We are short $MCY because we found how many home and landlord polices $MCY had in the zip codes hit by the CA wildfires as of June 2024 due to an obscure 4,000-page rate filing. For example: $MCY insured 385 homes and 31 landlord policies in Pacific Palisades (90272).
We estimate $MCY’s gross losses from the LA fires will exceed $2b, far more than their $1.3bn in reinsurance. Using $MCY's rate filings, we see $MCY had ~1,300 home and landlord policies in force as of June 2024 between Altadena and the Pacific Palisades.
In our report we show where investors can access CA rate filings. This should give investors a way to assess damages from these and any future wildfires

1/ We warned everyone about $MAX and the FTC investigation, but those that didn’t listen are getting a nasty surprise as the FTC is seeking injunctive and monetary relief and civil penalties that amount to significantly more than $MAX’s existing liquidity and financial resources, which appears to be ~$77m. In our opinion, this confirms the worst-case scenario for $MAX, which is that the FTC is hellbent on destroying $MAX as they did with Simple Health and Benefytt. 2/ Three months ago, $MAX CEO Steve “Straight Cash” Yi proclaimed on MAX 2Q earnings call that $MAX was in compliance with all ethical rules and regulations following an internal investigation. The FTC disagrees and proposes to seek injunctive and monetary relief and civil penalties which significantly exceed MAX’s existing liquidity and financial resources, which consists of $32m in cash and $45m on their debt facility according to the Q.

1/ We are short $SWVL because large sections of this so-called “technology” company’s website have been non-functional for months. Our on-the-ground due diligence in Egypt, where SWVL generated 92% of its FY ’23 revenue, reveals that its primary operations are grinding to a halt as $SWVL’s finances continue to circle the drain toward insolvency. 2/ In our opinion, SWVL has overpromised and undelivered to investors, leaving the company on the verge of bankruptcy. The company’s business model has clearly failed as the company has accumulated losses of $329 million. With just $2.9 million in cash and cash equivalents, we strongly believe as my British friend, Freddy would say, that they are proper fucked. We do not believe SWVL will make it to 2025 without significant dilution. Potential downside—100%.

1/ $MAX’s CEO Steven Yi was grandstanding during the earnings call about how “horrible” it was for us to publish our findings on MAX. We think this is a bit rich coming from a guy whose firm has spent years using fraudulent ads and deceptive websites to drive leads to scammers like Simple Health. We weren’t the first ones to make that connection, it was the FTC. 2/ Yi also said they are hopeful the investigation will be over sooner rather than later. And maybe after 18 months, it is finally wrapping up. But that may not be great news for $MAX shareholders, who should ask why Yi and the board recently rewrote the company rules to make themselves immune from liability for breaches of fiduciary duty to the fullest extent of the law.

1/ We are short $MAX because we believe their Health segment (47% of TTM revenue) tricks consumers into providing their contact information with false ads and deceptive websites. Then $MAX sells that info to scammers.

The FTC is investigating $MAX for its shady business practices in its Health segment after hammering two of $MAX's lead-buying partners for selling sham insurance.

Management’s apparent lack of concern over the investigation is belied by their actions. Top execs have dumped stock, switched base compensation to straight cash, and rewritten the articles of incorporation to shield them from liability for breaches of fiduciary duty.

wolfpackresearch.com/research/max/ 2/ How do we know $MAX sells leads to scammers? We created several aliases which were bombarded with 400+ phone calls and spoke with over 50 telemarketers, recording calls with 40 of them.

1. 45% gave fake insurance license numbers or hung up when asked.

2. 20% of them falsely claimed to work for the government, you can listen in here:

1/ $RILY has finally put out their 10-K. We are disappointed, but not surprised, that regulators have not stepped in to prevent the company from doing any more harm. $RILY has scored a win by getting this filed, but make no mistake, the contents of the K make it clear that $RILY's troubles are far from over. 2/ This K gives investors the clearest view yet of how $RILY does business and what condition it is in. This increase in transparency would not have been possible without our work and the work of other shorts. For example, this K reveals that 72.8% of their loans are to related parties. The fact that these loans were related party loans was often not disclosed at the time or in prior disclosures.

1/ As @binanceriskmgmt pointed out over the weekend, Jeremy Nowak appears to be a key player in the $RILY / Vintage / Bryant Riley / Brian Kahn network of schemes

https://x.com/binanceriskmgmt/status/1738619627654234317?s=20

2/ Nowak’s FINRA employment history says he worked for Vintage Capital from 09/2006 – 01/2016, then began working as a prop trader for $RILY from 02/2016 to present. Interestingly, Nowak continued to work from Windermere FL – where Kahn lives – after supposedly leaving Vintage

1/ We are short $METC because our analysis indicates the concentration of critical battery metals at $METC's Brook Mine appear to be 12% lower than the average found in the Earth’s crust wolfpackresearch.com/research/metc/
2/ A number of mining professionals appear to have identified the same problem with $METC claims:

1/ $RILY's purchase of $FRG turned out to be an even bigger fuck up than it seemed bc Brian Kahn (CEO of $FRG) seems to be the center of a DOJ investigation into a $300m fraud. Jeffries shopped $FRG around to 19 other potential buyers and got 0 bids. Only $RILY was interested. 2/ $RILY should’ve known Kahn had been accused of misusing funds in a civil suit from 2022. Yet, $RILY negotiated directly with Kahn anyway in order to get a deal done to take his failing public company $FRG private at $30/share

1/ We are short $APLD, a potato farm turned failed bitcoin miner. $APLD’s stock exploded after pivoting (again) to AI when AI hype has brought out the worst scumbags to peddle fake AI-wares to credulous investors. We believe $APLD is a stock promotion
wolfpackresearch.com/research/apld/ 2/ Naturally, $RILY is involved. $RILY insiders (which includes the CEO of APLD, Wes Cummins) own 48.4% of $APLD. These insiders coincidentally registered 95% of their holdings for sale the same day $APLD’s shares rose 320% on a deal w/ a mystery AI co supposedly worth $180m

1/
$RILY $43.5m of $15.1m net income ($1.50 per share) of earnings came from FV adjustments on loans receivable in 1Q23. This indicates operating cash flows were negative in Q1. 2/ Mgmt would have us believe $RILY is on the upswing, but a closer look at the numbers indicate that it is not:
$RILY (since 12/31/2022)
Cash: -$58.7m
Debt: +$62.2m
Equity: -$65.5m

1/ $GSHD’s total revenue for new business, both corporate and franchisee, declined 7.8% from Q3 to Q4. $GSHD missed adj. EPS estimates by $0.11 per share. This isn’t growth. 2/ $GSHD's 2022 net income attributable to shareholders was down 89% y/y to just $0.56m despite cutting 36% of corporate agents. Meanwhile, the Joneses pocketed $68.7m from stock sales in 2022 alone.

1/ $RILY: A Bank Without Cash is not a Bank
We believe $RILY is nearly out of cash & must raise new debt on onerous terms to stay afloat. In our analysis we looked at major publicly disclosed transactions that have drained $RILY’s liquidity over the last five months: 2/ The above analysis excludes $RILY's negative OCF & FCF. In the 1st 3 qtrs of 2022, $RILY generated OCF of -$14.9m, -$35m, and -$22.9m, sequentially. We believe these losses persisted in 4Q22 and are continuing today

1/ We are short $GSHD because 85-95% of its leads reportedly come via housing market. Our analysis shows 67% of signed franchisees fail in their 1st yr & mgmt has taken $900m off the table while delivering just $23.4m in cum net income since IPO wolfpackresearch.com/research/goose… 2/ 700 of 1400 $GSHD operating franchisees have less than 2 yrs tenure and need new business to pay bills. We calculate 193 shuttered through Q3 2022, and we expect Q4 to be worse. Franchisees who fail can lose their home as spouse must sign on the loan

1/ Why has $RILY been propping up its stock? We believe it is due to Bryant Riley’s pledge of 4.4 million shares (64% of his holdings) for a personal loan. Our analysis indicates Axos could give Riley a margin call if $RILY approaches $30. Lookout below. 2/ In 2019, Bryant Riley pledged 4,024,714 of his $RILY shares for a margin loan, creating an additional massive risk for $RILY’s shareholders:

1/ We have plenty more to say about $RILY, who hasn't responded to our report last week, just like they haven't announced a date for 4Q22 earnings or reassured investors that they aren't in violation of debt covenants. Read our full follow up report: wolfpackresearch.com/research/rily2/ 2/ One of RILY’s borrowers $SRNE, who took out a $41.6 million bridge loan from RILY on 9/30/2022, filed for bankruptcy yesterday. $SRNE was supposed to repay the loan on January 31st, but did it? $SRNE was not even the riskiest loan in RILY’s portfolio.

We are short $RILY because our research shows it levered up to buy toxic assets during a financial mania. Its cash & investments net of debt fell by $950m to -$350m in 2022 and we don't believe things will improve in 2023
wolfpackresearch.com/research/rily/ 2/ $RILY rode stimulus fueled bubbles to record years in 2020-21. It appears that mgmt. mistook their luck for skill. Instead of taking some chips off the table when the mkt turned in 2022, they doubled down, costing shareholders nearly $1B so far.

1/ $SGOC raising $115m in additional equity plus $3m in warrants after its controlling shareholders were arrested & charged for alleged fraud & money laundering in HK is just the latest middle finger to the SEC from a China-based company 2/ Our research showed us that $SGOC likely functions as a conduit for international mutual fund fraud and it seems the HK police agree - if the SEC wants to make an example out of anyone, $SGOC seems like a layup

1/ Check out our latest report – “SGOC: Multiple Arrests, Financial Fraud, and Money Laundering” here: wolfpackresearch.com/research/sgoc/
We are short $SGOC. 2/ In Dec 2020, three of $SGOC’s key people and largest shareholders were arrested by the HK Police for allegedly being the “masterminds” of a HK$475m (~US$61m) international fund fraud scheme involving $SGOC. singpao.com.hk/index.php?fi=n…

6/ Listen to our recording. We tried to contact $MOXC multiple times by using phone numbers listed on their websites and corp filings. Two of the numbers there is a recorded message unable to connect the call and one of the other numbers would automatically disconnect.

1/ Yesterday, announced an SEC investigation resulting from our April 2020 report on them. The SEC investigation into should be much faster. 2/ We have a few very straight forward questions for 's management going into today’s earnings call.
We believe shareholders deserve answers to these questions.