All eyes on #Putin speech and #Transnistria today.
But something else is happening in Moscow:
+10 Palestinian groups - including #Hamas & Islamic Jihad (PIJ) - are hosted by Russia for mediation talks.
What's #Russia up to? How's it linked to #Ukraine? And can it succeed? 🧵/1
The intra-Palestinian meeting in Moscow has precedent
Russia's hosted such meetings in the past, most recently Feb 2019
Russia has long lamented the US' "monopolization" of the peace process & tried to carve out a niche for itself: mediating among the disunited Palestinians/2
That Hamas & PIJ sit at the table is also no surprise:
Russia has never declared either a terrorist organization
#Hamas delegations have frequented Moscow since 2006
Since Oct 7, Hamas reps have been to Moscow 3x - this will be the 4th visit - a slap into #Israel's face /3
Why is Russia hosting this meeting now?
First, this is a continuation of #Russia's pro-Palestinian posturing since Oct 7.
Russia's slowness and reluctance to call out Hamas' terrorism broke with historical precedent, as I showed here: /4
Since Oct 7, Russia has:
-accused the West of double standards re: #Ukraine vs. #Gaza
-postured as the defender of Palestinians at the UN
thereby tapping into powerful grievances over Gaza worldwide & cynically exploiting the war for its own ends: /5nytimes.com/2023/10/26/opi…
The temptation to exploit anti-Western sentiments over #Gaza has been so powerful that Russia has been willing to sacrifice its (once good) relations w/#Israel
These relations have been very rocky since Oct 7 & we probably haven't reached the bottom: /6
Second, #Russia is hosting the intra-Palestinian meeting to stay relevant in the unfolding regional diplomacy.
The US has been highly active (toward ceasefire, hostage release deal, "day after") - at the highest level - and Russia doesn't want to cede the scene entirely. /7
But what can Russia achieve?
The Palestinian reps now in Moscow are senior (Mousa Abu Marzouk for #Hamas, Azzam al-Ahmad for #Fatah etc.), but they're not the key decision-makers.
Also, Russia's not hosting this at the highest level - Deputy FM Bogdanov is involved... /8
...but there won't be any meeting with #Putin.
Clearly, this is not a Russian priority.
Russia also lacks leverage. At the last intra-Palestinian mtg, Russia failed to get the groups to a joint declaration
It can't offer the Palestinians econ. incentives (unlike Saudi/UAE) /9
That said, Moscow's doing sth. no one else can/wants to do: bring Hamas & PIJ - the #Iran-backed groups - to the table
Some Arab media also rumored that the resignation of Palestinian PM Shtayyeh earlier this week might have been timed so as to give the Moscow talks a chance /10
I doubt that.
Still, #Russia says the talks aim at reaching a *general agreement* on the formation of a unified Palestinian technocratic government
But even if they succeed: #Israel's made clear that any Palestinian entity containing elements of Hamas/PIJ is simply a no-go. /11
What does the region think?
The Arab states - criticising the US for its one-sided backing of #Israel & long agonising over the US' purported unreliability as an ally - welcome a greater Russian & Chinese role in regional diplomacy. As a matter of rhetoric. /12
But when push comes to shove, all eyes are on Washington
In my various engagements with interlocutors from the Gulf/Egypt recently, no one is seriously looking toward Moscow to diffuse tensions
And Israel will likely reject any Russian mediation role toward the "day after" /13
Where does this leave us?
#Russia will continue -without spending much pol. capital- to signal its backing for the Palestinians
But more importantly: whatever diplomatic processes materialize (Israel-Palestinian or regional), Russia will have the back of #Iran & its partners/14
As @HamidRezaAz & I just argued, in light of its war against #Ukraine, Russia "will try to throw wrenches into any coming diplomatic efforts that would smell of American success or would seek to sideline the axis of resistance."
US/UK strikes against the #Houthis – what’s #Russia’s game?
Russia has called an urgent meeting of the UNSC & its MFA spox called the strikes a “perversion of UNSC resolutions & complete disregard for international law”
But what's happened is not against Russian interests
A🧵
As the situation heated up in the #RedSea in recent weeks, Russia has been quite defensive of the #Houthis:
It criticized the US' Operation Prosperity Guardian, while somewhat shielding the Houthis on the UN Security Council (on Dec 19 and Jan 3). /2
#Russia abstained from Security Council resolution 2722 that was adopted just days ago, but not without trying to force in amendments (including language suggesting that the #GazaWar was cause for the #Houthi attacks)
/3press.un.org/en/2024/sc1556…
My latest research report - "Dangerous Decline" - looks at the future of #Russia's military & security influence across the Global South (arms sales, Wagner/PMCs, other military activities) & the implications for the United States.
1) Russia’s pivot to the Global South will intensify. Anticipating a long-term, systemic confrontation with Western states, Russia is prioritizing its power projection into the Global South, expecting economic, coercive, deterrent, and political benefits. /2
2) Russian arms sales: Overall down but not out.
Russia will likely remain active in niche areas:
-servicing big legacy customers (India);
-selling lower-end defense goods to sub-Saharan Africa;
-exporting military drones;
-supplying weapons to states hostile to the US /3
On balance, I still believe #Russia stands to gain more than to lose from a protracted conflict in #IsraelGaza.
But there are risks & vulnerabilities, as became clear yesterday, when an antisemitic mob stormed the #Makhachkala airport in Dagestan, looking for Jews.
A 🧵
On the "Russia gains" side, Moscow benefits from a protracted conflict in #Gaza in 3 ways, as I just argued in @nytopinion:
-for its ambitions in #Ukraine,
-for its own designs for the MidEast &
-most importantly, for its war of narratives w/the West: /2nytimes.com/2023/10/26/opi…
On the risk side, there is the domestic level:
The Russian state has long tried to keep extremism in the predominantly Muslim N Caucasus in check, often using violent means & suppression.
It has proudly advertised a purported inter-ethnic & inter-faith harmony in #Russia /3
#Russia has not labeled last weekend's attacks on Israel by #Hamas "terrorism".
This is noteworthy and stands in contrast to Russian statements during the Second Intifada and the 2014 #Gaza War.
A🧵with some history 👇
Through the various rounds of violence in #Israel-#Palestine, Russian official statements have usually:
-stressed the need for a comprehensive peace process on the basis of Madrid
-called for an end of violence
-expressed concern over use of excessive military means by Israel /2
Still, #Russia was not shy to use the "terrorist" label.
Amid the Second Intifada, #Putin repeatedly stated that #Israel was facing "terrorism" and that "there should be no negotiations with terrorists"
What do we know?
What can we say about #Russia's role and cost-benefit assessment regarding this situation?
A 🧵
1) #Russia-#Hamas relations are active and go way back. Moscow only recently hosted a Hamas delegation
Russia's also been active in intra-Palestinian mediation, trying to carve out a niche for itself on the peace process. The Russian Academy of Sciences has played a role here /1
2) #Russia-#Iran relations have been expanding and changing qualitatively, with significant implications for: