We are short $SES because we believe they have announced a series of phantom deals to distract from the loss of their two biggest customers, Honda and Hyundai (who make up ~74% of sales this year), which we believe will happen in a matter of weeks. To patch this massive hole, they have also bought a low-margin China-based UZ energy, whose related entity used a registered agent that had allegedly participated in a $1 billion Ponzi scheme.

Please read the full report and disclaimer linked at bottom of the thread $SES's first phantom deal was an MOU with AISPEX. This Texas-based retail energy provider was supposed to generate up to $45m. But a former told us this deal was a “complete surprise” and then “they did nothing to fulfill it.” Our site visit shows AISPEX’s headquarters is a shabby little building in Texas sporting signage of another company. The yard is littered with shipping containers that we believe are from the CEO’s covid PPE business.

Another phantom deal was with Data Blanket who was going to make a “significant purchase order,” but, like AISPEX, only was ever mentioned in one SEC filing, the shareholder letter that $SES published three days before announcing a $150m ATM in Feb 2025.

We are short $DVLT, a joke of a company brought to you by a promoter sanctioned by the SEC who has co-authored patents with a convicted felon charged in an elaborate pump-and-dump.

Please read the full report and disclaimer linked at bottom of the thread $DVLT, a ridiculous company is up ~800% on misleading press releases and what we believe are empty claims about “AI driven data experiences,” “quantum computing,” and Web 3.0 nonsense. But what really gives the game away is an absolutely spectacular cast of top-tier bullshitters tied to this stock, like its CEO Nathaniel Bradley who was fined and settled charges with the SEC along with a convicted felon, Edward Withrow III, originally charged as part of a “pump and dump” scheme.

We are short Datasection (TYO:3905) because we believe Tencent, a designated Chinese Military Company, is their only significant customer. We believe furnishing Tencent or another Chinese company with the most advanced B200 NVIDIA GPUs worth $272m is illegal under US law and contrary to Japan's interests making Datasection’s alignment with Tencent an atrocious scandal. We have already shared our findings with Japanese and US authorities and believe Datasection’s efforts to obtain government funding and subsidies will fail.
We learned from multiple sources that it is common knowledge in the industry that Datasection's mystery customer is China-based. We were told Datasection let the cat out of the bag that Tencent was its backer while it was pursuing financing from Japanese banks, and that the banks quickly shut their doors due to the horrendous reputational risk. We suspect Chinese involvement was also the reason Datasection changed auditors from PwC Japan to a small, relatively unknown auditor.

We are short $FFAI because we think YT Jia (founder and CEO) has based its latest pump on fake orders, a rebadged Chinese minivan, and a tsunami of lies meant to induce retail to buy right before a massive flood of new shares are authorized. Between dilution, YT’s legal problems (SEC, DOJ, Bankruptcy Court, etc..) and its track record of abysmal failure ($4.4b spent with 17 cars delivered) we think $FFAI will go back to being a penny-stock on its way to delisting. 2/
$FFAI's stock shot up after Nature’s Miracle ($NMHI) announced 1,000 preorders in a deal worth up to $100 million. We think this is fake because $NMHI has almost no money; less than $10,000 in cash and its market cap is ~$2 million. Turns out YT is former classmates with $NMHI CEO Tie (James) Li.

We are short $CTO because we believe its dividend is unsustainable and management has deceived investors with a bullshit AFFO, a sham loan, and false and misleading statements about its tenants. It's like $CTO is aiming to be the $RILY of REITs. Our analysis shows a $38M cash shortfall in paying dividends since 2021 and dilution to make up for it, with shares outstanding increasing 70% since 2022
wolfpackresearch.com/items/cto%3A-t… $CTO's cash from operations over the TTM has been ~$17m a quarter, but total dividend obligations are >$14m and recurring capex was ~$5.7m per quarter 2023-2024. Cash is just $8.4m. We don’t think that math works, and investors can soon expect something dilutive—dilution , debt, an inopportune property sale to make ends meet

1/
We’re short $UFPT, a surgical drape manufacturer that is having their first conference call in 32 years according to Bloomberg. We think this is going to be a bad call for investors. The hot topic? Probably $UFPT's deteriorating relationship with $ISRG, its largest customer, responsible for 96.5% of $UFPT’s organic growth in 2024. Apparently, $IRSG's IR isn’t talking until after $UFPT's call. Think that is concerning? See below
Read the full report and Disclaimer

wolfpackresearch.com/items/ufpt%E2%… 2/
We spoke with $ISRG's IR team in Q1, $ISRG's IR team boasted to us that they had already begun insourcing 10% of surgical drapes from their Mexican plant and planned to ramp more production there. This insourcing contributed to turning y/y growth negative in Q4 for $UFPT, we expect it to have gotten much worse in Q1.

We are short $MCY because we found how many home and landlord polices $MCY had in the zip codes hit by the CA wildfires as of June 2024 due to an obscure 4,000-page rate filing. For example: $MCY insured 385 homes and 31 landlord policies in Pacific Palisades (90272).
We estimate $MCY’s gross losses from the LA fires will exceed $2b, far more than their $1.3bn in reinsurance. Using $MCY's rate filings, we see $MCY had ~1,300 home and landlord policies in force as of June 2024 between Altadena and the Pacific Palisades.
In our report we show where investors can access CA rate filings. This should give investors a way to assess damages from these and any future wildfires

1/ We warned everyone about $MAX and the FTC investigation, but those that didn’t listen are getting a nasty surprise as the FTC is seeking injunctive and monetary relief and civil penalties that amount to significantly more than $MAX’s existing liquidity and financial resources, which appears to be ~$77m. In our opinion, this confirms the worst-case scenario for $MAX, which is that the FTC is hellbent on destroying $MAX as they did with Simple Health and Benefytt. 2/ Three months ago, $MAX CEO Steve “Straight Cash” Yi proclaimed on MAX 2Q earnings call that $MAX was in compliance with all ethical rules and regulations following an internal investigation. The FTC disagrees and proposes to seek injunctive and monetary relief and civil penalties which significantly exceed MAX’s existing liquidity and financial resources, which consists of $32m in cash and $45m on their debt facility according to the Q.

1/ We are short $SWVL because large sections of this so-called “technology” company’s website have been non-functional for months. Our on-the-ground due diligence in Egypt, where SWVL generated 92% of its FY ’23 revenue, reveals that its primary operations are grinding to a halt as $SWVL’s finances continue to circle the drain toward insolvency. 2/ In our opinion, SWVL has overpromised and undelivered to investors, leaving the company on the verge of bankruptcy. The company’s business model has clearly failed as the company has accumulated losses of $329 million. With just $2.9 million in cash and cash equivalents, we strongly believe as my British friend, Freddy would say, that they are proper fucked. We do not believe SWVL will make it to 2025 without significant dilution. Potential downside—100%.

1/ $MAX’s CEO Steven Yi was grandstanding during the earnings call about how “horrible” it was for us to publish our findings on MAX. We think this is a bit rich coming from a guy whose firm has spent years using fraudulent ads and deceptive websites to drive leads to scammers like Simple Health. We weren’t the first ones to make that connection, it was the FTC. 2/ Yi also said they are hopeful the investigation will be over sooner rather than later. And maybe after 18 months, it is finally wrapping up. But that may not be great news for $MAX shareholders, who should ask why Yi and the board recently rewrote the company rules to make themselves immune from liability for breaches of fiduciary duty to the fullest extent of the law.

1/ We are short $MAX because we believe their Health segment (47% of TTM revenue) tricks consumers into providing their contact information with false ads and deceptive websites. Then $MAX sells that info to scammers.

The FTC is investigating $MAX for its shady business practices in its Health segment after hammering two of $MAX's lead-buying partners for selling sham insurance.

Management’s apparent lack of concern over the investigation is belied by their actions. Top execs have dumped stock, switched base compensation to straight cash, and rewritten the articles of incorporation to shield them from liability for breaches of fiduciary duty.

wolfpackresearch.com/research/max/ 2/ How do we know $MAX sells leads to scammers? We created several aliases which were bombarded with 400+ phone calls and spoke with over 50 telemarketers, recording calls with 40 of them.

1. 45% gave fake insurance license numbers or hung up when asked.

2. 20% of them falsely claimed to work for the government, you can listen in here:

1/ $RILY has finally put out their 10-K. We are disappointed, but not surprised, that regulators have not stepped in to prevent the company from doing any more harm. $RILY has scored a win by getting this filed, but make no mistake, the contents of the K make it clear that $RILY's troubles are far from over. 2/ This K gives investors the clearest view yet of how $RILY does business and what condition it is in. This increase in transparency would not have been possible without our work and the work of other shorts. For example, this K reveals that 72.8% of their loans are to related parties. The fact that these loans were related party loans was often not disclosed at the time or in prior disclosures.

1/ As @binanceriskmgmt pointed out over the weekend, Jeremy Nowak appears to be a key player in the $RILY / Vintage / Bryant Riley / Brian Kahn network of schemes

https://x.com/binanceriskmgmt/status/1738619627654234317?s=20

2/ Nowak’s FINRA employment history says he worked for Vintage Capital from 09/2006 – 01/2016, then began working as a prop trader for $RILY from 02/2016 to present. Interestingly, Nowak continued to work from Windermere FL – where Kahn lives – after supposedly leaving Vintage

1/ We are short $METC because our analysis indicates the concentration of critical battery metals at $METC's Brook Mine appear to be 12% lower than the average found in the Earth’s crust wolfpackresearch.com/research/metc/
2/ A number of mining professionals appear to have identified the same problem with $METC claims:

1/ $RILY's purchase of $FRG turned out to be an even bigger fuck up than it seemed bc Brian Kahn (CEO of $FRG) seems to be the center of a DOJ investigation into a $300m fraud. Jeffries shopped $FRG around to 19 other potential buyers and got 0 bids. Only $RILY was interested. 2/ $RILY should’ve known Kahn had been accused of misusing funds in a civil suit from 2022. Yet, $RILY negotiated directly with Kahn anyway in order to get a deal done to take his failing public company $FRG private at $30/share

1/ We are short $APLD, a potato farm turned failed bitcoin miner. $APLD’s stock exploded after pivoting (again) to AI when AI hype has brought out the worst scumbags to peddle fake AI-wares to credulous investors. We believe $APLD is a stock promotion
wolfpackresearch.com/research/apld/ 2/ Naturally, $RILY is involved. $RILY insiders (which includes the CEO of APLD, Wes Cummins) own 48.4% of $APLD. These insiders coincidentally registered 95% of their holdings for sale the same day $APLD’s shares rose 320% on a deal w/ a mystery AI co supposedly worth $180m

1/
$RILY $43.5m of $15.1m net income ($1.50 per share) of earnings came from FV adjustments on loans receivable in 1Q23. This indicates operating cash flows were negative in Q1. 2/ Mgmt would have us believe $RILY is on the upswing, but a closer look at the numbers indicate that it is not:
$RILY (since 12/31/2022)
Cash: -$58.7m
Debt: +$62.2m
Equity: -$65.5m

1/ $GSHD’s total revenue for new business, both corporate and franchisee, declined 7.8% from Q3 to Q4. $GSHD missed adj. EPS estimates by $0.11 per share. This isn’t growth. 2/ $GSHD's 2022 net income attributable to shareholders was down 89% y/y to just $0.56m despite cutting 36% of corporate agents. Meanwhile, the Joneses pocketed $68.7m from stock sales in 2022 alone.

1/ $RILY: A Bank Without Cash is not a Bank
We believe $RILY is nearly out of cash & must raise new debt on onerous terms to stay afloat. In our analysis we looked at major publicly disclosed transactions that have drained $RILY’s liquidity over the last five months: 2/ The above analysis excludes $RILY's negative OCF & FCF. In the 1st 3 qtrs of 2022, $RILY generated OCF of -$14.9m, -$35m, and -$22.9m, sequentially. We believe these losses persisted in 4Q22 and are continuing today

1/ We are short $GSHD because 85-95% of its leads reportedly come via housing market. Our analysis shows 67% of signed franchisees fail in their 1st yr & mgmt has taken $900m off the table while delivering just $23.4m in cum net income since IPO wolfpackresearch.com/research/goose… 2/ 700 of 1400 $GSHD operating franchisees have less than 2 yrs tenure and need new business to pay bills. We calculate 193 shuttered through Q3 2022, and we expect Q4 to be worse. Franchisees who fail can lose their home as spouse must sign on the loan

1/ Why has $RILY been propping up its stock? We believe it is due to Bryant Riley’s pledge of 4.4 million shares (64% of his holdings) for a personal loan. Our analysis indicates Axos could give Riley a margin call if $RILY approaches $30. Lookout below. 2/ In 2019, Bryant Riley pledged 4,024,714 of his $RILY shares for a margin loan, creating an additional massive risk for $RILY’s shareholders: