Key Points about Avdiivka Defense, covered in our recent analysis (full analysis available on the website listed in my bio).
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2/ Currently, Russian forces maintain a significant numerical advantage in both personnel and vehicles. Despite initial errors, high losses, and unrealistic expectations, they continuously replenish their troops with fresh recruits and preserve pressure
3/ Russian troops incurred substantial casualties, prompting the 25th Combined Arms Army to transfer equipment to the 2nd and 41st Combined Arms Armies for ongoing assaults.
4/ The situation improved for Russians upon entering the city in January, infiltrating residential areas with an element of surprise, seizing rear positions. Casualty ratios tend to equalize in urban areas.
5/ Lack of ammunition for counter-battery fire allowed large-scale deployment of Russian artillery, weakening Ukrainian defenses. Multiple groupings exploited weak spots for envelopment.
6/ Several units on the ground confirmed that recently captured POWs were recruited in December and January. Approximately 10 prisoners were recruited in mid-January
7/ An estimated 37-42 KAB bombs were dropped on Avdiivka in a single day, causing extensive damage despite their relative inaccuracy.
8/ With Russians nearing the creation of multiple pockets in the city, limited options remain—withdraw or attempt a very risky counter-attack.
9/ What’s next?
The most logical course of action at this point would be a withdrawal from Avdiivka. While viewed unfavorably politically, defending Avdiivka initially inflicted substantial damage on the Russian military, preventing them from advancing as deep as planned.
10/ As of February 9, 2024, OSINT analyst @naalsio26 reported over 655 vehicles damaged, destroyed, or captured on the outskirts of Avdiivka. Between October 10th and November 28th, our team reported more than 211 damaged or abandoned Russian vehicles near Avdiivka.
11/ During this highly dynamic environment, the trajectory of the battle suggests an inevitable withdrawal of Ukrainian forces and the imminent fall of important defense positions such as Zenit. Barring any unexpected events, this chapter is likely to conclude soon.
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In late 2022 - early 2023, amid Ukrainian artillery shortages, Frontelligence Insight observed a pattern: Russian forces, due to limited Ukrainian counteraction, occupied stationary artillery positions for long periods. Our team now notes the resurgence of this pattern. 🧵Thread:
2/ In January, our team recorded 14 concentrations of artillery and enemy forces, echoing Spring 2023 observations. In this example, vehicle revetments were stocked with supplies and vehicles. We have monitored this specific operational site persisting for multiple weeks
3/ Importantly, this doesn't mean a total loss of Ukraine's counter-battery capabilities. Multiple OSINT projects consistently document Russian artillery losses. Nevertheless, the prevailing pattern highlights a present challenge of inadequate counter-battery fire.
Frontelligence Insight tracked logistical routes between Russia and North Korea, calculated delivery numbers, and identified storage points. We are disclosing North Korea’s ammo transport ecosystem – and revealing some of its crucial nodes for the first time.
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2/ Frontelligence Insight has estimated the number of ammunition deliveries between September and December to be approximately 1.57 million artillery shells, combining 152mm and 122mm ammo.
3/ Evident from recent imagery, since October 2023, 20 ft shipping containers filled with ammunition are loaded onto sea vessels at Raijin port (Rason) and shipped to Dunai port near Vladivostok in Russia’s far east.
Latest on Avdiivka and Helicopters Operations. 🧵Thread
1/ By late 2023, Frontelligence Insight noted a stabilized situation in Avdiivka. However, recent developments have worsened the situation for Ukrainian troops, especially in the southern residential area
2/ While the northern part of Avdiivka is shielded by the AKHZ (industrial buildings), the southern area is comprised of one to two-story houses susceptible to artillery fire. If unable to capture the area, russians erase it with artillery, deploy infantry, and seize the rubble.
3/ The visible artillery strikes, moving from the outskirts to residential areas, indicate the shift. Eventually, the damage makes defense challenging. The same problem extends to nearby multi-story apartment buildings targeted by previous Russian FAB hits.
Geospatial Analysis: Railroad Construction on Occupied Territories. 🧵Updated Thread:
1/ Frontelligence Insight examined satellite imagery of railroad constructions in occupied territories, specifically south of Donetsk and in Mariupol. Here is what we know:
2/Burne - Malovodne branch
To enhance logistics between Russia, Donetsk, and Mariupol, Russians are actively constructing a new railroad branch to the south of Donetsk. This branch aims to bypass a risky section of the frontline near Mariinka and Vuhledar.
3/ The new branch starts in the village of Burne and links up with the existing railroad at Malovodne. Based on satellite imagery, significant progress is evident in the construction of this railroad branch, making our team believe that it might be completed in 2024.
Geospatial Analysis: Railroad Construction on Occupied Territories. 🧵Thread:
1/ Frontelligence Insight examined satellite imagery of two railroad constructions in occupied territories, specifically south of Donetsk and in close vicinity to Mariupol. Here is what we know:
2/ Burne - Malovodne branch
To enhance logistics between Russia, Donetsk, and Mariupol, Russians are actively constructing a new railroad branch to the south of Donetsk. This branch aims to bypass a risky section of the frontline near Mariinka and Vuhledar.
3/ The new branch starts in the village of Burne and links up with the existing railroad at Malovodne. Based on satellite imagery, significant progress is evident in the construction of this railroad branch, making our team believe that it might be completed in 2024.
Analyzing the early 2024 Frontline Dynamics.
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Ukrainian troops started this year with some challenges. Russian offensives and missile attacks seal a strategic initiative shift, but the overall outlook is acceptable for the AFU, despite upcoming Russian tactical gains
2/ We expect Russian forces to continue assaults in areas like Kupyansk-Lyman, Bohdanivka-Kostyantynivka, Novobakhmutivka-Novomykhailivka, and potential counter-attacks in the southern regions, particularly the Robotyne area and Krynky.
3/ Winter 2023 also saw a strategic initiative shift to Russian forces after Kherson's liberation, leading to sustained offensives in Vuhledar, Kreminna, and Bakhmut. While Bakhmut was captured, humiliating defeats occurred in places like Vuhledar.