This reform agenda, laid out in President Zelenskyy's speech today about the dismissal of General Zaluzhnyi, is worth studying. There are some very interesting aspects. 1/8 🧵
2/ First, a strategy for 2024. Clearly the President is unhappy with the current proposed military strategy for #Ukraine in the coming year. Getting this right, and balancing defensive and offensive operations as well as reconstituting the force, is a big task.
3/ 2nd, there is reference to logistics issues. This is not a new issue; it has been examined by analysts for some time. But it is obviously a priority for Zelenskyy because it has battlefield implications & implications for Ukraine's relationship with those providing support.
4/ 3rd, personnel issues. Once again, not an issue that is new to the Ukrainians or those analysing the war. But it is clearly hurting the military and is hurting Zelenskyy politically. The mobilisation debate is part of this but not the entirety of the challenge to be resolved.
5/ 4th, training. The counter offensive showed shortfalls in combined arms scaling as well as the integration of supporting elements. There have also been issues with basic training because of time available for training. Much that NATO can do to assist here.
6/ 5th, the size and number of headquarters. Ukraine is not the only military with this problem! But, large, numerous HQ are a drain on people and it imposes delay in wartime decision making and adaptation. An important issue for resolution.
7/ Finally, the new drone force highlights the need for wider transformation in how military forces - in Ukraine and beyond - need to think differently about their warfighting concepts and organisations. Much to be done here, in Ukraine and in the west.
Russia has employed missiles similar to Tomahawks since Day 1 of the full-scale invasion. This is NOT escalation. It is just leveling the playing field for a three-year-long Ukrainian long-range strike campaign that has now achieved critical mass and momentum. How have they done this? 1/16 🧵 🇺🇦 msn.com/en-us/news/wor…
2/ Back in 2022, when Ukraine received HIMARS, it changed the game. Ukraine could now hit Russia at depth. But it was clear even back then that Ukraine had bigger plans for making Russia hurt through even deeper strikes. mickryan.substack.com/p/striking-fur…
3/ By the 2nd half of 2023, Ukraine’s strategic aspirations for deep strike against Russia were clear. As I wrote back then, “throughout the war the Ukrainian Armed Forces have undertaken a range of adaptations to their force posture, structure and processes to enhance their operational effectiveness. Their development of more complex, long-range strike capabilities stands out.”
The last few years have seen many examples of wartime adaptation. This has occurred in #Ukraine as well as the Middle East. We have also seen nations in Europe, North America and Asia seek to learn and conduct peacetime adaptation. But there is a 3rd form of #adaptation that is crucial. 1/4 🧵
2/ This 3rd form of adaptation is that which occurs in the short period between peace and war: Peace to War Adaptation. It is important to understand this form of adaptation because it is the crucial process of learning and change that connects peacetime and wartime adaptation.
3/ The effectiveness or otherwise of Peace to War Adaptation can also influence the trajectory of a war. It is important to ensure governments, industry, the military and society are all prepared for such a rapid cognitive shift.
An initial assessment of the PLA parade that has just finished in Beijing. Overall, no major surprises although there were was some new equipment. The structure and content of the parade was pretty standard. Five key themes stood out for me however. 1/9 🧵
2/ Theme 1. Most of the weapons and platforms were not brand new, but generally, every land, air and sea platform was more modern than that in the inventories of western military organisations. Newer does not always mean better however. While most western military equipment has been tested in Iraq, #Ukraine and elsewhere, none of China's new kit has.
3/ Theme 2. The new weapons and platforms were interesting and demonstrate the ongoing, advanced military R&D eco-system that China now has. The Large Underwater Uncrewed Vessels, the uncrewed rotary wing aircraft and the HHQ-16C (HT @AlexLuck9), DF-61 and DF-31BJ missiles as well as the laser defence systems were new reveals by the PLA. I thought the UAV on the back of the Infantry Fighting Vehicle was interesting. Long gone are the days were China was reliant on Russia or other foreign systems. This level of indigenous capacity infers high levels of sustainability in any future conflict.
Tomorrow's big parade in Beijing will preview new Chinese weapon systems. But the military 'bling' may also provide insights into new and evolved PLA operating concepts for drones and missiles. 1/7 🧵
2/ In my latest piece, I explore the concept of a Pacific drone wall built by China, and how tomorrow’s PLA parade might preview some of its new components. There has been much speculation about the new weaponry that might be unveiled during the 3 September parade. Two key systems that are likely to receive a lot of attention are missiles and drones.
3/ Of course, China is not the only nation capable of assembling a 21st century military barrier comprised of air, sea and land drones. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has been discussing and simulating the creation of a drone barrier in the Taiwan Strait called Hellscape.
I have just published my regular update on global conflict. This week: Gerasimov's Ukraine war update, the aerial campaigns of Ukraine & Russia, Japan's missile moves, China's big parade and my Big Five reads. 1/5 🇺🇦🧵(Image: @DefenceU)
2/ This week, Russia's General Gerasimov provided an update on the war in Ukraine. Among his insights, Russia won't stop until it achieves its objectives, and that Russia holds the strategic initiative. He also discussed Russia's attacks on 'industrial targets' in Ukraine.
3/ In the Pacific, Japan made announcements about the deployment of American Typhon missile systems in September, as well as the deployment of indigenous counter-strike missile systems throughout Japan. Also, Exercise Alon 2025 concluded and China practiced for its 3 September parade. (Image: @TaiwanMonitor)
Ukraine has developed a world-class long-range strike capability. My latest assessment explores this topic. Ukraine's strikes in the past few months, especially against the Russian oil industry, reinforce that Russia cannot win this war. 1/6 🇺🇦🧵
2/ The impact of Ukraine's long-range strike campaign shows that Russia can only be handed a victory through a political process, which is why Putin is so desperate to convince the Trump administration about land transfers, and deny the presence of foreign troops in Ukraine.
3/ Ukraine's long-range strike capability has been a vital development for the Ukrainian Armed Forces since February 2022. They have developed an increasingly capable range of weapons to hit further into Russia and hold a wider range of strategic targets at risk.