Thread by @edenhofer_jacob

Delighted to have co-authored (with O. Edenhofer, @mkalkuhl, and @CeciliaK07 (@PIK_Climate)) this essay on the geopolitics of the green transition.
While the essay is in German, I'll summarise our key arguments in English - in the hope of reaching a broader audience. 1/n

https://twitter.com/journal_amosin/status/1760346721542906228

We develop a theoretical framework for examining the geopolitical consequences of decarbonisation. We do so by, first, documenting 3 stylised facts — one well-known, the other two less so.
1⃣Geopolitics is increasingly shaped by the competition between democracies and ... 2/n

autocracies. This (👆) is partly a result of the economic growth some autocracies - notably China - have experienced since 2000.
2⃣ Autocracies - especially the MENA monarchies - are much more dependent on fossil resource rents than democracies. For autocracies ... 3/n

fossil resource rents account, on average, for close to 15% of GDP, whereas they make up less than 4% for democracies.
3⃣ Stringent climate policy will devalue these rents (👇) and, given 2, hit autocracies much harder than democracies.
@GunnarLuderer's graph is ... 4/n

based on @PIK_Climate's REMIND model and shows how oil and gas consumption will likely to evolve up until 2045 if the EU were to achieve its climate targets. Incidentally, this also implies that the Green Deal will effectively turn the EU into ...

5/npik-potsdam.de/en/institute/d…

a demand cartel, which will siphon off autocracies' fossil resource rents. This (👇) graph by @NB_pik rams this point home quite forcefully.
This raises the question: how will autocracies respond to the threat of declining resource rents as a result of climate policy? 6/n

This brings us to our framework, which focuses on two parameters: the size of autocracies' winning coalition (Mesquita et al.) and their supply chain position (whether or not they control chokepoints).
▶️ The smaller the winning coalition, the easier it is to privatise ... 7/n

the costs of aggression and to socialise its cost (see Jackson & Morelli). Hence, smaller winning coalitions entail greater incentives for aggression cp.
▶️While the size of the w. coalition determines whether or not to engage in aggression, a ...

8/naeaweb.org/articles?id=10…

country's supply chain position determines the type of aggression (military, trade wars, etc.) it will resort to. This is the key insight of the weaponised interdependence lit (@henryfarrell + @ANewman_forward).
Autocracies' threat potential is greatest when ...9/n

their winning coalition is small and they control chokepoints. Responding robustly to this type aggression is difficult for democracies because doing so comes with concentrated cost (e.g. Russian gas embargo's cost for energy-intensive industry in Germany), while the ... 10/n

benefits (e.g. more credible deterrence in the future) are diffuse and not very visible.
I'll conclude with a caveat: This is just a conceptual framework; the next step will be to formalise and operationalise it. Yet, I hope that our framework will contribute to ... 11/n

a better understanding of the geopolitical risks created by the green transition. This is critical if we are to avoid the kind of strategic insouciance that has characterised the foreign, trade, and defence policies of many European countries in the past three decades. 12/END

Perhaps of interest to: @ChFlachsland, @adannenberg11, @fgenovese__, @JoschkaWanner, @MSchularick, @Ch_Trebesch, @fetzert , @mjfeist, @KClausing, @COdendahl, @Copela1492, @fuecks, @pleh_mann, @infornomics

@DanielSpiro1 - I meant to tag you, but forgot - apologies.

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