80 seconds is neither consistent with a computer controlled electronic countermeasures system nor with Russian friendly fire incident as Buk, S-300, S-350, and S-400 missile travel to between Mach 6.7 to Mach 7 within their engagement envelope.
2/
We saw flares in the video, but it is certain that radar chaff was also released, but was unseen in the dark.
As a 5V28 missile of the S-200/SA-5 has a radar signature rivaling a Mig-25 Foxbat.
This extended A-50 countermeasures release _is_ consistent with a S-200 3/
...engagement with radar warning receiver blaring at a VKS pilot that a 5N62M SQUARE PAIR was in its initial fine tracking to get accurate range and angle for a Mach 3 missile at over 250 km.
4/
The A-50 crew would start toggling expendable countermeasures when SQUARE PAIR radar dropped range finding modulation into pure 'monochromatic' carrier wave illumination.
The full S-200 engagement sequence is at the link ⬇️
By way of comparison, the Late Cold War era EF-111A Ravens and EA-6B Prowler's had the S-200/SA-5's measure during Operation El Dorado Canyon in 1986.
Could there be something else going on here?
8/
Air Power Australia reported that the S-200 was exported to Belarus, Uzbekistan, Bulgaria, the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, India, North Korea, Libya, Syria, and more recently Iran.
...were available for the S-300PMU2 Favorit / SA-20 Gargoyle & S-400 Triumf / SA-21 to control the S-200 Vega/SA-5 Gammon and its 5N62 Square Pair engagement radar so the latter would only illuminate/update the 5V28 missile.
See⬇️
11/
Given that Ukraine has been provided Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS) Engagement Operations Center (EOC) from the USA.
It's likely IAMD was plugged into the SQUARE PAIR for an illumination/uplink only kill.
THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium Bombers in the ETO
MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION
First Edition 3 November 1945
Second Edition January 1947
You find both mission failures & gross errors were "excluded data" 2/
And that both increased altitude and the number of combat boxes involved made CEP worse.
>>This is essentially a complete tactical bomber cell in a box, sized for a small mobile drone team operating at brigade level or below. It is not a strategic deep-strike weapon, and it is not pretending to be one.
I've spent the last few hours reposting my 2022 to date take down's of Alex Vershinin's "Truck beer math" (from the Nov. 2021 War on the Rocks article "Feeding the Bear") which I used to review this Tochnyi article⬇️
TLDR: Tochnyi screwed up & used Vershinin's disproven work. 1/
Specifically this bit stating Russian trucks did three trips a day because they spent one hour loading and one hour unloading trucks.
That is, like Alex Vershinin, they assumed mechanized logistics loading times with pallets & forklifts⬇️
2/
This is Alex Vershinin's truck "Beer Math" for comparison.
It assumes 45 miles vice 50 km, but both show the same mirror imaging of Western mechanized logistics on Red/Russian Army non-mechanized logistics.