My latest Occasional Paper @JamesMartinCNS looks at "Russia, The Global South and Multilateral Nuclear Diplomacy after the Invasion of Ukraine"



It shows how #Russia's war had a detrimental impact across the multilateral nuclear negotiating forums.
🧵/1nonproliferation.org/wp-content/upl… It's based on a year-long project funded by the Stanton Foundation. I observed proceedings at the IAEA & NPT and interviewed ca. 20 diplomats from the Global South

Main points:
1) The war paralyzed & politicized processes at the IAEA, UN First Committee and at NPT meetings..
/2

Yesterday, the US State Department formally accused #Russia of using chemical weapons (CW) against Ukraine, violating the Chemical Weapons Convention.

It also said Russia had used riot control agents as a method of warfare in #Ukraine.


🧵/1state.gov/imposing-new-m… The US statement says that "the use of such chemicals is not an isolated incident, and is probably driven by Russian forces’ desire to dislodge Ukrainian forces from fortified positions and achieve tactical gains on the battlefield”.
/2

#Einfrieren

Wir haben das ja mal in einem anderen Krieg gesehen, in dem #Russland auch meinte, die größeren Interessen und den längeren Atem (uns ggü.) zu haben:

Syrien, 2017-2018

Das Einfrieren hielt nicht lange und war für die Syrer katastrophal.

Kurzer historischer🧵/1 #Russland stimmte dem (teilweisen) Einfrieren des Krieges in Syrien im Mai 2017 zu und es wurden im Astana-Prozess dann 4 "Deeskalationszonen" eingerichtet:

In Ost Ghuta, Homs, Daraa und Idlib, allesamt Hochburgen der syrischen Opposition /2

"Putin zündelt auch im Nahen Osten" - mein neuster Gastbeitrag für @zeitonline

Da leider hinter der Paywall, hier die Hauptargumente 👇🧵/1

zeit.de/politik/auslan… #Russland ordnet heute seine gesamte Außenpolitik einem einzigen Thema unter: der Konfrontation mit dem Westen.

Das sieht man auch im Nahen Osten, anhand dreier Beispiele:
-Syrien
-Iran u. sein Atomprogramm
-Gaza-Krieg

/2

All eyes on #Putin speech and #Transnistria today.

But something else is happening in Moscow:
+10 Palestinian groups - including #Hamas & Islamic Jihad (PIJ) - are hosted by Russia for mediation talks.

What's #Russia up to? How's it linked to #Ukraine? And can it succeed? 🧵/1 The intra-Palestinian meeting in Moscow has precedent

Russia's hosted such meetings in the past, most recently Feb 2019

Russia has long lamented the US' "monopolization" of the peace process & tried to carve out a niche for itself: mediating among the disunited Palestinians/2

US/UK strikes against the #Houthis – what’s #Russia’s game?

Russia has called an urgent meeting of the UNSC & its MFA spox called the strikes a “perversion of UNSC resolutions & complete disregard for international law”

But what's happened is not against Russian interests
A🧵 As the situation heated up in the #RedSea in recent weeks, Russia has been quite defensive of the #Houthis:

It criticized the US' Operation Prosperity Guardian, while somewhat shielding the Houthis on the UN Security Council (on Dec 19 and Jan 3). /2

My latest research report - "Dangerous Decline" - looks at the future of #Russia's military & security influence across the Global South (arms sales, Wagner/PMCs, other military activities) & the implications for the United States.


5 key take-aways:🧵nonproliferation.org/wp-content/upl… 1) Russia’s pivot to the Global South will intensify. Anticipating a long-term, systemic confrontation with Western states, Russia is prioritizing its power projection into the Global South, expecting economic, coercive, deterrent, and political benefits. /2

On balance, I still believe #Russia stands to gain more than to lose from a protracted conflict in #IsraelGaza.

But there are risks & vulnerabilities, as became clear yesterday, when an antisemitic mob stormed the #Makhachkala airport in Dagestan, looking for Jews.

A 🧵 On the "Russia gains" side, Moscow benefits from a protracted conflict in #Gaza in 3 ways, as I just argued in @nytopinion:
-for its ambitions in #Ukraine,
-for its own designs for the MidEast &
-most importantly, for its war of narratives w/the West: /2nytimes.com/2023/10/26/opi…

#Russia has not labeled last weekend's attacks on Israel by #Hamas "terrorism".

This is noteworthy and stands in contrast to Russian statements during the Second Intifada and the 2014 #Gaza War.

A🧵with some history 👇 Through the various rounds of violence in #Israel-#Palestine, Russian official statements have usually:
-stressed the need for a comprehensive peace process on the basis of Madrid
-called for an end of violence
-expressed concern over use of excessive military means by Israel /2

#Russia-#Hamas
#HamasAttackOnIsrael

What do we know?
What can we say about #Russia's role and cost-benefit assessment regarding this situation?

A 🧵 1) #Russia-#Hamas relations are active and go way back. Moscow only recently hosted a Hamas delegation

Russia's also been active in intra-Palestinian mediation, trying to carve out a niche for itself on the peace process. The Russian Academy of Sciences has played a role here /1

10 yrs ago today -on Aug 21, 2013- the Syrian regime used chemical weapons (CW) against its people in #EasternGhouta.

#Syria has yet to be held to account for its CW attacks & for its retention of CW.

But #Russia is trying to remove the issue from the international agenda (1/) Initially, there was cooperation between #Russia, the U.S. & others in the disarmament of #Syria's declared CW after the Eastern Ghouta attack.

@JobyWarrick offers the most comprehensive & compelling account of that disarmament operation in his non-fiction book “Red Line” (2/)

The predominant take on this platform is that yesterday's events revealed #Putin's weakness & vulnerability. The beginning of the end of his regime.

I think that's premature.

After all, Putin came out on top & there is so much we don't know about what exactly went down. (1/4) It's conceivable that the corrosion of his rule is in motion. And more importantly, that the process will continue.

But there's also the possibility that the immense dysfunctionality of the system we observed yday can prove quite durable & not become dangerous to #Putin. (2/4)

I don't think I've ever seen the Russian strategic community engage in such intense public debate over nuclear use as over the past 1 week.

Here a summary of all contributions, for those who missed it:

(Others, feel free to add pieces I left out to this thread!) 1) Sergey Karaganov, 13.06.2023, "A Difficult but Necessary Decision"
eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/a-dif…

Last yr #UkraineWar became the organizing principle of Russian foreign policy

➡️7 trends
1 Full turn to non-West
2 China’s junior partner
3 Less leverage vis middle powers
4 Struggle in the neighbourhood
5 Russia MFA sidelined
6 Wagner normalized
7 End of compartmentalization
🧵 1. Full turn to the non-West:
Judging its break with the West to be total & irreversible, Russia's leadership has intensified its (pre-existing) turn to #MENA, #Africa, #LATAM, #Asia-Pacific.

Shunned & sanctioned, Russia needs to make up for losses wherever it can... (2/22)

At Conference of Disarmament in Geneva yday, #Russia slightly more conciliatory on #NewSTART:

-"Important" that treaty continues to operate
-This fact means its parties "share an understanding of the risks emanating from a situation of strategic uncertainty and unpredictability" -#NewSTART "keeps a window of opportunity open" for continued dialogue on strategic stability, with a focus on developing a possible agreement to replace it.

#Russian reactions to the #Leopard2 going to #Ukraine.

An OPEN THREAD 🧵 /1 RUS embassy in Germany: The decision will bring “permanent escalation”, “battle tanks with German crosses will again be sent to the ‘eastern front’ which will inevitably lead to the deaths of not only Russian soldiers, but also the civilian population” aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/25…

Not making headlines, the @OPCW Executive Council is in session this week.

Despite zero progress in clarification on the #Navalny poisoning - with #Russia issuing denials & accusations - #Western states seem to have decided NOT to up the ante vis-a-vis Russia at this time..(1/5) ... unlike some have called for @StrickerNonpro: fdd.org/analysis/2022/…

Looking at statements issued at the Council this week, many - US, UK, Finland, Romania, Latvia, Germany, etc - recall #Navalny poisoning & bemoan lack of #Russian cooperation to date,...(2/5)

On #OPEC cuts: Narrative that "Saudi is screwing us (i.e. West) on oil" is part of the problem - as seen by many in the #MiddleEast.
They resent expectation that #Saudi "should help" keep prices low to a) mitigate fallout of #RussiaUkraineWar & b) cater to US domestic politics. We may disagree, but do well to understand where they're coming from more broadly:

Since Feb, a reluctance in Gulf capitals (& elsewhere in #MiddleEast) to take action "with" the West "against" Russia in #RussiaUkraineWar (join sanctions, pump more oil) has had multiple layers:

6 months into #Russia’s aggression against #Ukraine, there are mostly losers.

One potential winner is #Turkey, given 2nd-order effects of the war.

Since Feb, Ankara has gained some leverage vis-a-vis both #Russia and #NATO.

An attempt at a (complicated) balance sheet🧵(1/18) Since Feb, #Turkey has attempted a careful balancing act on #RussiaUkraineWar:
-No sanctions against #Russia
-No boycott of Russian #gas
-#Erdogan engaging #Putin frequently & visibly
-Giving #Ukraine #BayraktarTB2
-Invoking Montreux Convention

I could go on and on (2/18)

Yday, #Lavrov’s confirmation in #Cairo that #Russia seeks to “help the Ukrainian people to free themselves” from their regime gained - understandably -considerable attention in Western capitals.

But it might obscure other important aspects of #Lavrov’s visit to #Egypt. A 🧵1/14 There was much hype around #Putin meeting #Iranian & #Turkish leaders last week

But #Lavrov's engaged the Arabs extensively since Feb, visiting Algeria, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi. He also hosted other Arab FMs in Moscow

Now Egypt, where he also engaged the League of Arab States 2/14

The imperative that we must not waver in supporting #Ukraine is reinforced by a factor we often overlook in our #West-centric bubble:

#Russia is not isolated globally.

Pushing back against Russia thus 1) takes extra effort & 2) is of strategic importance beyond #Ukraine (1/11) For proof that #Russia is not isolated, look toward big parts of Asia, LatAm, Africa, Middle East. Voting patterns at #UNGA. Who hasn’t joint sanctions against #Russia. How media beyond the "West" reports on the war in #Ukraine. And most of all: Look at #China and #India. (2/11)