A chart that illustrates how it is fundamentally impossible for China to construct a block centered around the developing world that replaces the US/ EU ...
there is an obvious problem, namely the size of China's surplus
Here is the same chart without China -- it looks totally different. That's the point.
Note one other thing: the big deficits are in India and Turkey.
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That is a real problem for a Sinocentric block that aims to replace the US and Europe as a source of end demand. India is absolutely not prepared to run bigger deficits with China -- and Turkey really needs to bring its deficit down.
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India, remember, didn't join China's trade deal (unlike say Japan ... ) and is exceptionally worried that Chinese exports are undermining its own manufacturing sector. Turkey competes with China in the EU market and isn't gonna give up the EU for China ...
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The bigger point of course is that the world cannot really decouple so long as there are enormous surpluses and deficits across different parts of the global economy (and different political blocks)
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This point is I think obvious to @michaelxpettis, me/ & others who think about "global" demand and supply imbalances. But it is not at all intuitive to the world of trade and commercial diplomacy -- and to my surprise no longer obvious to the "it's all fiscal" IMF!
@michaelxpettis ps i think the goods data tells the story more cleanly/ with fewer distortions than the broader data showing the current account (note I don't trust the Chinese current account number & current account data is more distorted by tax). But the CA numbers say the same thing
@littlebigfis and BoP based thinking is a lost art -- sadly, even at the IMF, where the norm is now "it is all fiscal" ...
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Have the tariffs reduced the trade deficit? The answer is actually not obvious ...
The headline data misleads because of massive swings in the pharmaceuticals balance and the gold balance
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If you look at goods trade net of pharma and gold, imports are down a bit from earlier in the year (consistent with a tariff impact) but the base earlier in the year was inflated by a bit of front running
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Recent monthly deficits (last data point is July, August will likely be down but this calculation takes the detailed data) are running a bit below last year in recent months -- but the YTD numbers are still driven by q1 (front running)
One of the arguments I made at last week's Federal Reserve (Board +FRBNY) Conference on the international role of the dollar is that the dollar's share of reserves gets too much attention, and the absolute stock of reserve holdings gets too little ...
1/many
Central banks did add a bit to their Euro holdings in dollar terms (or rather, they didn't sell euros just because the euro rose against the dollar in q2). But the bigger story is that dollar holdings are basically constant ...
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There has been essentially no flow from foreign central banks/ reserve managers into dollars in the last year plus -- and global reserve growth has also stalled ...
A simple explanation of the changes that China made back in 2021 might help others understand the issue, and why many people (even some at the IMF) question the size of China's reported current account surplus. 1/
The adjustments made to the data lowered the "BoP" goods surplus relative to the customs balance --
it though is easy to replicate the old methodology and report what the surplus would be absent the new "survey" rather than customs based methodology
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This methodological shift is lowering the reported surplus by about $250b (over a pp of GDP) relative to what it would be with an unchanged BoP methodology. And the reasons why the new approach has generated a lower number haven't really been explained 3/
Saudi Arabia's balance of payments break even oil price is now in the 90s. With oil in the 60s, a large current account deficit should now be baked into the calculations of the desert kingdom
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The reasons for the deficit are well known: new cities in the desert don't come chief, and the PIF is spending a lot on other projects as well ...
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Don't tell President Trump as he seems to expect hundreds of billions if not trillions of gold plated investment will be coming in from the Gulf --
Saudi outward investment has slowed as borrowing covers the current account
A junior (BoP) analyst question -- how does the renewed rise in foreign asset accumulation by the state banks relate to the reported current account surplus?
a: it increased, as more reported outflows implies a higher surplus if reported errors needs to be zero
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Another junior BoP analyst question: why is the fall in reported errors (hot money outflows) correlated with the fall in reported FDI inflows -- with both collapsing in 2022?
One of the (many) annoying things about China's new (after 2021) balance of payments data is that the adjustment relative to the underlying customs and services data isn't constant. The q2 reported surplus even tho the underlying customs data showed a bigger surplus
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That gap had shrunk in q3 and q4 of last year, and in q1 -- but it widened again in q2 (see the chart below)
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Or, put differently, the gap between the surplus implied by the underlying data (which has long tracked the customs surplus plus the tourism deficit) is about as big as the underlying surplus -- annualized both are around $500b