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Feb 21, 2024 15 tweets 4 min read Read on X
What are Russian forces currently doing in Belarus? How has the Belarusian army evolved since 2022? Is another invasion from Belarus imminent? Rochan Consulting, in collaboration with Frontelligence Insight, answers these key questions.

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2/ The Belarusian Forces have not significantly changed since the invasion. Modernization is slow, with no notable increase in personnel. Minsk's aggressive rhetoric contrasts with its defensive posture. However, there have been some important changes.
3/ Belarusians conducted brigade-level drills, which had never occurred previously. More importantly, in September 2023, Minsk launched the first-ever bilateral exercise when they placed one operational command against the other Image
4/ Belarus Armed Forces now have a three-tier structure. The first includes operational forces (regular army), the second is Territorial Defence Forces (TDF), and the last is People's Militia.
5/ Сall-ups via SMS were introduced. Previously, a call-up was to be delivered by post or a courier. Now, troops are mobilized almost instantly, significantly increasing the country's mobilization readiness.
6/ The 2024 budget brought an additional BYN 0.7 billion increase to the armed forces spending, which means that their budget has increased by 350% since 2018 and 200% since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Image
7/ In early January 2024, Radio Svaboda confirmed a military camp construction near Gomel. Satellite imagery analysis suggests that the construction is unfinished and is unlikely to have a significant impact, with the primary site at the moment covering a mere 650 square meters Image
8/ While Wagner PMC still trains with the Belarusian Armed Forces, their primary focus is on joint exercises with Belarusian Internal Troops. They work on enhancing the force's capacity for missions like storming buildings, sniper operations, first aid, and explosives handling Image
9/ The overall Wagner presence in the country significantly dropped by 2024. Satellite imagery comparison reveals a significant reduction in the size of Wagner's camp in Tsel, where Prigozhin and multiple Wagner commanders temporarily stayed before being assassinated in Russia. Image
10/ Regular Russian troop presence in Belarus is limited, with Moscow maintaining a modest air presence. Two S-400 battalions, supplemented by Pantsir-S1 units, are positioned in Southern Belarus at the Prybytki and Velikii Bokov air bases. Image
11/ The Belarusian Forces is a mobilization force. They maintain 4 mechanized brigades, each fielding 5 battalions (3 mechanized and 2 tanks). Yet, the peacetime posture of these formations means that they are only manned in 30-40% and mobilization would be needed.
12/ Equipment fielded is still mostly of Soviet legacy, and although some efforts have been made in recent years to field modern samples, such as modernized T-72s, S-400s, Iskanders, or Su-30SMs, the armed forces are largely obsolete. Image
13/ As a result, the probability of Belarus directly entering the war against Ukraine is currently low. However, as Minsk is capable of applying pressure on NATO's eastern flank through hybrid activities, shifts within the Belarusian Armed Forces require close observations.
14/ Currently, no evidence indicates preparations for an invasion of Ukraine from the North. The limited Russian presence in Belarus is insufficient to replicate the 2022 scenario. While this doesn't guarantee the situation won't change, any preparations would not go unnoticed.
15/ If you found this useful, please like and share the initial message in this thread, as our posts on Ukrainian topics are currently facing reduced visibility. Kindly follow us to stay updated

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