Playing the International Security System: How does Russia purchase sanctioned components from Taiwan and the US?
Our team has accessed documents obtained by the hacktivist group "Cyber Resistance" and has analyzed the data. Here are key points and select documents. 🧵Thread
2/ Frontelligence Insight concluded that the Russian company "Special Technology Center," which produces drones for the Russian military, indirectly buys equipment from Keysight Technologies, an American corporation, and MPI Corporation, a Taiwanese company. This is how we know:
3/ The "Special Technology Center," abbreviated as STC, is a Russian company specializing in the production of technological equipment, notably the Orlan-10 UAV and Leer-3 drone-based electronic warfare system for the Russian army
4/ This company has been sanctioned by many countries and can be located both in the sanction list of Ukraine and the US:
5/ Despite sanctions, STC acquires equipment from both American and Taiwanese sources through intermediary companies that obscure the original buyer. Thanks to the documents, we now know their names.
6/ The key person in the deliveries was the procurement manager of the Special Technology Center - Andrei Florinskiy. According to documents, he received 3 commercial proposals for the supply of parts from KeySight. The proposals came from Dipaul, Radioline, and Ritm
7/ It seems that one of these entities, named "Radioline," has previously made agreements with the Special Technology Center for the procurement of Keysight equipment, as indicated in these separate documents:
8/ One of the documents has drawn our attention to the lead engineer of Radioline, Mikhail Mulminov, who has previously received contracts with this Special Technology Center. The conducted research has uncovered some concerning details.
9/ On the website of Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University, Mikhail Mulminov is recognized as a regional representative of Keysight Technologies, the American company from which the sanctioned company is seeking to procure equipment.
10/ In this photograph, Mikhail Mulminov is standing alongside equipment with the Keysight Technologies logo during a lecture at another university, providing additional evidence of his association with Keysight Technologies.
11/ His face visually aligns with his profile picture on the popular Russian social network "VK."
It is unclear whether he is still employed with Keysight Technologies and what his current connection to the company is. Nevertheless, it creates numerous concerns.
12/ It remains unclear whether Russian company “Radioline” directly purchased equipment for the sanctioned STC from Keysight Technologies or utilized another third party in between.
13/ The emails also suggest that Radioline is not the sole company tasked with acquiring Western technology for the Special Technology Center. It has also entered into an agreement with Protech, with CEO Denis Nikolaevich Koval, to acquire Western equipment, including Keysight.
14/ Russians also try to broaden their search beyond Western avenues, which is why, unsurprisingly, the sanctioned STC company made an agreement with Akmetron, a distribution company that imports Taiwanese dual-use technology from MPI Corporation into Russia.
15/ Headquartered in Taiwan, MPI Corporation specializes in producing semiconductors and various technological items. According to intercepted documents, a procurement contract for an MPI TS150 Probe Station was granted, totaling $154,700.
16/ Earlier this year, @InformNapalm, a volunteer community, also scrutinized some of these documents, publishing a compelling and detailed investigation on the Russian Special Technological Center LLC's procurement of equipment from European and Chinese companies
17/ Addressing this problem requires a multi-step approach, including sectoral sanctions, robust monitoring, and enforcement. Halting the supply of dual-use goods to Russia is a more cost-efficient strategy than the prolongation of the war.
18/ If you want to read the complete article, feel free to visit our website, as provided in my bio.
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The latest satellite images show 3 major developments: a large Russian troop buildup in Bryansk Oblast, damage from recent drone strikes in Kyiv, and unusual military activities at Taiwan’s Wangan Airport.
All three have one thing in common - they were generated by AI. 🧵Thread:
2/ While those who regularly work with satellite imagery or OSINT can quickly tell that something is "off," the quality of AI-generated satellite images is improving fast. As the number of convincing fakes grows, I've put together a few recommendations to help avoid being misled
3/ In the case of the "Kyiv attack," it took just a single prompt on a free platform to generate the image. While it appears convincing at first glance, a closer look reveals clear geometric irregularities - distorted car shapes, and irregular windows and balconies on buildings
A drone attack is ongoing against Russian airbases with strategic bombers. While the full damage is still unclear, several videos show multiple bombers have been badly hit. Satellite images from yesterday confirm that Belaya hosts various Tu-95 models, Tu-22M3s, and Tu-160s
Satellite imagery of Olenya Airbase from May 26 at 09:50 UTC, shared by @avivector , shows the presence of 11 Tu-95MS (Bear-H), 5 An-12 (Cub), and 40 Tu-22M3 (Backfire-C) aircraft.
Another suspected target is Belaya Airbase. Satellite images from May 31, analysed by @avivector , show the presence of 7 Tu-160 (Blackjack), 6 Tu-95MS (Bear-H), 2 Il-78M (Midas), 6 An-26, 2 An-12, 39 Tu-22M3, and 30 MiG-31 aircraft.
Over the past few months, Russians have focused on disrupting Ukrainian logistics, using a mix of drones, including fiber-optic. Once EW is neutralized or forced to withdraw by fiber-optic drones, it clears the way for drones like the Molniya, which can fly over 20 km. Thread:
2/ Cutting off supply lines has made vehicle transport nearly impossible. In some cases, individual soldiers must walk more than 10 km at night to deliver basic supplies: an unsustainable way for supporting any sizable unit, or even rotating troops.
3/ Despite growing logistical problems, Ukrainian command has made bad choices to launch Russian-modelled assaults. The attempt to capture positions while already struggling to hold current ones, with fewer troops and less equipment, lead to predictably poor outcome
Through the Optics of War: An analysis of leaked confidential data from Russia’s military-industrial complex by Frontelligence Insight — from thermal scopes and laser anti-UAV programs to Chinese import schemes and production bottlenecks in the optoelectronic sector. 🧵Thread:
2/ Rostec is a state-owned conglomerate that includes much of Russia’s military-industrial complex. One of its key holdings, Shvabe, specializes in optical-electronic technologies for military and dual-use applications. The original files were obtained by the @256CyberAssault
3/ In February 2024, Polyus Scientific Research Institute, part of Shvabe Holding, was tasked with advancing laser technologies to counter UAVs. This includes developing materials like active elements under a program focused on high-power lasers, running through 2033.
How bad is Russia’s war chest? Has the country entered stagflation? Why does it fear falling oil prices, but not a crash? And how is the tariff war hurting Russia?
These questions — and more — are explored in a special interview with Russian economist Vladimir Milov.
🧵Thread:
2/ Tariff wars:
China’s economic slowdown has closed its market to many Russian products, hitting major industries hard. The China-focused Russian coal industry is struggling, and Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels
3/ Tariff war will obviously exacerbate the Chinese slowdown. The slower Chinese growth, the less market for Russian goods. Share of China in the total Russian exports is as high as a third now - we're heavily dependent on this market and its well-being.
1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.
2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.
3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war