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Jacob Edenhofer 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 Profile picture
@edenhofer_jacob
Feb 15, 2024 • 13 tweets • 4 min read • Read on X
These maps are interesting. Given the pre-existing differences between the East and West, however, we cannot simply "eyeball" the effects of the GDR regime, though some of the variation is likely causal.
Here are some of my favourite works that help us think carefully ... 1/11
about the GDR regime's effects.
1. I've pointed to this great paper so many times that I feel like a broken record, but this by @essobecker, @LukasMergele, and @Woessmann is essential reading 2/11
2. This by Kern and Hainmueller is an absolute classic and leverages the variation generated in large part by the topography of the valley of the unaware ("Tal der Ahnungslosen") around Dreseden.
3/11cambridge.org/core/journals/…
3. Bursztyn and Cantoni's paper use a similar identification strategy, but look at a different outcome, i.e. consumption, rather than attitudes.
4/11direct.mit.edu/rest/article-a…
4. Another great paper is this @JEEA_News piece by Lichter, Löffler, and @Sigginho. They use within-GDR differences in spying intensity to examine the effects on trust and, more broadly, social capital.
5/11academic.oup.com/jeea/article/1…
5. For non-German readers, let me note that imo Jens Gieseke's (@zzfpotsdam) history of the Stasi is unrivalled. English translation here
6/11amazon.co.uk/History-Stasi-…
Recently, a number of papers have come out that analyse the (i) process of privatisation (via the Treuhand) and (ii) effects of privatisation on economic and political outcomes.
6. This🧵and the related paper are absolute must-reads. 7/11
7. Then, there is this interesting working paper by @ufukakcigit and co-authors.
8/11nber.org/papers/w31645
8. This paper by @BachmannRudi et al. sheds light on the role of monopsony in creating productivity differences between East and West German firms.
9/11papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…
9. On the political effects of privatisation, see the work by Hennicke, @anselmhager, @krause_we, and @LukasMergele
10/11osf.io/preprints/osf/…
10. @HansLueders has a new paper in @World_Pol, where he shows that the economic uncertainty associated with East Germany's democratisation has long-lasting effects, with East Germans responding more strongly to present economic uncertainty. 11/END
muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/…
Addendum: See this🧵of mine for some more general thoughts on the "workings" of autocracies:
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More from @edenhofer_jacob

Jacob Edenhofer 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 Profile picture
Sep 15
Here is the sketch of my tentative conceptual answer to the questions below -- let me know what you think. I'd argue that higher wages have two countervailing effects. They raise competence (by reducing opportunity costs), but may lower morality (by crowding out intrinsicially
motivated types).
1. Opportunity Cost Channel (Competence Effect) If pay in office is low compared to private-sector outside options, highly skilled individuals self-select out of politics. Raising wages reduces this incentive, making office more attractive to people with better
outside options. In principle, this should raise the average competence or quality of politicians.
2. Motivation Channel (Morality Effect) Both prospective and retrospective accountability are only ever imerfect (see my summary below) dropbox.com/scl/fi/70lkuwp…Image
Image
Read 12 tweets
Jacob Edenhofer 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 Profile picture
Aug 17
That strikes me as too strong a claim. I think it's more accurate to say that accommodation *can* work when: (i) the party system (probably yes in Denmark, less clear in Germany) and internal party politics allows for electoral arbitrage (gains from programmatic accommodation),
(ii) the general equilibrium effects - notably thenormalisation of right-wing attitudes and its wider behavioural manifestations -- don't outweigh the electoral gains, and (iii) voters' distrust in mainstream parties is sufficiently low and the policies used for accommodation are
sufficiently simple. Let me explain.
For the first and second conditions, see this thread. The key point of the party competition literature -- and that I seem to remember @mvinaes disagrees with -- is that programmatically accommodating any party can
Read 29 tweets
Jacob Edenhofer 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 Profile picture
Jul 20
🧵Ein paar tentative Gedanken zur politischen Ökonomie eines möglichen AfD-Verbotsverfahrens.
Ich bin an Kritik sehr interessiert – denn ich bin mir selber unsicher.
Die strategische Lage lässt sich, denke ich, mit einem 5-stufigen "Spiel" ganz gut erfassen (als Approximation
erster Ordnung)
1️⃣ Mainstream-Parteien entscheiden, ob sie ein Verbotsverfahren einleiten.
2️⃣ Die AfD entscheidet über Mobilisierungsstrategie.
3️⃣ Das BVerfG fällt ein Urteil.
4️⃣ Wähler:innen & Partei reagieren auf das Urteil.
5️⃣ Mainstream-Parteien reagieren programmatisch
Was sind zentrale Zielkonflikte je nach Stufe?
🔹1. Unsichere Erfolgsaussicht
Ein Antrag wird nur gestellt, wenn der erwartete Nutzen (Neutralisierung einer demokratiefeindlichen Kraft) höher ist als Risiken (z. B. Scheitern oder Eskalation).
🔹2. Mobilisierung: Risiko
Read 36 tweets
Jacob Edenhofer 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 Profile picture
Jun 30
🧵 @ChFlachsland and I posted the first draft of our Climate Politics Framework (CPF) paper—our attempt to provide a structured synthesis of the insights of modern social science into why ambitious climate mitigation is politically such a wicked problem, and under
what conditions it becomes feasible (see figure below). Critical feedback is warmly welcome.
The CPF’s central structure is: Fundamental problems → mass and elite politics → climate policy platforms → strategic challenges → mass/elite politics & GHG outcomes. Image
See below for the framework figure. Reading from left to right, let's start with the four fundamental problems of ambitious climate mitigation that we identify:
1. pervasive collective action failure (free-riding everywhere)
2. adverse distributional dynamics (concentrated Image
Read 22 tweets
Jacob Edenhofer 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 Profile picture
Apr 17
Some thoughts on the strategic rationale behind the "Brandmauer” – the cordon sanitaire vis-à-vis the AfD – and the challenges associated with maintaining it. Seems pertinent, given that senior CDU/CSU figures regularly float the idea of ditching it and exploring avenues for
closer cooperation.
As for the strategic rationale, let me make two points.
1. I am sceptical that “Entzauberung” is a good strategy – betting on the AfD revealing itself as incompetent once in power *and* voters punishing the AfD for such incompetence.
First, the welfare
costs of such a strategy would be high -- something that we shouldn't lose sight of. Funke, @MSchularick, and @Ch_Trebesch have impressively documented this. The importance of their findings is reinforced by Bellodi et al. @SeanGailmard and Gailmard
aeaweb.org/articles/pdf/d…Image
Read 36 tweets
Jacob Edenhofer 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 Profile picture
Feb 3
🚨 New working paper! 🚨
@grattonecon and I just completed the first draft of "The Rise and Fall of Technocratic Democracies". Excited to present it in Munich this week—thanks to @LauraSeelkopf, @christoph_knill & others for hosting us! 🧵👇
▶️ Motivation
Many democracies have Image
have witnessed a process of "technocratization", with unelected technocrats having gained greater discretion over important realms of public policy (e.g. monetary policy). Populists explicitly oppose this narrowing of the purview of majoritarian policymaking, instead vowing to
return power to the "real people". Against this backdrop, we develop a formal model that allows us to study when democracies delegate policymaking to technocrats and why they may later reverse these decisions. We abstract from the expertise-related rationales for delegation,
Read 15 tweets

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