What are Russian forces currently doing in Belarus? How has the Belarusian army evolved since 2022? Is another invasion from Belarus imminent? Rochan Consulting, in collaboration with Frontelligence Insight, answers these key questions.
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2/ The Belarusian Forces have not significantly changed since the invasion. Modernization is slow, with no notable increase in personnel. Minsk's aggressive rhetoric contrasts with its defensive posture. However, there have been some important changes.
3/ Belarusians conducted brigade-level drills, which had never occurred previously. More importantly, in September 2023, Minsk launched the first-ever bilateral exercise when they placed one operational command against the other
4/ Belarus Armed Forces now have a three-tier structure. The first includes operational forces (regular army), the second is Territorial Defence Forces (TDF), and the last is People's Militia.
5/ Сall-ups via SMS were introduced. Previously, a call-up was to be delivered by post or a courier. Now, troops are mobilized almost instantly, significantly increasing the country's mobilization readiness.
6/ The 2024 budget brought an additional BYN 0.7 billion increase to the armed forces spending, which means that their budget has increased by 350% since 2018 and 200% since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
7/ In early January 2024, Radio Svaboda confirmed a military camp construction near Gomel. Satellite imagery analysis suggests that the construction is unfinished and is unlikely to have a significant impact, with the primary site at the moment covering a mere 650 square meters
8/ While Wagner PMC still trains with the Belarusian Armed Forces, their primary focus is on joint exercises with Belarusian Internal Troops. They work on enhancing the force's capacity for missions like storming buildings, sniper operations, first aid, and explosives handling
9/ The overall Wagner presence in the country significantly dropped by 2024. Satellite imagery comparison reveals a significant reduction in the size of Wagner's camp in Tsel, where Prigozhin and multiple Wagner commanders temporarily stayed before being assassinated in Russia.
10/ Regular Russian troop presence in Belarus is limited, with Moscow maintaining a modest air presence. Two S-400 battalions, supplemented by Pantsir-S1 units, are positioned in Southern Belarus at the Prybytki and Velikii Bokov air bases.
11/ The Belarusian Forces is a mobilization force. They maintain 4 mechanized brigades, each fielding 5 battalions (3 mechanized and 2 tanks). Yet, the peacetime posture of these formations means that they are only manned in 30-40% and mobilization would be needed.
12/ Equipment fielded is still mostly of Soviet legacy, and although some efforts have been made in recent years to field modern samples, such as modernized T-72s, S-400s, Iskanders, or Su-30SMs, the armed forces are largely obsolete.
13/ As a result, the probability of Belarus directly entering the war against Ukraine is currently low. However, as Minsk is capable of applying pressure on NATO's eastern flank through hybrid activities, shifts within the Belarusian Armed Forces require close observations.
14/ Currently, no evidence indicates preparations for an invasion of Ukraine from the North. The limited Russian presence in Belarus is insufficient to replicate the 2022 scenario. While this doesn't guarantee the situation won't change, any preparations would not go unnoticed.
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When Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in Syria, a critical geopolitical question emerged: can Russia maintain its foothold in the MENA region, and if so, how? What does this mean for Ukraine? Below are the key points from the latest Frontelligence Insight report:
2/ Maxar satellite images, dated December 17, show an unusual buildup of vehicles at the Tartus Naval Base. Video from site show that most of these vehicles are logistical, with only a few appearing to be combat vehicles. We identified approximately 150 vehicles and 29 containers
3/ It is assessed that the vehicles are likely being prepared for evacuation from the Tartus by naval vessels. Indications suggest that two Russian cargo ships, Sparta and Ursa Major, could be involved in the operation. It could take over a week for them to reach the port
The Pokrovsk direction, once known as the Avdiivka direction, remains one of the most active and difficult areas. After failing to seize the town directly, as in Novohrodivka, Russian forces pushed towards south of the town, creating an increasingly dangerous situation.🧵Thread
2/ The fall of Selydove has allowed Russian forces to advance south of Pokrovsk, opening a path to Shevchenko, a key settlement before the town itself. With this vital position now almost lost, Russian forces can now expand to the south of Pokrovsk.
3/ A particularly bad development reported to our team is the growing Russian effort to target supply routes leading to Pokrovsk with FPV drones. Ground reports to our team confirm that russians have successfully deployed FPV drones with fiber-optic cables along the E-50 highway
Famous YouTuber @johnnywharris, with 6 million followers, released a video titled "Why People Blame America for the War in Ukraine." He presented his argument in it, essentially blaming the West for causing Russia's imperialistic rise. I find it necessary to respond🧵:
2/ In essence, Johnny claims that after the USSR collapse, Russia was excluded from Western society and draws parallels to the treatment of Weimar Germany under the Treaty of Versailles, suggesting that an unjust settlement fueled militarization in both cases
3/ So, what's wrong with that vision? First, shortly after the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia engaged in conflicts and created pro-Russian pseudo-states, a scenario it later replicated in Ukraine in 2014. Specific examples include Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 1992–1993.
With Russia's budget deficit at 3.3 trillion rubles, 21% key interest rate and 2-3 million job vacancies, Russia has to choose between hyperinflation or an economic freeze, says Vladimir Milov, former Deputy Minister of Energy in an interview with Frontelligence Insight
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2/ Vladimir Milov (@v_milov), an economist and longtime ally of Alexei Navalny, explains that Russian markets are gloomy ahead of the Central Bank’s board meeting on Dec 20. The Bank is expected to raise interest rates once again, from the current 21%, possibly to 23% or even 25%
3/ For Central Bank to continue interest rate hikes means to kill the real sector of the economy, where most companies simply don't have sufficient profitability to borrow at current interest rates (Central Bank's 21% rate translates into 25-30% commercial loan rates)
Overnight, Ukraine carried out a series of missile strikes on Khalino Airbase in Kursk Oblast, reportedly using ATACMS missiles. Here’s what we can anticipate based on previous data gathered by Frontelligence Insight:
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2/ In recent months, the airfield had been spotted to home SU-25 close air support jets, helicopters, and UAVs.
3/ For some time, the airfield hasn’t been heavily utilized by Russia in the same way as other air bases. Instead, it has primarily hosted helicopters and Su-25 for close-air support, rather than for KAB deployments like those conducted from bases in Voronezh or Lipetsk.
Gallup, the famous analytics firm known for its public opinion polls, recently released a study titled "Half of Ukrainians Want Quick, Negotiated End to War." The data might sound controversial, with many citing the headline without delving deeper into the survey. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to the latest survey, conducted in August and October 2024, an average of 52% of Ukrainians now favor a swift, negotiated resolution to the war. This a notable increase from 2023, when only 27% expressed this sentiment, reflecting a 25% increase in just one year
3/ At first glance, it might seem as though Ukrainians are giving up. However, the phrase "negotiated end to the war" is ambiguous: many, including myself, want peace and negotiations, but without capitulation. This nuance becomes clearer in the follow-up question of the poll.