This reform agenda, laid out in President Zelenskyy's speech today about the dismissal of General Zaluzhnyi, is worth studying. There are some very interesting aspects. 1/8 🧵
2/ First, a strategy for 2024. Clearly the President is unhappy with the current proposed military strategy for #Ukraine in the coming year. Getting this right, and balancing defensive and offensive operations as well as reconstituting the force, is a big task.
3/ 2nd, there is reference to logistics issues. This is not a new issue; it has been examined by analysts for some time. But it is obviously a priority for Zelenskyy because it has battlefield implications & implications for Ukraine's relationship with those providing support.
4/ 3rd, personnel issues. Once again, not an issue that is new to the Ukrainians or those analysing the war. But it is clearly hurting the military and is hurting Zelenskyy politically. The mobilisation debate is part of this but not the entirety of the challenge to be resolved.
5/ 4th, training. The counter offensive showed shortfalls in combined arms scaling as well as the integration of supporting elements. There have also been issues with basic training because of time available for training. Much that NATO can do to assist here.
6/ 5th, the size and number of headquarters. Ukraine is not the only military with this problem! But, large, numerous HQ are a drain on people and it imposes delay in wartime decision making and adaptation. An important issue for resolution.
7/ Finally, the new drone force highlights the need for wider transformation in how military forces - in Ukraine and beyond - need to think differently about their warfighting concepts and organisations. Much to be done here, in Ukraine and in the west.
In the past 48 hours, the U.S. and Ukraine signed a new security agreement on the sidelines of the G7 meeting being held in Italy. What is the nature of the new agreement between Ukraine and the U.S. and what are the potential implications over the next decade? 1/9 🧵 🇺🇦
2/ There are four key elements of the agreement.
3/ First, the agreement sets out a ten-year horizon. But, the deal won’t be ratified by the US Congress. And hopefully, Ukraine will be in NATO well before the ten year period ends.
I wanted to talk a little more about this great thread from @sambendett One of the interesting aspects of this thread is how it recognises the cycle of adaptation in military affairs. 1/8 🧵 🇺🇦
2/ Richard Simpkin wrote about the 50 year cycle in Race to the Swift - a great book which is still relevant after 40 years. I have also published multiple articles about the ongoing adaptation battle in this war.
3/ But we have also seen much faster adaptation cycles during this war in #Ukraine. As the thread points out, the drone-on-drone fights are happening regularly but we did not adequately prepare for this in western military organisations.
After two years of war, and some early successes in offensive operations, adaptations on both sides have led to an increasingly difficult environment for the conduct of offensive operations. The defence is now the stronger form of war – at least in Ukraine. 1/14 (Image: @DefenceU)
2/ As the Ukrainian counteroffensive last year, and the lack of significant progress in Russia’s 2024 offensives against a much weaker Ukrainian force demonstrate, successful offensive operations are very difficult in the current environment.
3/ This phenomenon has been explored by military theorists in recent years. Brilliant articles by the late Dave Johnson, T.X. Hammes, Frank Hoffman, & Alex Verhinin since the start of Russia’s large-scale invasion have examined the shift to defensive dominance in military operations. I recommend them all.
Is there an ongoing revolution in military affairs in Ukraine? This is a topic I have been pondering for a while. So, a short thread (and an accompanying article), that explores the issue. 1/8 (Image: @DefenceU)
2/ First, it is important to differentiate between “military revolutions” and “revolutions in military affairs (RMA).” A military revolution “recasts the nature of society & the state as well as of military organizations. By so doing they alter the capacity of states to project military power.”
3/ RMAs however are a more limited phenomenon requiring the aggregation of different tactical, organizational, doctrinal, and technological innovations to construct a new conceptual paradigm in military affairs. Indeed, it is the conceptual element rather than the technological aspects that is fundamental.
The US has relaxed its restrictions on the use of its weapons on Russian soil. While these changes are geographically constrained, there are some important implications. A quick assessment. 1/12 🧵edition.cnn.com/2024/05/30/pol…
2/ Apparently the new direction on U.S. weapons will allow Ukraine to employ American weapons to intercept Russian missiles that are targeting Kharkiv, and to attack concentrations of Russian troops just over the border in the vicinity of the city.
3/ Permitted targets also apparently include Russian air force bombers, which launch many of the long-range missiles that attack Ukrainian civil infrastructure and civilian targets.
The latest large-scale PLA exercise around #Tawian appears to be wrapping up. What might be some of the initial observations that can be made? (Thanks @ianellisjones for the terrific infographic below) 1/21 🧵
2/ The latest joint exercises commenced in the wake of the inauguration of the new President of Taiwan last week. You can read his speech here: english.president.gov.tw/News/6726
3/ Frequent speeches by Chinese President Xi, and a recent Taiwan White Paper, make their intentions clear. As the White Paper pronounces in bold, “Taiwan Is Part of China - This Is an Indisputable Fact.”