In this @zer0estv interview, which was recorded before $INOD reported its 3Q23 numbers, Dan lays out the case for why this deteriorating data entry company is more like Initech from the movie Office Space than a serious AI company. The numbers $INOD posted in 3Q23 only reinforce our opinion of $INOD – we will provide them below:
- Didn’t report any R&D expense in 3Q23
- 3Q23 cash: $14.8m ($5.1m held overseas)
- 3Q23 PP&E: $2.4m (-13% y/y)
- 3Q23 TTM net loss: ($4.5m)
- 3Q23 NWC: $6.4m ($5.1m cash held overseas leaves only $1.3m of NWC available to the US parent co.)
All numbers above are from $INOD's 3Q23 earnings press release (), its 3Q23 10-Q () and previous SEC filings.
Additionally, at the time Dan made this recording, $INOD did not have any software engineer positions listed on its website.
In late January 2024, $INOD finally posted a job for a software engineer with experience in AI, although it doesn't appear to have been filled as the deadline to apply has already passed.
1/ As @binanceriskmgmt pointed out over the weekend, Jeremy Nowak appears to be a key player in the $RILY / Vintage / Bryant Riley / Brian Kahn network of schemes
2/ Nowak’s FINRA employment history says he worked for Vintage Capital from 09/2006 – 01/2016, then began working as a prop trader for $RILY from 02/2016 to present. Interestingly, Nowak continued to work from Windermere FL – where Kahn lives – after supposedly leaving Vintage
3/ We decided to do an experiment on Saturday (12/23). We sent a test email to Nowak’s $RILY email address and his Vintage email address to see if they were still active – both were, as neither email bounced back to us.
1/ We are short $METC because our analysis indicates the concentration of critical battery metals at $METC's Brook Mine appear to be 12% lower than the average found in the Earth’s crust wolfpackresearch.com/research/metc/
2/ A number of mining professionals appear to have identified the same problem with $METC claims:
3/ Based on data provided by $METC, we estimate at best its revenue will be $3.59/t for the project. Processing costs alone for ionic clay projects are estimated at ~$7/t. Add in capex, mining costs, G&A, and delivery and this project is underwater
1/ $RILY's purchase of $FRG turned out to be an even bigger fuck up than it seemed bc Brian Kahn (CEO of $FRG) seems to be the center of a DOJ investigation into a $300m fraud. Jeffries shopped $FRG around to 19 other potential buyers and got 0 bids. Only $RILY was interested.
2/ $RILY should’ve known Kahn had been accused of misusing funds in a civil suit from 2022. Yet, $RILY negotiated directly with Kahn anyway in order to get a deal done to take his failing public company $FRG private at $30/share
3/ Despite stating that it didn’t believe $FRG was worth $30/share, $RILY was willing to proceed with the transaction if it could be completed on an expedited timeline. Why would $RILY blatantly breach its fiduciary duty to shareholders to rush this shitty deal to completion?
1/ We are short $APLD, a potato farm turned failed bitcoin miner. $APLD’s stock exploded after pivoting (again) to AI when AI hype has brought out the worst scumbags to peddle fake AI-wares to credulous investors. We believe $APLD is a stock promotion wolfpackresearch.com/research/apld/
2/ Naturally, $RILY is involved. $RILY insiders (which includes the CEO of APLD, Wes Cummins) own 48.4% of $APLD. These insiders coincidentally registered 95% of their holdings for sale the same day $APLD’s shares rose 320% on a deal w/ a mystery AI co supposedly worth $180m
3/ We think claims $APLD has made about its supposed AI business make no sense. And $RILY insiders are poised to exit with perfect timing, en masse before that becomes evident to everyone else.
1/ $RILY $43.5m of $15.1m net income ($1.50 per share) of earnings came from FV adjustments on loans receivable in 1Q23. This indicates operating cash flows were negative in Q1.
2/ Mgmt would have us believe $RILY is on the upswing, but a closer look at the numbers indicate that it is not:
$RILY (since 12/31/2022)
Cash: -$58.7m
Debt: +$62.2m
Equity: -$65.5m
3/ $RILY interest expense +56.3% y/y to $47.6m in 1Q23 ($190.2m annual run rate for interest expense)
1/ $GSHD’s total revenue for new business, both corporate and franchisee, declined 7.8% from Q3 to Q4. $GSHD missed adj. EPS estimates by $0.11 per share. This isn’t growth.
2/ $GSHD's 2022 net income attributable to shareholders was down 89% y/y to just $0.56m despite cutting 36% of corporate agents. Meanwhile, the Joneses pocketed $68.7m from stock sales in 2022 alone.
3/ $GSHD's growth rate for its policies in force in Q4 was just 3.7%, its lowest q/q growth since its IPO. This paltry growth is not what investors need in order to justify $GSHD’s ~2,000x TTM PE Ratio.