A short thread on Kupiansk sector and the disposition of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (1GTA). Between 19-28JAN24 Russian forces from the 1GTA managed to capture the villages of Krokhmal'ne and Tabaivka. 1/
The offensive seems to have been local and opportunistic in nature, with several UkrAF 103rd TDF Bde positions being overrun by assaulting elements from RuAF 47th Guards Tank Division (47GTD) 2/
Russians were able to seriously threaten UkrAF positions around the village of Berestove and Kyslivka-Kotlyarivka, but it seems that at least for the time being RuAF forces have been unable to further exploit their initial success. 3/
Capture of Krokhmal'ne and Tabaivka has resulted in forming a salient some 5km deep and 5-8km wide. After the initial effort by elements of 47thGTD petered out, RuAF has reportedly reorganized their forces in the salient 4/
bringing forth elements from the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division (2GMRD). So far there has been no evidence of them being able to advance any further. Salient continues to threaten Ukr positions in Kyslivka-Kotlyarivka, 5/
and if the 1GTA were to go on in to fully committed offensive, this position could be at risk of being cut-off and overrun. At the moment it seems that no such commitment of 1GTA forces has been made yet. 6/
Comparison of sentinel imagery from the area of the salient between 13JAN and 21JAN does not show any significant preparatory fires from the Russians which further reinforces the image that this was mainly an opportunistic local action 7/
rather than beginning of full-scale offensive by 1GTA. For comparison here are sentinel images from Ivanivske-Klischiivka area near Bakhmut showing the extensive cratering from artillery fires between 13-23JAN24. 8/
The 1st Guards Tank Army seems to be concentrating bulk of its forces along roughly 30 km wide area of the front between Verkhnia-Duvanka and Svatove. 9/
This concentration seems to comprise of elements from all three divisions of the 1GTA: 2GMRD, 4GTD and 47GTD. Additionally a grouping of 27thSGMRB and 7th MRR seems to be present near Kuzemivka-Novoselivske. 10/
Several Russian territorial regiments are also reportedly being used to reinforce 1GTA units. Overall, it seems that the 1GTA has been able to recover after their defeat during the Kharkiv counteroffensive, but it remains to be seen if they are able to 11/
significantly ramp up and scale their offensive operations in the near future. So far concentration of offensive force, overcoming obstacles & minefields, suppression of opposing artillery and proper combined arms coordination 12/
are as difficult for Russians as they are to Ukrainians. Russians do however enjoy clear manpower and munitions advantage. To which degree Russians have been able to refit 1GTA with vehicles and other heavy weapons is also another open question. 13/
As the battle for Avdiivka now approaches its climax, Ukr high command has to make difficult decisions whether to commit significant reserves there or not. This may in turn serve to signal RuAF to commit 1GTA into general offensive 14/
once Ukr reserves are committed elsewhere. I will end this thread with a few disclaimers regarding the maps: UkrAF units are purely based on videos and other information published by UkrAF. 15/
With Russian forces I was forced to rely heavily on secondary sources like Konstantin Mashovets () which naturally means that the information presented must be taken with degree of caution. 16/t.me/zvizdecmanhustu
I will see if I can work out a similar thread on the situation around Avdiivka in the near future, but that battle may wrap up sooner than I can get it done (the situation over there does not seem good at all). 17/17
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It has been tough couple of weeks. General situation on the frontline seems to be deteriorating around Avdiivka and northern Luhansk. Velyka Novosilka sector been activating and Novomykhailivka not faring particularly well either. 1/
And then there is the mobilization deadlock and manpower&munitions crisis coupled with the military-political command crisis in Kyiv. Latter seems to be resolving now, at least publicly, but there may be unforseen consequences and shocks throughout the UKR armed forces. 2/
Timing for all this to go down could not be worse, especially since the command crisis has clearly been gaining momentum ever since the summer offensive failed. A lot will depend on Russian ability to exploit this situation and we should expect them to try within coming weeks. 3/
We have decided to release a series of full satellite images used to construct this thread, since at this point they are nearly five months old (13MAR23) and could be useful for geolocation as well as providing some transparency on the methods used in the original analysis. 1/
The series in question is particularly relevant at this moment, since this area has seen some of the fiercest fighting over the past few months as Ukrainian forces have been trying to bypass the Russian held village of Robotyne from the east. 2/
However, as you can see from the images themselves, this area had very few points of interest and was at the time when the images were taken very lightly fortified. This was likely due to the area being a seam or "gap" between two Russian frontline regimental groups. 3/
Back on May 8th I posted the thread on the Russian defences around Kopani – Robotyne - Tokmak axis. Quite frankly I did not quite expect the way it captured attention of the people and the amount of discussion it generated. 1/
I know that I also promised a tactical operational analysis on later date. A promise which I did not keep for two reasons: I was burned out and I was also beginning to increasingly spot certain subtle sings that, contrary to my earlier expectations Ukraine was in fact going to 2/
conduct some sort of offensive on this sector despite the apparent formidability of Russian defences. Since the Ukrainian counter offensive in the south has now been going on for the past three or so weeks, I feel more safe 3/
1/ Thread: Analysis of Russian defensive network and field fortifications on Kopani-Robotyne-Tokmak sector of the Zaporizhzhia front. This analysis was done using Sentinel Hub EO imagery and commercially available very high-resolution satellite imagery by Airbus DS Pléiades Neo.
2/ Russian defenses have been constructed along dominant heights and ridgelines. Defenses have been established at depth of 25-30km from Russian forward line of friendly troops (FLOT) all the way to the city of Tokmak.
3/ There are several distinct layers or defensive zones. Zone 1: first 3-4km from the RuFLOT is the forward security zone consisting of individual squad or platoon outposts and individual company strongpoints.
30.1.2023 Ketju: Ajatuksia Ukrainan sodan tämänhetkisestä tilanteesta ja kuluneesta sotavuodesta. Tämä ketju toiminee todennäköisesti alustuksena sarjalle pohdintoja erilaisista sotaan liittyvistä aiheista, ilmiöistä ja tapahtumista. 1/
Aloitan aluksi pahoittelemalla viimeaikojen hiljaisuuttani twitter-rintamalla. Erinäiset opintoihini liittyvät velvoitteet rajoittavat käytettävissäni olevaa aikaa ja ennen kaikkea henkisiä resursseja sekä rajallista keskittymiskykyäni. 2/
Olen kuitenkin jatkanut edelleen tiivistä yhteistyötä @J_JHelin, @emilkastehelmi, @EerikMatero et. al. -tiimissä ja seuraamme jatkuvasti tilanteen kehitystä Ukrainassa. Pyrin omalta osaltani ylläpitämään tiimin sisäistä tilannekuvaa joukkojen siirroista ja sijainneista. 3/
THREAD: Northern Luhansk Front 19 DEC 2022 - Frontline situation overview and analysis of estimated Russian Order of Battle (ORBAT). 1/
First some disclaimers: Sources, notes and possible biases are presented in the pictures, but in general be aware that the drawn maps and the analysis leans heavily on secondary sources who often do not disclose their primary sources. 2/
K. Mashovets is a good example of this problem and while this presentation relies uncomfortably heavily on information, he has provided the public with his analysis on social media (FB, TG), we must remain conscious on just how limited and error prone such data truly is. 3/