Pasi Paroinen Profile picture
Feb 25 27 tweets 6 min read Read on X
Two years of Russian invasion of Ukraine. This is an overview thread on the situation at the front and deployment of UkrAF and RuAF forces as of 24th FEB 2024. Attached is high resolution image of our Order of Battle tracking map. Zoom in for more detail. 1/ Image
Ukrainian forces along the frontline are organized in three “Operational-Strategic Group of Forces” (OGS): Odessa (O), Tavriya (T) and Khortytsia (K). 2/ Image
OSG Odessa is tasked with conducting raids and harassment across the Dnipro River and prevention of Russian incursions in its area of operations (AO) stretching roughly between cities of Odessa and Zaporizhzhia. 3/
OSG Odessa has roughly 11-12 Brigades = equivalent of approximately four divisions (as depicted in the map attached to tweet#2). Most of these are light infantry forces (TDF and NG) reinforced by four Marine Brigades). 4/
OSG Tavriya’s AO is roughly between the cities of Zaporizhzhia and Horlivka. On its AO there are currently four different directions with ongoing heavy battles: Tokmak-Orikhiv, Velyka Novosilka, Novomykhailivka – Marinka and Avdiivka. 5/
OSG Tavriya has approximately 35-40 maneuver brigades + artillery units. Roughly 11-12 “division equivalents”. Ukrainian reserves are difficult to estimate, but likely consist of 3-4 brigades and resting elements from units deployed to the frontlines. 6/
OSG Khortytsia’s AO spans the rest of the active frontline roughly from the City of Horlivka to Kupiansk and likely includes the rest of Kharkiv Oblast. Here the current hotspots are Bakhmut, Kreminna-Lyman and Kupiansk axes. 7/
OSG Khortysia has approximately 42-52 maneuver brigades or roughly 14-17 “division equivalents”. It also likely has the most reserves, albeit likely consisting of units recovering and refitting for previous frontline deployments. 8/
Russian forces are divided into four OSGs: “Dnepr”, “East“, “Centre” and “West”. They are further divided into roughly 10 army sized operational groupings. 9/
Dnepr OSG is currently the strongest of the Russian OSGs with approximately 12-13 division equivalents. It is further divided into 18th Army grouping facing the Dnipro River and 58th Army Grouping on Zaporizhzhia direction. 10/
18thArmy grouping has two principal maneuver divisions: 70th MRD and 104th Air Assault Division which are currently concentrated against the Krynky bridgehead. Additionally, there are plethora of various brigades and territorial motor rifle regiments. 11/
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Quality of the most Russian forces deployed along the Dnipro River is at best questionable, but there is considerable quantity of reserves which could be deployed on other sections of frontline, should it be necessary. 12/
On the southern front Russia has the 58th Army OG facing Zaporizhzhia – Orikhiv with strong concentration of forces: two VDV divisions (7thand 76th) and two motor rifle divisions (19th and 42nd). 58th OG is approximately 5-6 division equivalents in total. 13/
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“East” or “Eastern” OSG has strong 5th Army OG facing Velyka Novosilka and a weaker 35th Army grouping near Polohy. Altogether 5-6 division equivalents. 127th MRD represents the East OSGs principal maneuver force, currently engaged near Velyka Novosilka. 14/
“Centre OSG has approximately 17-19 division equivalents, divided into three operational groupings: The 8th Army grouping currently engaged in Novomykhailivka – Marinka sector, one grouping around Avdiivka and one engaged in Bakhmut. 15/
The 8thArmy OG has approximately 3-4 division equivalents, with elements from 20thGMRD and 150th MRD making up the bulk of the fighting force in this sector. Avdiivka grouping equates to roughly 5-6 division equivalents 16/
And Bakhmut OG has 7-8. In the Bakhmut AO the bulk of Russian forces are composed of elements from two VDV airborne divisions (98th and 106th), both of which have recently received a third regiment in addition to their original two. 17/
“West” OSG is likewise divided into three operational groupings: 20th Army on Kreminna-Lyman axis, 1st Guards Tank Army (1GTA) on Svatove-Verkhnia Duvanka sector and the 6th Army on Kupiansk axis. In total it has 13-14 division equivalents. 18/
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I already did an earlier thread on 1 GTA’s deployment and posture: I wont go much further into them here, other than to point out that it is possible that some elements of the 1GTA are being redeployed on Lyman axis. 19/
The 20th Army grouping is one of the hardest to assess accurately. The Kreminna-Lyman axis in general seems to be highly crowded with various units, some possibly being redeployed elsewhere and others coming in as mentioned above. 20/
Bulk of Russian forces in this sector are from the 3rd, 67th and 144thMotor Rifle Divisions. With elements from 2nd GMRD and 47th GTD possibly being sent in to reinforce them (low confidence). 21/
6thArmy grouping is one of the weakest, with principal maneuver formations of 21st and 138th motor rifle brigades backed up by multiple territorial motor rifle regiments. I will be returning to each AO in greater detail at some point in the near future. 22/
I will finally wrap this thread up with some disclaimers and mentions: all units on the maps marked with “In reserve” as well as all higher headquarters are placed with readability in mind and do not represent actual accurate locations of these forces. 23/
All Ukrainian frontline units are based on geolocated footage and are mostly sourced from @Geoconfirmed. Same goes for all Russian units with timestamps without (*). All timestamps with one or more asterisks (*) are from secondary sources like CDS or Mashovets. 24/
I have also relied heavily on work done by @UAControlMap. In general, I have attempted to use data only from the past three months (DEC23-FEB24). The maps are very much a work in progress and likely have some units missing. 25/
@UAControlMap Finally, I would like to thank @wihurinrahasto whose funding has made compiling the presented data possible. Follow the rest of our team on @Black_BirdGroup and our frontline situation map can be found here: 26/26scribblemaps.com/maps/view/The-…
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More from @Inkvisiit

Feb 13
A short thread on Kupiansk sector and the disposition of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (1GTA). Between 19-28JAN24 Russian forces from the 1GTA managed to capture the villages of Krokhmal'ne and Tabaivka. 1/ Image
The offensive seems to have been local and opportunistic in nature, with several UkrAF 103rd TDF Bde positions being overrun by assaulting elements from RuAF 47th Guards Tank Division (47GTD) 2/
Russians were able to seriously threaten UkrAF positions around the village of Berestove and Kyslivka-Kotlyarivka, but it seems that at least for the time being RuAF forces have been unable to further exploit their initial success. 3/
Read 17 tweets
Feb 8
It has been tough couple of weeks. General situation on the frontline seems to be deteriorating around Avdiivka and northern Luhansk. Velyka Novosilka sector been activating and Novomykhailivka not faring particularly well either. 1/
And then there is the mobilization deadlock and manpower&munitions crisis coupled with the military-political command crisis in Kyiv. Latter seems to be resolving now, at least publicly, but there may be unforseen consequences and shocks throughout the UKR armed forces. 2/
Timing for all this to go down could not be worse, especially since the command crisis has clearly been gaining momentum ever since the summer offensive failed. A lot will depend on Russian ability to exploit this situation and we should expect them to try within coming weeks. 3/
Read 5 tweets
Jul 31, 2023
We have decided to release a series of full satellite images used to construct this thread, since at this point they are nearly five months old (13MAR23) and could be useful for geolocation as well as providing some transparency on the methods used in the original analysis. 1/
The series in question is particularly relevant at this moment, since this area has seen some of the fiercest fighting over the past few months as Ukrainian forces have been trying to bypass the Russian held village of Robotyne from the east. 2/ Image
However, as you can see from the images themselves, this area had very few points of interest and was at the time when the images were taken very lightly fortified. This was likely due to the area being a seam or "gap" between two Russian frontline regimental groups. 3/
Read 15 tweets
Jun 23, 2023
Back on May 8th I posted the thread on the Russian defences around Kopani – Robotyne - Tokmak axis. Quite frankly I did not quite expect the way it captured attention of the people and the amount of discussion it generated. 1/
I know that I also promised a tactical operational analysis on later date. A promise which I did not keep for two reasons: I was burned out and I was also beginning to increasingly spot certain subtle sings that, contrary to my earlier expectations Ukraine was in fact going to 2/
conduct some sort of offensive on this sector despite the apparent formidability of Russian defences. Since the Ukrainian counter offensive in the south has now been going on for the past three or so weeks, I feel more safe 3/
Read 25 tweets
May 8, 2023
1/ Thread: Analysis of Russian defensive network and field fortifications on Kopani-Robotyne-Tokmak sector of the Zaporizhzhia front. This analysis was done using Sentinel Hub EO imagery and commercially available very high-resolution satellite imagery by Airbus DS Pléiades Neo. Image
2/ Russian defenses have been constructed along dominant heights and ridgelines. Defenses have been established at depth of 25-30km from Russian forward line of friendly troops (FLOT) all the way to the city of Tokmak. Image
3/ There are several distinct layers or defensive zones. Zone 1: first 3-4km from the RuFLOT is the forward security zone consisting of individual squad or platoon outposts and individual company strongpoints. Image
Read 19 tweets
Jan 30, 2023
30.1.2023 Ketju: Ajatuksia Ukrainan sodan tämänhetkisestä tilanteesta ja kuluneesta sotavuodesta. Tämä ketju toiminee todennäköisesti alustuksena sarjalle pohdintoja erilaisista sotaan liittyvistä aiheista, ilmiöistä ja tapahtumista. 1/
Aloitan aluksi pahoittelemalla viimeaikojen hiljaisuuttani twitter-rintamalla. Erinäiset opintoihini liittyvät velvoitteet rajoittavat käytettävissäni olevaa aikaa ja ennen kaikkea henkisiä resursseja sekä rajallista keskittymiskykyäni. 2/
Olen kuitenkin jatkanut edelleen tiivistä yhteistyötä @J_JHelin, @emilkastehelmi, @EerikMatero et. al. -tiimissä ja seuraamme jatkuvasti tilanteen kehitystä Ukrainassa. Pyrin omalta osaltani ylläpitämään tiimin sisäistä tilannekuvaa joukkojen siirroista ja sijainneista. 3/
Read 38 tweets

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