thread (and an accompanying article), that explores the issue. 1/8 (Image: @DefenceU)
2/ First, it is important to differentiate between “military revolutions” and “revolutions in military affairs (RMA).” A military revolution “recasts the nature of society & the state as well as of military organizations. By so doing they alter the capacity of states to project military power.”
3/ RMAs however are a more limited phenomenon requiring the aggregation of different tactical, organizational, doctrinal, and technological innovations to construct a new conceptual paradigm in military affairs. Indeed, it is the conceptual element rather than the technological aspects that is fundamental.