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Feb 26 19 tweets 5 min read Read on X
Playing the International Security System: How does Russia purchase sanctioned components from Taiwan and the US?

Our team has accessed documents obtained by the hacktivist group "Cyber Resistance" and has analyzed the data. Here are key points and select documents. 🧵ThreadImage
2/ Frontelligence Insight concluded that the Russian company "Special Technology Center," which produces drones for the Russian military, indirectly buys equipment from Keysight Technologies, an American corporation, and MPI Corporation, a Taiwanese company. This is how we know:
3/ The "Special Technology Center," abbreviated as STC, is a Russian company specializing in the production of technological equipment, notably the Orlan-10 UAV and Leer-3 drone-based electronic warfare system for the Russian army
4/ This company has been sanctioned by many countries and can be located both in the sanction list of Ukraine and the US: Image
5/ Despite sanctions, STC acquires equipment from both American and Taiwanese sources through intermediary companies that obscure the original buyer. Thanks to the documents, we now know their names. Image
6/ The key person in the deliveries was the procurement manager of the Special Technology Center - Andrei Florinskiy. According to documents, he received 3 commercial proposals for the supply of parts from KeySight. The proposals came from Dipaul, Radioline, and RitmImage
7/ It seems that one of these entities, named "Radioline," has previously made agreements with the Special Technology Center for the procurement of Keysight equipment, as indicated in these separate documents: Image
8/ One of the documents has drawn our attention to the lead engineer of Radioline, Mikhail Mulminov, who has previously received contracts with this Special Technology Center. The conducted research has uncovered some concerning details.Image
9/ On the website of Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University, Mikhail Mulminov is recognized as a regional representative of Keysight Technologies, the American company from which the sanctioned company is seeking to procure equipment.Image
10/ In this photograph, Mikhail Mulminov is standing alongside equipment with the Keysight Technologies logo during a lecture at another university, providing additional evidence of his association with Keysight Technologies. Image
11/ His face visually aligns with his profile picture on the popular Russian social network "VK."
It is unclear whether he is still employed with Keysight Technologies and what his current connection to the company is. Nevertheless, it creates numerous concerns. Image
12/ It remains unclear whether Russian company “Radioline” directly purchased equipment for the sanctioned STC from Keysight Technologies or utilized another third party in between.
13/ The emails also suggest that Radioline is not the sole company tasked with acquiring Western technology for the Special Technology Center. It has also entered into an agreement with Protech, with CEO Denis Nikolaevich Koval, to acquire Western equipment, including Keysight. Image
14/ Russians also try to broaden their search beyond Western avenues, which is why, unsurprisingly, the sanctioned STC company made an agreement with Akmetron, a distribution company that imports Taiwanese dual-use technology from MPI Corporation into Russia. Image
15/ Headquartered in Taiwan, MPI Corporation specializes in producing semiconductors and various technological items. According to intercepted documents, a procurement contract for an MPI TS150 Probe Station was granted, totaling $154,700. Image
16/ Earlier this year, @InformNapalm, a volunteer community, also scrutinized some of these documents, publishing a compelling and detailed investigation on the Russian Special Technological Center LLC's procurement of equipment from European and Chinese companies
17/ Addressing this problem requires a multi-step approach, including sectoral sanctions, robust monitoring, and enforcement. Halting the supply of dual-use goods to Russia is a more cost-efficient strategy than the prolongation of the war.
18/ If you want to read the complete article, feel free to visit our website, as provided in my bio.

If you would like to see more of these investigations, consider supporting us through BuyMeaCoffee, as our expenses rely solely on your public support.buymeacoffee.com/frontelligence
19/ Thank you for reading. Don't forget to like and share the initial message in the thread for maximum visibility!

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More from @Tatarigami_UA

Feb 22
Given recent TAURUS and ATACMS missile developments for Ukraine, I would like to share useful insights previously available to our paid subscribers, explaining the importance of Ukraine's ability to target locations within Russia

🧵Thread (Kindly like, share, and follow): Image
2/ A previously abandoned farm in Ol'khovatka, Voronezh Oblast, near the Ukraine border, started to show some signs of activity in late July 2023. By the summer's end, it was fully occupied, with ammo crates filling the dugouts. In November imagery, the facility is still used Image
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Kindly like, share, and follow.

🧵ThreadImage
2/ The Belarusian Forces have not significantly changed since the invasion. Modernization is slow, with no notable increase in personnel. Minsk's aggressive rhetoric contrasts with its defensive posture. However, there have been some important changes.
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Feb 15
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Kindly like and share this thread, as our posts on Ukrainian topics are experiencing reduced visibility.

🧵Thread:Image
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Feb 1
In late 2022 - early 2023, amid Ukrainian artillery shortages, Frontelligence Insight observed a pattern: Russian forces, due to limited Ukrainian counteraction, occupied stationary artillery positions for long periods. Our team now notes the resurgence of this pattern. 🧵Thread: Image
2/ In January, our team recorded 14 concentrations of artillery and enemy forces, echoing Spring 2023 observations. In this example, vehicle revetments were stocked with supplies and vehicles. We have monitored this specific operational site persisting for multiple weeks Image
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🧵Thread: Image
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Jan 23
Latest on Avdiivka and Helicopters Operations. 🧵Thread

1/ By late 2023, Frontelligence Insight noted a stabilized situation in Avdiivka. However, recent developments have worsened the situation for Ukrainian troops, especially in the southern residential area Image
2/ While the northern part of Avdiivka is shielded by the AKHZ (industrial buildings), the southern area is comprised of one to two-story houses susceptible to artillery fire. If unable to capture the area, russians erase it with artillery, deploy infantry, and seize the rubble.
3/ The visible artillery strikes, moving from the outskirts to residential areas, indicate the shift. Eventually, the damage makes defense challenging. The same problem extends to nearby multi-story apartment buildings targeted by previous Russian FAB hits. Image
Read 9 tweets

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