This (👇) illustrates just how popular citizens' assemblies (CAs) have become in the past two decades, with some arguing that the ills of representative democracy can be addressed by deploying CAs more extensively. Here is why I tend to be sceptical about these arguments. 1/n
By way of explanation, let me distinguish between 4 distinct justifications.
1⃣ CAs will produce more congruent policies and correct responsiveness biases (in favour of the rich).
Representative democracies, the argument goes, have been shown to ... 2/n docs.google.com/document/d/1vw…
favour the rich, producing policies that are relatively far from the median voter's preferences (see👇for the difference between congruence and responsiveness). Because CAs are - at least socio-economically - representative of the population and everyone's voice has the ... 3/n
same weight, the resulting policies will be more representative. Indeed, the policy recommendations by CAs might allow us to get a better sense of the true "responsiveness/congruence" gaps because they might be more likely to reflect the population's enlightened ... 4/n
preferences about complex policy issues, compared to "throw-away" answers to survey questions.
To me, this is the strongest reason for grappling with CA-centred reform proposals. I'd object by saying that the fundamental problem with CAs' policy proposals is the lack ... 5/n
of accountability and therefore incentive-compatibility.
▶️CAs do not bear the costs of their policies, and have little incentive to ignore the constraints policymakers face.
▶️This means policymakers have strong incentives not to implement their ...
6/n
costly and more meaningful recommendations.
2⃣ CAs will reduce the influence of money and lobbying.
This is related. I bring it up here in response to sth. @landemore said on Capital'isnt (@zingales + @bethanymac12). There might be sth. to this ...
argument, but, given their limited / non-existent influence, there has thus far been little reason for interest groups to lobby CAs. If they CAs were granted more powers, we'd expect this to change. Only then could we evaluate @landemore's argument.
8/n
3⃣CAs increase the legitimacy of the policymaking process and thus the acceptance of contentious decisions.
The causal chain is sth. like: CAs → consultation → greater trust / understanding of process → higher legitimacy 9/n
The Irish CAs seem to suggest that this can sometimes work. Yet, a recent paper by @DamienBol et al. cautions against pushing these qualitatively derived conclusions too far: citizens are most in favour of CAs when they believe many agree with ... 10/n
their pre-existing attitude on an issue.
Second caveat: Even if the above causal chain holds, the number of people that would have to be involved in CAs (even accounting for diffusion across social networks) and the temporal persistence of the legitimacy-boosting effect ... 11/n
strike me as implausibly big / long, for this effect to make much of a dent in the aggregate perceived legitimacy of the policymaking process. Ultimately, this is, of course, an empirical question.
4⃣ CAs will help us address the problem of a passive citizenry / make ... 12/n
better citizens.
This is incredibly important, but the question is: are CAs the best tool to address the problem?
The work by Fishkin and co-authors is encouraging in that regard. Note, though, that, if this is the objective, then CAs are ...
13/namazon.co.uk/Democracy-When…
first and foremost about civic education, rather than policy influence. This has to be communicated clearly then.
The more serious risks with CAs is that they overlook the fact that some citizens are passive because they are busy eking out a living or because the ... 14/n
opportunity cost of being informed and engaged - i.e. being a good citizen - are prohibitively high, as a result of, say, lower education. This can easily give rise to a system that tilts the playing field in the favour of those fortunate enough to have the time as well ... 15/n
intellectual resources to be informed.
Where does that leave us? My overall conclusion is that CAs can work well for issues with low / none distributional consequences, especially when preferences diverge on these issues primarily for moral or ...
16/n
epistemic reasons. Abortion and gay marriage in Ireland illustrate this. For issues, where the distributional stakes are high, CAs run into incentive-compatibility problems (see 1⃣) and can, if at all, only serve as legitimacy-boosting and citizenship-fostering devices. 17/END
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Almost exactly two years ago, Russia launched its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. By way of reflection, let me provide a somewhat quirky overview of the political science / economy literature on autocracy in this🧵.
In the past two decades, our understanding ... 1/n
of the workings of autocracies has improved considerably, which, as the figure i.a. below shows, is important.
To impose some structure on this vast body of work, I'll follow @MilanSvolik's approach. He argues that autocrats ... 2/n cambridge.org/core/books/pol…
must address two problems: They have to control both the elite (problem of authoritarian power sharing) and the masses (problem of authoritarian control) to prevent either group from overthrowing them (see👇).
Crucially, autocrats must grapple with these problems against ... 3/n
"Green subsidies" are often justified on (implicitly) political grounds. Below, I've tried to summarise, explicate, and extend some of these arguments (👇). 1/n
In the short- to medium term, these subsidies *can* achieve two objectives (see upper branch): reduce opposition and build some, albeit not stable, support.
At the mass level - i.e. among citizens - this can manifest itself in attitudinal ... 2/n
(e.g. lower opposition to climate measures) or behavioural changes (e.g. pro-climate voting, short-term changes in consumption). @LFesenfeld et al. summarise this type of mass-level sequencing logic very clearly. 3/n academic.oup.com/policyandsocie…
What I wrote last year is still true and I'd like to continue this🧵today.
While grappling with the unspeakable horrors of the Shoa requires much more than serious intellectual engagement, such engagement is still important. In that ... 1/n
spirit, then, let me share some of my favourite papers - in addition to the ones I listed last year.
I. Emergence and origins of the Nazi dictatorship 1. This new WP by @essobecker and @joachim_voth is well worth a read. They argue that ... 2/npapers.ssrn.com/abstract=46220…
where Christianity had only shallow roots (see below for measure) the Nazis were more successful electorally. To that end, they construct an instrumental variable - a county's distance to pre-1500 monastries and pagan cults. 3/n
Metcalf, Gilbert E. 2023. ‘Five Myths about Carbon Pricing’. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 39(4): 680–93. academic.oup.com/oxrep/article-…
Blanchard, Olivier (@ojblanchard1), Christian Gollier (@CGollier), and Jean Tirole. 2023. ‘The Portfolio of Economic Policies Needed to Fight Climate Change’. Annual Review of Economics 15(1): 689–722. annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.114…
Very helpful thread!
Let me, drawing on Ian Shapiro's book chapter and the Clark et al. comparative politics textbook, add some thoughts on the advantages and drawbacks of different measures of democracy. 1/n
The first point I want to make is that any measure of democracy consists of two components:
1⃣ conception of democracy
2⃣ scale on which democracy is measured
Let's discuss each component in turn.
Fundamentally, there are two different types of conceptions of democracy. 2/n
• *Minimalist* conceptions classify countries as democratic if and only if they have a certain set of formal democratic procedures / institutions in place, most notably free and competitive elections.
Note, these formal institutions are regarded as both a necessary 3/n
1/ The veto player approach to analysing politics has considerable intuitive appeal, which is perhaps why few non-political-scientists bother to familiarise themselves with the details. Let me try to explain this approach in somewhat more detail in this🧵.
2/ The slide (👇) summarises the starting point. Let me just expand on the last bullet point. Tsebelis (2002) writes: "While some researchers try to focus on the specific policy implications of certain institutions, I believe that specific outcomes are the result of both ...
3/ prevailing institutions and the preferences of the actors involved. ... institutions are like shells and the specific outcomes they produce depend upon the actors that occupy them." (p. 8)
• Veto players are conceived of as functional equivalents: while institutions might ...