Playing the International Security System: How does Russia purchase sanctioned components from Taiwan and the US?
Our team has accessed documents obtained by the hacktivist group "Cyber Resistance" and has analyzed the data. Here are key points and select documents. 🧵Thread
2/ Frontelligence Insight concluded that the Russian company "Special Technology Center," which produces drones for the Russian military, indirectly buys equipment from Keysight Technologies, an American corporation, and MPI Corporation, a Taiwanese company. This is how we know:
3/ The "Special Technology Center," abbreviated as STC, is a Russian company specializing in the production of technological equipment, notably the Orlan-10 UAV and Leer-3 drone-based electronic warfare system for the Russian army
4/ This company has been sanctioned by many countries and can be located both in the sanction list of Ukraine and the US:
5/ Despite sanctions, STC acquires equipment from both American and Taiwanese sources through intermediary companies that obscure the original buyer. Thanks to the documents, we now know their names.
6/ The key person in the deliveries was the procurement manager of the Special Technology Center - Andrei Florinskiy. According to documents, he received 3 commercial proposals for the supply of parts from KeySight. The proposals came from Dipaul, Radioline, and Ritm
7/ It seems that one of these entities, named "Radioline," has previously made agreements with the Special Technology Center for the procurement of Keysight equipment, as indicated in these separate documents:
8/ One of the documents has drawn our attention to the lead engineer of Radioline, Mikhail Mulminov, who has previously received contracts with this Special Technology Center. The conducted research has uncovered some concerning details.
9/ On the website of Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University, Mikhail Mulminov is recognized as a regional representative of Keysight Technologies, the American company from which the sanctioned company is seeking to procure equipment.
10/ In this photograph, Mikhail Mulminov is standing alongside equipment with the Keysight Technologies logo during a lecture at another university, providing additional evidence of his association with Keysight Technologies.
11/ His face visually aligns with his profile picture on the popular Russian social network "VK."
It is unclear whether he is still employed with Keysight Technologies and what his current connection to the company is. Nevertheless, it creates numerous concerns.
12/ It remains unclear whether Russian company “Radioline” directly purchased equipment for the sanctioned STC from Keysight Technologies or utilized another third party in between.
13/ The emails also suggest that Radioline is not the sole company tasked with acquiring Western technology for the Special Technology Center. It has also entered into an agreement with Protech, with CEO Denis Nikolaevich Koval, to acquire Western equipment, including Keysight.
14/ Russians also try to broaden their search beyond Western avenues, which is why, unsurprisingly, the sanctioned STC company made an agreement with Akmetron, a distribution company that imports Taiwanese dual-use technology from MPI Corporation into Russia.
15/ Headquartered in Taiwan, MPI Corporation specializes in producing semiconductors and various technological items. According to intercepted documents, a procurement contract for an MPI TS150 Probe Station was granted, totaling $154,700.
16/ Earlier this year, @InformNapalm, a volunteer community, also scrutinized some of these documents, publishing a compelling and detailed investigation on the Russian Special Technological Center LLC's procurement of equipment from European and Chinese companies
17/ Addressing this problem requires a multi-step approach, including sectoral sanctions, robust monitoring, and enforcement. Halting the supply of dual-use goods to Russia is a more cost-efficient strategy than the prolongation of the war.
18/ If you want to read the complete article, feel free to visit our website, as provided in my bio.
If you would like to see more of these investigations, consider supporting us through BuyMeaCoffee, as our expenses rely solely on your public support.buymeacoffee.com/frontelligence
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One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.
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2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement.
Kursk Offensive: A Preliminary Assessment by Frontelligence Insight.
A condensed version of report for X. 🧵Thread:
1/ With Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Sudzha, the operation is clearly approaching its conclusion though it is not yet entirely over.
2/ To assess the operation, not in isolation, but within the broader context of the war, we broke down the Kursk operation into 3 key questions: whether its geopolitical objectives were met, whether the attrition rate was favorable, and whether it achieved battlefield success
3/ To determine equipment attrition, we analyzed data from OSINT analyst @naalsio26, who tracks losses across multiple frontlines. Our graphs show losses from August to March but are not exhaustive, as they exclude some retreat-related losses. The cut-off date was March 10.
Frontelligence Insight Special Report: AWOL Trends and Casualty Ratios in Russia and Ukraine
In assessing overall manpower casualty ratios, we analyzed Russian AWOL figures alongside Ukrainian estimates, factoring in KIA, MIA, and recruitment rates to assess the war’s prospects
2/ Thanks to @InformNapalm, a Ukrainian OSINT community, we analyzed a screenshot of a Russian presentation slide detailing desertion numbers. The percentage and corresponding figures allowed us to calculate the total number of AWOL cases across all Russian military districts.
3/ As shown in the translated graph, the Southern MD has the highest number of desertion cases. This is unsurprising, as it includes the former 1st and 2nd Army Corps (now the 51st and 3rd CAAs), which are largely composed of forcibly mobilized residents from occupied territories
One of the most critical yet unresolved questions of this war is the true impact of drone attacks inside Russia. Our team has been working with media organizations and volunteers to tackle this. But finding the answer isn’t easy, and we need your support. Here’s how you can help:
2/ The simplest and most effective way to support our investigation is through donations. This helps cover essential expenses like satellite imagery, expert analysis, and time. You can donate via BuyMeaCoffee:
3/ We’re also looking for volunteers to assess the damage, particularly those with expertise in damage surveys, industrial building damage assessments, and the oil and gas industry: especially in evaluating potential refinery damage. Feel free to contact us at
frontel@proton.me
As we move into the second month of the year, Frontelligence Insight has prepared an early assessment report covering recent developments on the frontlines and within both Ukrainian and Russian military forces. Below are some key highlights from the report. 1/ 🧵Thread:
2/ The frontline dynamics for Ukraine remain challenging, with setbacks in Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Kupyansk, and Toretsk. While leadership is working to address organizational and recruitment issues, it will take time for these changes to be implemented and impact the battlefield.
3/ Russian forces are facing high losses, with tens of thousands of AWOL cases and a significant depletion of armored vehicles, which are being replaced by civilian transport. Nevertheless, they continue advancing in areas where Ukrainian defenses are stretched with few people