80 seconds is neither consistent with a computer controlled electronic countermeasures system nor with Russian friendly fire incident as Buk, S-300, S-350, and S-400 missile travel to between Mach 6.7 to Mach 7 within their engagement envelope.
2/
We saw flares in the video, but it is certain that radar chaff was also released, but was unseen in the dark.
As a 5V28 missile of the S-200/SA-5 has a radar signature rivaling a Mig-25 Foxbat.
This extended A-50 countermeasures release _is_ consistent with a S-200 3/
...engagement with radar warning receiver blaring at a VKS pilot that a 5N62M SQUARE PAIR was in its initial fine tracking to get accurate range and angle for a Mach 3 missile at over 250 km.
4/
The A-50 crew would start toggling expendable countermeasures when SQUARE PAIR radar dropped range finding modulation into pure 'monochromatic' carrier wave illumination.
The full S-200 engagement sequence is at the link ⬇️
By way of comparison, the Late Cold War era EF-111A Ravens and EA-6B Prowler's had the S-200/SA-5's measure during Operation El Dorado Canyon in 1986.
Could there be something else going on here?
8/
Air Power Australia reported that the S-200 was exported to Belarus, Uzbekistan, Bulgaria, the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, India, North Korea, Libya, Syria, and more recently Iran.
...were available for the S-300PMU2 Favorit / SA-20 Gargoyle & S-400 Triumf / SA-21 to control the S-200 Vega/SA-5 Gammon and its 5N62 Square Pair engagement radar so the latter would only illuminate/update the 5V28 missile.
See⬇️
11/
Given that Ukraine has been provided Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS) Engagement Operations Center (EOC) from the USA.
It's likely IAMD was plugged into the SQUARE PAIR for an illumination/uplink only kill.
The arrival of the Ukrainian Gogol-M, a 20-foot span fixed-wing aerial drone mothership, with over a 200km radius of action while carrying a payload of two 30km ranged attack drones under its wings, underlines the impact of low level airspace as a drone "avenue of approach."
2/
The Gogol-M flys low and slow, below ground based radar coverage like a helicopter.
It opens up headquarters, ground & air logistics in the operational depths to artificial intelligence aided FPV drone attacks.
This is the main example of one of the most unprofessional delusions held by the US Navalist wing of the F-35 Big/Expensive/Few platform and missile cult.
Russian fiber optic FPV's have a range of 50km - over the horizon!
Drones simply don't have ground line of sight issues like soldiers do.
Drones can see in more of the electromagnetic spectrum than humans.
And the US Army refuses to buy enough small drones (1 m +) to train their troops to survive on the drone dominated battlefield.🤢🤮
2/3
"Just send a drone" is the proper tactic for almost everything a 21st century infantryman does from patrolling, raiding enemy positions, sniping and setting up forward observation posts.
3/3
The odds are heavily in favor of the IDF having parked Hermes drones with "Gorgon Stare" technology over Tehran to hunt Iranian senior government officials.