Playing the International Security System: How does Russia purchase sanctioned components from Taiwan and the US?
Our team has accessed documents obtained by the hacktivist group "Cyber Resistance" and has analyzed the data. Here are key points and select documents. 🧵Thread
2/ Frontelligence Insight concluded that the Russian company "Special Technology Center," which produces drones for the Russian military, indirectly buys equipment from Keysight Technologies, an American corporation, and MPI Corporation, a Taiwanese company. This is how we know:
3/ The "Special Technology Center," abbreviated as STC, is a Russian company specializing in the production of technological equipment, notably the Orlan-10 UAV and Leer-3 drone-based electronic warfare system for the Russian army
4/ This company has been sanctioned by many countries and can be located both in the sanction list of Ukraine and the US:
5/ Despite sanctions, STC acquires equipment from both American and Taiwanese sources through intermediary companies that obscure the original buyer. Thanks to the documents, we now know their names.
6/ The key person in the deliveries was the procurement manager of the Special Technology Center - Andrei Florinskiy. According to documents, he received 3 commercial proposals for the supply of parts from KeySight. The proposals came from Dipaul, Radioline, and Ritm
7/ It seems that one of these entities, named "Radioline," has previously made agreements with the Special Technology Center for the procurement of Keysight equipment, as indicated in these separate documents:
8/ One of the documents has drawn our attention to the lead engineer of Radioline, Mikhail Mulminov, who has previously received contracts with this Special Technology Center. The conducted research has uncovered some concerning details.
9/ On the website of Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University, Mikhail Mulminov is recognized as a regional representative of Keysight Technologies, the American company from which the sanctioned company is seeking to procure equipment.
10/ In this photograph, Mikhail Mulminov is standing alongside equipment with the Keysight Technologies logo during a lecture at another university, providing additional evidence of his association with Keysight Technologies.
11/ His face visually aligns with his profile picture on the popular Russian social network "VK."
It is unclear whether he is still employed with Keysight Technologies and what his current connection to the company is. Nevertheless, it creates numerous concerns.
12/ It remains unclear whether Russian company “Radioline” directly purchased equipment for the sanctioned STC from Keysight Technologies or utilized another third party in between.
13/ The emails also suggest that Radioline is not the sole company tasked with acquiring Western technology for the Special Technology Center. It has also entered into an agreement with Protech, with CEO Denis Nikolaevich Koval, to acquire Western equipment, including Keysight.
14/ Russians also try to broaden their search beyond Western avenues, which is why, unsurprisingly, the sanctioned STC company made an agreement with Akmetron, a distribution company that imports Taiwanese dual-use technology from MPI Corporation into Russia.
15/ Headquartered in Taiwan, MPI Corporation specializes in producing semiconductors and various technological items. According to intercepted documents, a procurement contract for an MPI TS150 Probe Station was granted, totaling $154,700.
16/ Earlier this year, @InformNapalm, a volunteer community, also scrutinized some of these documents, publishing a compelling and detailed investigation on the Russian Special Technological Center LLC's procurement of equipment from European and Chinese companies
17/ Addressing this problem requires a multi-step approach, including sectoral sanctions, robust monitoring, and enforcement. Halting the supply of dual-use goods to Russia is a more cost-efficient strategy than the prolongation of the war.
18/ If you want to read the complete article, feel free to visit our website, as provided in my bio.
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When it comes to the AFU estimates of Russian losses, they're not far from reality, at least in 2026. Russia's own internal reporting indicates close to ~1,000 casualties per day on average, with roughly half or more being KIA (we classify most MIAs as KIA).
🧵Short thread:
2/ We think Ukraine's 2022-2023 reporting undermined the credibility of its figures. By 2026, however, its estimates are much closer to reality. Ukraine's reported RU personnel losses generally align with the combined Russian KIA, WIA, and MIA totals, usually within 10-20% margin
3/ In some cases we've observed a 30-35% gap between Russian reporting and Ukraine's official figures. However, when averaged over year, the overall picture aligns more closely. It's not perfect, but for a belligerent party reporting enemy loss, it's quite accurate
Ukraine has just struck multiple Wildberries logistics hubs. One of them, in St. Petersburg, is engulfed in flames, disrupting Russia's second-largest city.
Here's one of Russia's largest 24/7 news websites (auto-translated). This is the virtual reality many Russians live in.
2/ The only mention of the attack is a brief report claiming that drones were shot down. Here's the auto-translated version:
The crisis in Crimea continues, with conditions worsening. After Crimea's occupation head, Sergey Aksyonov, claimed steps were being taken to address the situation in a recent Telegram post, hundreds of locals flooded the comments, challenging his narrative. 🧵Translations:
2/ "Please, just do something! Have you forgotten about northern Crimea? Have you abandoned the people? Soon people will be starving, and we are already close to breaking down! At least say something! Declare an evacuation, do anything at all! This is not life, this is suffering"
3/ "I wonder if Aksyonov (governor) would be willing to bring his family and come stay with us in Dzhankoy, sitting through the complete blackout that has already lasted a week, while telling us to hold on until mid-August."
The situation in Crimea is becoming critical. As authorities remain largely silent, residents are flooding the Telegram channel of the head of Crimea with complaints about power outages, communication disruptions, fuel shortages, and water supply issues. Thread with translations:
1/ "Why is gasoline so expensive? It's twice the price compared to the mainland! Are people here supposed to be twice as rich or something? 😳"
2/ "The city of Dzhankoy has been without electricity for more than 24 hours. If the situation does not improve in the near future, a collective complaint will be drafted and sent to Moscow tomorrow."
The grooming of Orban's regime as a Trojan horse inside the EU and NATO is no longer speculative: it's now evidence-based, confirmed by leaked Budapest-Moscow communications. Agentstvo reports that roughly half of all Russian embassy staff maintain ties to intelligence services:
2/ The EU officially identifies Russia as one of its primary security threats. Yet Orban has been systematically distancing Hungary from both the EU and NATO, deteriorating relations with neighbors including Ukraine, while growing increasingly reliant on Russian influence.
3/ Moscow has no genuine interest in Hungary itself, or in the country's long-term wellbeing. What it wants is a lever - to undermine EU institutions, erode European support for Ukraine, and seed distrust between member states toward one of their own EU members and NATO allies
There’s been a lot of discussion about the potential threat FPV drones could pose to US forces on the ground, with some going as far as claiming that American troops would suffer heavy casualties from FPV drones. That’s possible, but it’s also worth questioning the assumptions:
2/ First, it’s not clear to what extent Iran has actually trained and prepared its ground forces for large-scale use of small drones. Even relatively decentralized militaries still operate within ORBAT and logistics. So far, there isn’t strong evidence of systemic changes within the Iranian army to support widespread FPV deployment.
3/ Second, we’ve seen relatively little FPV usage from Iran-supported groups like Hamas or Hezbollah, despite continuous war with Israel. A few examples have emerged from Iraq, but we’re talking about a handful of videos at most. That’s not a level of a large-scale implementation