Bristlemoon just published a deep dive on The Trade Desk. $TTD is a solid business exposed to two high growth digital ad channels (CTV + retail media) but we question the extent to which TTD will benefit, explore the likely take rate pressure, and other risks such as...
signal loss from cookie deprecation, risks around the scalability and regulatory scrutiny re $TTD's alt. ID called UID2, as well as supply path optimization risks. We do our best to cut through the complexity and provide a balanced view.
$TTD is one of the greatest stock compounding stories, achieving a 40x stock return in 7 years since it listed.
We set the stage by exploring the various programmatic buying models and give an overview of the ad tech industry participants.
We then explore $TTD's positioning as a programmatic ad buying platform. As a pure-play DSP, TTD doesn’t own or operate any of its own ad inventory. Instead, it obtains a supply of omnichannel inventory from over 100 directly integrated ad exchanges and SSPs.
We give a brief recap of $TTD's phenomenal financial performance. Since the company’s IPO in 2016, it has compounded gross spend and revenue at a 38% CAGR, handily outgrowing the broader open programmatic market and taking 700 bps of market share between 2017 and 2022.
We dive into the technical details of $TTD's platform. Bid factoring is TTD’s original technical claim to fame and allows traders to apply a factor or weight to elements of the bidstream such as ad size, site, device etc. that are more likely to produce the best ad performance.
We discuss $TTD's competitive differentiation, looking at the companies scale, independence, close relationship with agencies, and greater transparency and control for ad buyers.
We challenge $TTD mgt's assessment of the CTV opportunity and highlight risks around walled gardening and agencies going direct to publishers. There is also an outstanding question on what % of CTV ad buying shifts to programmatic biddable which informs CPMs and fees for $TTD.
There are material differences in fees for the different forms of programmatic ad buying, and we believe that this will create a negative mix headwind for $TTD as CTV growth continues to outpace the remainder of TTD's business.
We strongly push back on mgt's assertion that CTV CPMs as a rule of thumb are higher for biddable inventory than guaranteed inventory. Their investor day disclosures were, shall we say, massaged.
We then explore the retail media opportunity; we are skeptical that the opportunity for $TTD is as large as mgt paints it to be due to a lack of capabilities to serve onsite retail media.
We call into question the sustainability of $TTD's take rate due to the impact of CTV mix as well as 3rd party cookie deprecation.
There is much more contained in the report - it is our most detailed and comprehensive report to date and hopefully sheds some light on a complex/opaque industry. Please feel free to subscribe and share our report with others if you feel that it's valuable!
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Bristlemoon just published a deep dive on $PDD, the owner of Pinduoduo and Temu. This company is insane. It was founded in 2015 and did c.$72m of revenue in 2016. Seven years later it 490x'd its revenue, doing c.$35bn in 2023. It's the fastest company in history to achieve $100bn in market cap, hitting it in just 5 years (vs. 18 years for Amazon to go from founding to $100bn). We have a look at what makes this company special and what allowed it to achieve such meteoric growth.
Pinduoduo and Temu are 3P e-commerce platforms: they act as marketplaces connecting buyers with merchants. Pinduoduo is not like conventional e-commerce companies which rely on intent-driven shopping and a solitary shopping experience. Pinduoduo’s platform uses feed-based shopping that’s personalized to a user’s preferences, allowing them to serendipitously discover items they may not have known they wanted. User demand preferences are then collated by Pinduoduo and fed back to merchants, directing future production quantities for goods. bristlemoonresearch.com/p/pdd-holdings…
Pinduoduo utilizes a “team purchase” model. Under this model, buyers are able to form groups on Pinduoduo and then receive discounts by purchasing items as a group. The team purchase model was an ingenious way for Pinduoduo to scale its user base. Users have a direct financial incentive to recruit other users into their groups.
A year ago I left my job at a hedge fund in NY to start my own fund, Bristlemoon Capital. Some thoughts below on the journey of launching a fund (both the good and bad):
Unsurprisingly, launching a fund is very hard. It requires execution on multiple fronts: building/managing a portfolio, legal/operations buildout, capital raising and building a brand, and then eventually managing a team as the AUM scales. These roles require v diff skillsets.
A good analyst does not automatically convert to a good PM, and being a good PM does not mean you will be a good leader of a business. Managing people is v different from managing a portfolio of stocks. Introspection and recognizing your strengths and weakness is key.
Bristlemoon just published a deep dive (>16k words) on Dutch Bros $BROS, a U.S. drive-thru coffee chain that is like a cross between $SBUX and Dairy Queen. BROS has 831 shops and is targeting 4,000 shops over the next 10-15 years (an 11-17% CAGR). We explore issues such as...
the portability of the mostly West Coast concept to other (colder) parts of the U.S., given >80% of drinks served are cold, as well as what the shop expansion is doing to shop AUVs.
BROS’s new shops under a build-to-suit lease arrangement are achieving an almost 60% cash-on-cash return in their second year. These are phenomenal returns but have been degrading due to escalating build costs.
$MTCH now targeting QoQ Tinder payer growth in mid-24' and YoY growth by YE-24' [Wells Fargo TMT conference]. Really need to bank on the product refresh helping the top-of-funnel trends which according to CFO are "slowly bouncing back". Co now talking about a heavy mktg push...
CFO reiterated that Tinder is a 50% mgn asset but that mktg spend would only be a 1-2 ppt mgn impact. Co now talking about "always-on" marketing required with periodic mktg spikes around events/product launches.
CFO spoke about having closed most of the pricing gap between Tinder and competitors. He noted there's opportunities for the pricing team to go "market by market, cohort by cohort to figure out how to maximize price". There's likely still decent pricing power in this biz.
Bristlemoon just published a report on $CPRT, one of the best businesses we've ever encountered (link below). The problem is that the mkt is seemingly missing the pricing-led, high-incremental mgn growth of the last few years being replaced by relatively lower mgn vol growth...
This, along with relatively stronger growth from the much lower mgn international biz, will likely see mgns struggle to hold these elevated levels. The stock is richly valued and falls far short of our return thresholds. bristlemoonresearch.com/publish/posts/…
We look at the mechanics of $CPRT's biz, starting with how a total loss for a vehicle is determined following an automotive accident.
$MTCH looked okay on the surface; below the surface it was pretty bad. The Tinder net payers stabilization/inflection keeps getting pushed out and marked a significant degradation vs. prior comments (see below). Some thoughts...
In 1Q23 mgt guided to "much stronger" Tinder sequential payer adds by the end of the yr and later that month @ JPM conf. guided to them being back in "positive territory" in Q4. That got walked back in Q2 with MSD % net payer declines guided for the rest of the year.
Part of this is due to the more gradual implementation of US price hikes but they also abandoned intl. pricing increases (which wld have helped the payer inflection). The big upset this qtr was the Q4 guide w. "slightly larger" YoY Tinder payer declines than in Q3.