That strikes me as too strong a claim. I think it's more accurate to say that accommodation *can* work when: (i) the party system (probably yes in Denmark, less clear in Germany) and internal party politics allows for electoral arbitrage (gains from programmatic accommodation),

https://twitter.com/mvinaes/status/1956958905327653343

(ii) the general equilibrium effects - notably thenormalisation of right-wing attitudes and its wider behavioural manifestations -- don't outweigh the electoral gains, and (iii) voters' distrust in mainstream parties is sufficiently low and the policies used for accommodation are

🧵Ein paar tentative Gedanken zur politischen Ökonomie eines möglichen AfD-Verbotsverfahrens.
Ich bin an Kritik sehr interessiert – denn ich bin mir selber unsicher.
Die strategische Lage lässt sich, denke ich, mit einem 5-stufigen "Spiel" ganz gut erfassen (als Approximation erster Ordnung)
1️⃣ Mainstream-Parteien entscheiden, ob sie ein Verbotsverfahren einleiten.
2️⃣ Die AfD entscheidet über Mobilisierungsstrategie.
3️⃣ Das BVerfG fällt ein Urteil.
4️⃣ Wähler:innen & Partei reagieren auf das Urteil.
5️⃣ Mainstream-Parteien reagieren programmatisch

🧵 @ChFlachsland and I posted the first draft of our Climate Politics Framework (CPF) paper—our attempt to provide a structured synthesis of the insights of modern social science into why ambitious climate mitigation is politically such a wicked problem, and under

https://twitter.com/socarxivpapers/status/1935712976192913626

what conditions it becomes feasible (see figure below). Critical feedback is warmly welcome.
The CPF’s central structure is: Fundamental problems → mass and elite politics → climate policy platforms → strategic challenges → mass/elite politics & GHG outcomes.

Some thoughts on the strategic rationale behind the "Brandmauer” – the cordon sanitaire vis-à-vis the AfD – and the challenges associated with maintaining it. Seems pertinent, given that senior CDU/CSU figures regularly float the idea of ditching it and exploring avenues for closer cooperation.
As for the strategic rationale, let me make two points.
1. I am sceptical that “Entzauberung” is a good strategy – betting on the AfD revealing itself as incompetent once in power *and* voters punishing the AfD for such incompetence.
First, the welfare

🚨 New working paper! 🚨
@grattonecon and I just completed the first draft of "The Rise and Fall of Technocratic Democracies". Excited to present it in Munich this week—thanks to @LauraSeelkopf, @christoph_knill & others for hosting us! 🧵👇
▶️ Motivation
Many democracies have have witnessed a process of "technocratization", with unelected technocrats having gained greater discretion over important realms of public policy (e.g. monetary policy). Populists explicitly oppose this narrowing of the purview of majoritarian policymaking, instead vowing to

@KaiGehring1 Yes -- this argument depends on a number of assumptions, though, which are rarely spelt out:
1. Voters have a clear objective they want to see achieved (is -10% immigration enough? -50%?). If this is a moving target, then parties' will be pulled away ever more from the centre. @KaiGehring1 2. Voters will actually realise that an "issue" has been solved. This rules out that populists can conjure up beliefs by exploiting misperceptions about immigration/immigration.
3. Voter will credit a government consisting of mainstream parties with this. The deeper the distrust,

Das finde ich sehr plausibel, da der/die Medianwähler:in immer älter wird. Meine Frage ist: Denkt man dieses Argument zu Ende, wäre das nicht auch ein Grund, die Schuldenbremse nicht aufzuheben? Dazu ein sechs politökonomische Gedanken und Fragen.

https://twitter.com/schieritz/status/1878384401257550319

1⃣ Deutschland befindet sich in einer Situation, in der diejenigen, die von investiven Ausgaben vor allem profitieren, relativ an Gewicht verlieren, sowohl anteilig an der Bevölkerung als auch (und noch mehr) an der Wählerschaft (geringere Wahlbeteiligung jüngerer Menschen).

Interessante Argumente, denen ich allerdings nur in Teilen zustimme. Bin aus folgenden Gründen skeptischer.
1. Die Kostenreduktionen bei den erneuerbaren Energien müssen auch vor dem Hintergrund des technologischen Fortschritts bei der Extraktion von Öl and Gas

https://twitter.com/ChrisStoecker/status/1875827461130162210

gesehen werden -- insbesondere, weil die geopolitischen Anreize, die Extraktionskosten weiter zu reduzieren, beträchtlich sind. Das wird auch deutlich, wenn man sich vergegenwärtigt, dass die Öl- und Gas-Produktion unter Harris
academic.oup.com/isq/article-ab…

Interessanter Artikel, den ich allerdings nur mäßig überzeugend finde.
Zunächst bin ich – anders als Zürn – skeptischer, was die „explanatory power“ der politikwissenschaftlichen Erklärungen für den Aufstieg der Rechtspopulisten betrifft.

https://twitter.com/annettedittert/status/1875082954063347753

Die Effektgrößen (meistens zwischen 1 bis 10 Prozentpunkten) der gut identifizierten Studien reichen eher nicht aus, um das "support level" zu erklären -- und die Studien, die zu "großen" Effekten kommen, sind empirisch wackelig sind. Das hat auch damit zu tun, dass es schwierig

Möchte dies zum Anlass nehmen, auf meinen Bsky-Post von vor ~2 Wochen zu verweisen. "Für mich ist das Attraktive an der liberalen Demokratie, dass sie eben auch mit ganz gewöhnlichen Menschen funktioniert – also Menschen, deren Motive meist eine
bsky.app/profile/jacobe… x.com/sabinedoering/… ganze Menge Egoismus und ein Wenig Altruismus widerspiegeln und die kognitiv erhebliche Beschränkungen haben, weshalb sie Fehlwahrnehmungen und "inferential mistakes" aufsitzen. Das unterscheidet die liberale Demokratie von anderen Systemen, die – wenn überhaupt – nur

Here is my list.
1. “Special Interest Politics” by Grossman and Helpman
mitpress.mit.edu/9780262571678/… x.com/edenhofer_jaco… 2. “The Normalization of the Radical Right” by @ValentimVicente
academic.oup.com/book/57946

Ok, I'll bite - mainly because the idea that accommodating the radical right on immigration is almost bound to work electorally seems to be rather popular among mainstream politicians.
Let me try to provide a basic overview of the party competition literature and, in doing so,

https://twitter.com/MartGuenzel/status/1862817120540606590

explain why there are good reasons to be sceptical about the claim that accommodation will reap electoral rewards. This doesn't mean that accommodation never works -- just that there is little reason to be as confident about its radical-right-dampening potential as many

RIP Walter Korpi -- one of the key figures in the development of the "power resources theory". Let me take this opportunity to connect some recent work in (labour) economics to this way of thinking about the welfare state and the political economy of redistribution.

https://twitter.com/GerardoMunck/status/1860609304761602049

Most (political) economists think about redistribution and the welfare state in terms of the Meltzer-Richard-Romer model (see 👇) for a summary of the demand- and supply-side assumptions. The famous macro-level prediction is that, as the right-ward skew of the income ...

@kyleichan has a very interesting post, arguing that -- because China is more dependent on the US than the other way around -- Trump's desire to ratchet up the trade war with China might work to the advantaged of the US. While I'm not qualified to assess high-capacity.com/p/beijing-brac… the overall argument, I think the post under-estimates the political costs that the first trade war engendered for Trump. Here are three interesting papers documenting these costs.
1. @fetzert , and Carlo Schwarz. 2021. ‘Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump’s Trade Wars’.

Interesting podcast, which reminded me of this book chapter:
@benwansell and @jrgingrich. 2021. ‘The End of Human Capital Solidarity?’ In Who Gets What?: The New Politics of Insecurity, eds. Frances McCall Rosenbluth and Margaret Weir. 52–78. cambridge.org/core/books/abs… x.com/voxeu/status/1… I seem to remember that one of the authors did a thread on this when it came out, but I can't find it. In lieu of linking to thread, I'll post some of favourite passages from their chapter.
Their chapter is especially important against the backdrop of the flattening or even

It's the political selection stupid (at least in the US). The supply-side dynamics of US politics over the last ~40 years or so seem like an underrated factor in explaining elite-level polarisation and its downstream ramifications.

https://twitter.com/qjps_editors/status/1846993490967970034

Let me collect some explanations.
1. The cost of running for office have increased. Given these high opportunity costs (in terms of money and time), only wealthy people take the risk of running in elections, and even they rely heavily on campaign contributions. That is

Let me celebrate today's Nobel Prize for Acemoglu, Robinson, and Johnson by summarising the work of the first two laureates on the relationship between inequality and democratisation. In fact, AR kicked off the literature on redistributive theories of democratisation. 1/n Most summaries will focus on their contributions to the historical political economy of development, but their work on democratisation shouldn't go unmentioned today.
The synthesis of their work is presented in AR's "Economic Origins" book -- the

2/ncambridge.org/core/books/eco…

Interesting paper, which also raises deeper questions about the (unintended side) effects of the distributional ramifications of technocratic poliycmaking on politics. Let me sketch some thoughts.
To be clear: This is not suggest that central bank
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jo… independence is a bad idea. In fact, I believe trying to mitigate commitment problems via delegation is very important. If, however, that type of delegation engenders (regressive) distributional effects and voters cannot hold those that craft these policies accountable in

Den Tag der deutschen Einheit verstehe ich als Aufforderung,
- die historisch nahezu singuläre Leistung der ProtagonistInnen (in Ost u. West) der friedlichen Revolution zu würdigen,
- mir die durch die Wiedervereinigung gerissenen Wunden sowie deren Persistenz zu vergegenwärtigen, und
- indes nicht die Integrationserfolge aus den Augen zu verlieren.
Mein komparativer Kostenvorteil besteht in der (leider zu oberflaechlichen) Kenntnis von Teilen der sozialwissenschaftlichen Literatur. Ich hoffe dennoch, dass diese Arbeiten zu einer

The book by @CharlotteCavai1 that Marc mentions in his thread is required reading imo for anyone interested in comparative political economy. I'm not qualified to review the book, but would like to draw your attention to some especially interesting cambridge.org/gb/universityp… x.com/MarcHvidkjaer/… points.
Cavaillé defines "fairness reasoning as the thought process through which individuals reason as if a third-party judge ruling on the fairness of a given situation" (p. 32)
She then discusses 3 questions
1⃣ When does fairness matter relative to self-interest?

Quick🧵on "models of social change", inspired by @DinaPomeranz mentioning @_HannahRitchie's great book on climate policy on Bsky.
The slide below summarises the conceptual space and provides some tentative examples (feel free to correct me).
The space distinguishes ... 1/n between drivers and objects of change.
➡️Drivers of change:
*Structural variables
**incremental (e.g. econ growth, urbanisation)
**sudden (e.g. debt crises, recessions)
*Agential variables
**incremental (e.g. agenda-seeding, as
2/n