Thread by @MassDara

A thread on Avdiivka, what it its loss says about Russian strategy and capabilities, and what they may try to do next. /1

At Avdiivka, multiple Russian brigade and regiment elements attacked intensely for five months. They gained 31 kilometers for an estimated cost of over 600 armored vehicles @naalsio. /2

https://x.com/naalsio26/status/1758670525499367570?s=20

List of attacking Russian units: 7 brigade + 5 regimental elements. Ukraine mounted a strong defense + 9 years of prepared defenses. Ultimately it it was not enough given the pressure applied. Russian forces overwhelmed UAF units with fires, assault teams, and air attacks. /3

It may seems like a large force against one defended city. However, it’s consistent with Russian planning and doctrine on this point based on the frontage that units of this size are supposed to have Still, those losses are very steep, suggesting issues remain. /4

Russian casualties are hard to calculate just yet, with ranges from various social media and Ukrainian accounts 16K-47K casualties. Shoigu falsely claims “minimal losses” for Avdiivka. And that the Avdiivka operation will be “taught in textbooks” /5 moscowtimes.ru/2024/02/20/sho…

Ukrainian authorities withdrew and preserved what they could. Reinforcements were brought in to cover the withdrawal but by that time, Russia already had fire control of one of the last routes out. Not everyone made it out, including wounded. /6 nytimes.com/2024/02/17/wor…

The evacuating UAF 110th brigade said that Russian forces shot some of the wounded. If confirmed, this would be a war crime and break of Geneva Convention protocols. /7

https://x.com/Militarylandnet/status/1759713919944229050?s=20

If Russian forces continue to advance past Avdiivka and capture route networks, including west of Bakhmut, they eventually threaten a more strategic location, Pokrovsk, around 80KM away. /8

What’s next for Russian forces? They know about Ukrainian rationing, delays in vital American military assistance, and UAF manning issues. Their strategy since the fall of 2023 has been to apply pressure along the front to fix UAF forces and try to attrit/exhaust them. /9

Russian military leaders’ training and mindset will tell them that now is the time to press forward on objectives: UAF units have ammunition and manpower deficits, American assistance is delayed, western ammo production targets are not reached. /10

Russian forces have a 5:1 fires advantage and are regenerating combat units from training pipelines in Russia, and are pulling equipment from storage and can do this through 2024. /11

As @konrad_muzyka sees, Russia has been steadily increasing units in Donetsk, probably some of this was in support of Avdiivka operations. Russia is looking at a 2:1 manpower advantage in the area which could be concentrated against individual objectives

https://x.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1758452937515241902?s=20

Avdiivka became the emphasis for the Russians in October, and now I suspect it will shift shifting to two areas. One, Robotyne in the south, with a possibility of trying to push west to the edge of Donetsk oblast. /13

In the south, Robotyne and other areas have been under attack for months; and attacks are accelerating in but in recent days. Russia’s goal there is likely to reverse UAF counteroffensive gains and deal a psychological blow to the UAF and to the West. /14

To the north, Russian forces are trying to get to Chasiv Yar to the west of Bakhmut, and move to the NE of Avdiivka. If they gain control of these roads, Pokrovsk is at risk from two routes. /15

Pokrovsk is a vital intersection that allows the UAF to reinforce and resupply multiple units in the area. Pokrovsk has two lines of defenses. /16

The most heavily defended Ukrainian positions in this area are the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk defenses. If Russia tries to advance to the borders of Donetsk and Luhansk, they would need to attack these heavily defended locations. /17

Kramatorsk and Sloviansk are strongholds. Like Avdiivka, these towns are defended and have been built up over the past ten years. Russia will pay costs to attack these towns- as long as the UAF receive additional ammunition and manpower to defend /18

Final thoughts. Ukrainian units are being starved of ammunition from delays in western (mostly American) military aid. Some are also experiencing manning problems as a result of policy delays in mobilization in Kyiv. (there are many reasons for that). /19

Russian forces are keeping pressure along the frontline the past several months to exhaust UAF and their supplies. Ukrainian defensive lines are being constructed, but there are areas that have very little by way of prepared positions in the south. /20

If Russian forces probe weak spots on the frontline, they could advance quickly if they get a breakthrough. They are still vulnerable while maneuvering. /21

Russia has advantages in manpower and ammunition that they can use--and are willing to expend-- for brute force methods to secure advances. Russia still pays a high cost with losses , despite its advantages, which is also important to remember as they try to advance. /22

Russia has many incentives to keep the pressure on the UAF on its current path—attacking Ukrainian positions while they are rationed or depleted. Russia is constrained somewhat by keeping overall casualties to a level that can be sustained by ‘volunteer’ monthly intake/23

This is a precarious time for Ukraine --without aid this situation will degrade. They are asking for support, and when given,there is a way forward. /end warontherocks.com/2024/01/hold-b…

NW I mean