A chart that illustrates how it is fundamentally impossible for China to construct a block centered around the developing world that replaces the US/ EU ...
there is an obvious problem, namely the size of China's surplus
Here is the same chart without China -- it looks totally different. That's the point.
Note one other thing: the big deficits are in India and Turkey.
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That is a real problem for a Sinocentric block that aims to replace the US and Europe as a source of end demand. India is absolutely not prepared to run bigger deficits with China -- and Turkey really needs to bring its deficit down.
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India, remember, didn't join China's trade deal (unlike say Japan ... ) and is exceptionally worried that Chinese exports are undermining its own manufacturing sector. Turkey competes with China in the EU market and isn't gonna give up the EU for China ...
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The bigger point of course is that the world cannot really decouple so long as there are enormous surpluses and deficits across different parts of the global economy (and different political blocks)
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This point is I think obvious to @michaelxpettis, me/ & others who think about "global" demand and supply imbalances. But it is not at all intuitive to the world of trade and commercial diplomacy -- and to my surprise no longer obvious to the "it's all fiscal" IMF!
@michaelxpettis ps i think the goods data tells the story more cleanly/ with fewer distortions than the broader data showing the current account (note I don't trust the Chinese current account number & current account data is more distorted by tax). But the CA numbers say the same thing
@littlebigfis and BoP based thinking is a lost art -- sadly, even at the IMF, where the norm is now "it is all fiscal" ...
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Chinese state banks were buying fx to keep the CNY at the fix during the second quarter; with China now intervening to hold the CNY down (v the USD) it would not be hard to engineer a stronger yuan ...
Apart from a brief period in q1 when the market feared China would respond to Trump tariffs with a CNY depreciation, fx settlement has been positive since September --indicating that China's state actors are generally pushing the CNY down.
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China can also guide the yuan stronger through a series of stronger fixes -- as the yuan starts to appreciation, exporters tend to convert dollars back into yuan, adding to the underlying pressure
According to the WSJ, the "transshipment" provisions will in reality be rules of origin that limited embedded Chinese content --
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This potentially matters quite a lot, as the primary impact of the tariffs on China to date have been a reallocation of the point of final assembly inside Asia -- so rising imports from the ASEAN countries and the NIEs (Korea, Taiwan)
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This is obvious in a graph showing the bilateral trade deficits with different parts of Asia. The initial trade war led to a reallocation of the deficit away from China -- not a reduction in the overall deficit with "manufacturing" Asia
China's seemingly inexorable march toward a $1.2 trillion goods surplus (customs data) continues.
The July monthly surplus was a bit below $100b, but still up about $15 billion compared to July 2024.
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Higher US tariffs are having an impact on bilateral trade (the US and Chinese data agree on the trend tho not the level of trade) ...
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China tho has made up for the fall in direct exports to the US through increased indirect exports (parts to Asia for final assembly for the US market) and higher direct exports to the EU ...
Lots of folks (including the FT!) seem puzzled by the broad strength of Chinese exports so far this year --
The answer tho seems easy. China's real exchange rate has fallen by at least 15% over the last couple of years -- giving China's exports a big boost
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. @sobel_mark has a good piece today for OMFIF making the case that an appreciation of the yuan is a necessary component of any global effort to bring China's surplus down. I of course agree
@sobel_mark A bit technical, but there is now overwhelming evidence that China has resumed intervention to limit the yuan's APPRECIATION. The rise in settlement when the yuan is at the center point of the band is part of the story, as is the general increase in the SCB's foreign assets
One by product of Trump's obsession with bilateral trade deficits is that it has brought attention to the big deficits the US runs with pharmaceutical exporting tax centers ...
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The deficit in pharmaceuticals is now big ($200b, ~ 1/6th the total deficit ...) and 1/2 of that is with Ireland alone ... (hence the bigger bilateral deficit with Ireland than with Germany this year)
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Switzerland and Singapore are also big suppliers of patent protected meds to the US market (Switzerland = mostly EU/ Swiss companies; Singapore is more like Ireland ... Pfizer has a big tax center there )