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Feb 21 15 tweets 4 min read Read on X
What are Russian forces currently doing in Belarus? How has the Belarusian army evolved since 2022? Is another invasion from Belarus imminent? Rochan Consulting, in collaboration with Frontelligence Insight, answers these key questions.

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2/ The Belarusian Forces have not significantly changed since the invasion. Modernization is slow, with no notable increase in personnel. Minsk's aggressive rhetoric contrasts with its defensive posture. However, there have been some important changes.
3/ Belarusians conducted brigade-level drills, which had never occurred previously. More importantly, in September 2023, Minsk launched the first-ever bilateral exercise when they placed one operational command against the other Image
4/ Belarus Armed Forces now have a three-tier structure. The first includes operational forces (regular army), the second is Territorial Defence Forces (TDF), and the last is People's Militia.
5/ Сall-ups via SMS were introduced. Previously, a call-up was to be delivered by post or a courier. Now, troops are mobilized almost instantly, significantly increasing the country's mobilization readiness.
6/ The 2024 budget brought an additional BYN 0.7 billion increase to the armed forces spending, which means that their budget has increased by 350% since 2018 and 200% since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Image
7/ In early January 2024, Radio Svaboda confirmed a military camp construction near Gomel. Satellite imagery analysis suggests that the construction is unfinished and is unlikely to have a significant impact, with the primary site at the moment covering a mere 650 square meters Image
8/ While Wagner PMC still trains with the Belarusian Armed Forces, their primary focus is on joint exercises with Belarusian Internal Troops. They work on enhancing the force's capacity for missions like storming buildings, sniper operations, first aid, and explosives handling Image
9/ The overall Wagner presence in the country significantly dropped by 2024. Satellite imagery comparison reveals a significant reduction in the size of Wagner's camp in Tsel, where Prigozhin and multiple Wagner commanders temporarily stayed before being assassinated in Russia. Image
10/ Regular Russian troop presence in Belarus is limited, with Moscow maintaining a modest air presence. Two S-400 battalions, supplemented by Pantsir-S1 units, are positioned in Southern Belarus at the Prybytki and Velikii Bokov air bases. Image
11/ The Belarusian Forces is a mobilization force. They maintain 4 mechanized brigades, each fielding 5 battalions (3 mechanized and 2 tanks). Yet, the peacetime posture of these formations means that they are only manned in 30-40% and mobilization would be needed.
12/ Equipment fielded is still mostly of Soviet legacy, and although some efforts have been made in recent years to field modern samples, such as modernized T-72s, S-400s, Iskanders, or Su-30SMs, the armed forces are largely obsolete. Image
13/ As a result, the probability of Belarus directly entering the war against Ukraine is currently low. However, as Minsk is capable of applying pressure on NATO's eastern flank through hybrid activities, shifts within the Belarusian Armed Forces require close observations.
14/ Currently, no evidence indicates preparations for an invasion of Ukraine from the North. The limited Russian presence in Belarus is insufficient to replicate the 2022 scenario. While this doesn't guarantee the situation won't change, any preparations would not go unnoticed.
15/ If you found this useful, please like and share the initial message in this thread, as our posts on Ukrainian topics are currently facing reduced visibility. Kindly follow us to stay updated

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More from @Tatarigami_UA

Feb 22
Given recent TAURUS and ATACMS missile developments for Ukraine, I would like to share useful insights previously available to our paid subscribers, explaining the importance of Ukraine's ability to target locations within Russia

🧵Thread (Kindly like, share, and follow): Image
2/ A previously abandoned farm in Ol'khovatka, Voronezh Oblast, near the Ukraine border, started to show some signs of activity in late July 2023. By the summer's end, it was fully occupied, with ammo crates filling the dugouts. In November imagery, the facility is still used Image
3/ The presence of ammunition packaging debris suggests that certain containers are opened and unpacked at this location. Image
Read 9 tweets
Feb 15
Key Points about Avdiivka Defense, covered in our recent analysis (full analysis available on the website listed in my bio).

Kindly like and share this thread, as our posts on Ukrainian topics are experiencing reduced visibility.

🧵Thread:Image
2/ Currently, Russian forces maintain a significant numerical advantage in both personnel and vehicles. Despite initial errors, high losses, and unrealistic expectations, they continuously replenish their troops with fresh recruits and preserve pressure
3/ Russian troops incurred substantial casualties, prompting the 25th Combined Arms Army to transfer equipment to the 2nd and 41st Combined Arms Armies for ongoing assaults. Image
Read 12 tweets
Feb 1
In late 2022 - early 2023, amid Ukrainian artillery shortages, Frontelligence Insight observed a pattern: Russian forces, due to limited Ukrainian counteraction, occupied stationary artillery positions for long periods. Our team now notes the resurgence of this pattern. 🧵Thread: Image
2/ In January, our team recorded 14 concentrations of artillery and enemy forces, echoing Spring 2023 observations. In this example, vehicle revetments were stocked with supplies and vehicles. We have monitored this specific operational site persisting for multiple weeks Image
3/ Importantly, this doesn't mean a total loss of Ukraine's counter-battery capabilities. Multiple OSINT projects consistently document Russian artillery losses. Nevertheless, the prevailing pattern highlights a present challenge of inadequate counter-battery fire.
Read 8 tweets
Jan 25
Frontelligence Insight tracked logistical routes between Russia and North Korea, calculated delivery numbers, and identified storage points. We are disclosing North Korea’s ammo transport ecosystem – and revealing some of its crucial nodes for the first time.

🧵Thread: Image
2/ Frontelligence Insight has estimated the number of ammunition deliveries between September and December to be approximately 1.57 million artillery shells, combining 152mm and 122mm ammo. Image
3/ Evident from recent imagery, since October 2023, 20 ft shipping containers filled with ammunition are loaded onto sea vessels at Raijin port (Rason) and shipped to Dunai port near Vladivostok in Russia’s far east. Image
Read 14 tweets
Jan 23
Latest on Avdiivka and Helicopters Operations. 🧵Thread

1/ By late 2023, Frontelligence Insight noted a stabilized situation in Avdiivka. However, recent developments have worsened the situation for Ukrainian troops, especially in the southern residential area Image
2/ While the northern part of Avdiivka is shielded by the AKHZ (industrial buildings), the southern area is comprised of one to two-story houses susceptible to artillery fire. If unable to capture the area, russians erase it with artillery, deploy infantry, and seize the rubble.
3/ The visible artillery strikes, moving from the outskirts to residential areas, indicate the shift. Eventually, the damage makes defense challenging. The same problem extends to nearby multi-story apartment buildings targeted by previous Russian FAB hits. Image
Read 9 tweets
Jan 9
Geospatial Analysis: Railroad Construction on Occupied Territories. 🧵Updated Thread:

1/ Frontelligence Insight examined satellite imagery of railroad constructions in occupied territories, specifically south of Donetsk and in Mariupol. Here is what we know: Image
2/Burne - Malovodne branch

To enhance logistics between Russia, Donetsk, and Mariupol, Russians are actively constructing a new railroad branch to the south of Donetsk. This branch aims to bypass a risky section of the frontline near Mariinka and Vuhledar. Image
3/ The new branch starts in the village of Burne and links up with the existing railroad at Malovodne. Based on satellite imagery, significant progress is evident in the construction of this railroad branch, making our team believe that it might be completed in 2024. Image
Read 13 tweets

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